THE ECSTASY OF NOTHING

A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, REALITY, AND THE MODERN EXPERIENCE

by James Riordan - Waters

Second Edition

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Exit society, enter the world.

THE ECSTASY OF NOTHING

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FOREWORD to the First Edition

by Thomas Dylan Daniel

A year ago, a man read an essay. I had no idea, of course, until he reached out to me via social media and informed me that he'd enjoyed it immensely. We became friends, but when James Riordan-Waters began sending me snippets of his book I had an uncomfortable number of questions for him. His interest was clear: he wanted to publish a book he'd written. Moreover, he wanted to get it through the peer review process at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, where I served on the editorial board for philosophy and could have recommended it.

I hadn't read the whole book, but the snippets I'd seen provoked intense debate between myself and James; we even ceased speaking for a little while over it. The experience I'd had in the traditional publishing industry during the process of creating and publishing my book, *Formal Dialectics*, which is also a language-oriented text, had been brutal. I didn't think Jimmy's book was right for the process because it did not contain a bevy of logical proofs, references to other philosophers, and footnotes. It was, in a word, a philosophy book, and not an *analytical* philosophy book.

My initial reaction is a thing which I look back upon with a smile today, as does Jimmy. We have teamed up to improve the book, and we have circumvented the analytic philosophy strictures by creating our own publishing house, WIP Publishing. We're releasing this book, together, under this new independent label as a way of highlighting a basic fact: publishing needs to be more inclusive. The exclusivity model is

crushing creative diversity in the market, and worse, even the most talented writers whose works should easily merit publication are having a large amount of trouble navigating the market.

What we consider success for a writer today also represents a consistently lower bar for incentivization in literary compensation structures—the vast majority of writers will never earn a living from their writing unless something big changes.

The Ecstasy of Nothing

The Ecstasy of Nothing is a phenomenology text; that is, it is a book about an individual man's lived experience. This remarkable soul, our dear author, has experienced bizarre events in the course of his life which have colored his future experiences and modified his ability to engage with the world in subtle ways. In general, our society tends to be very cruel to people who fall outside of the bell curve and who qualify, therefore, as outliers. I myself fall into this category, afflicted as I may be by some amount of autism, and in my own experience none of this has been easy as a result. Being "on the spectrum" is a thing many of my more intelligent friends seem to wonder about just as I do, and to whatever extent I find myself handicapped, I certainly have my merits despite this apparent disability.

For Jimmy, the lived experience in question is a sort of openness which is radically related to psychosis, and a state of psychosis which was not as temporary as such things can tend to be. Fortunately for us all, Jimmy has emerged from this state, rather than worse for the wear, as something like a guru.

Many of the conclusions I present logical arguments for in *Formal Dialectics* and develop therein also appear in this book, under a different sort of light. The Ecstasy of Nothing is, after all, a book about the shortfall in modern language that *Formal Dialectics* also addressed. That is, both books address the tendency of language to assume its own completeness, or its own ability to build structures above and beyond itself. My views on these matters are exhaustively proven, from the standpoint of logic, in a text that is both difficult to read and expensive to procure.

I believe that Jimmy's work chronicles the same set of issues in a different way; where I focus intensively upon minutiae and work to create a recursive logic which ultimately does a highly postmodern and rather negative task by establishing a sort of set of limits for language, I see Jimmy's book as an attempt to do something completely different. Jimmy is more of a Robert Pirsig or Jean-Paul Sartre sort of figure in my mind, whereas I identify more with the likes of Albert Camus and Simone de Beauvoir, had they perhaps been a touch more analytical. The phenomenological side of the inability of language to speak of what must not be spoken of, or of what *cannot* be spoken of, is likely the more difficult side of the coin, not least because of the sorts of experiences that are required to produce a coherent account of an incoherent event. Jimmy's work here is to be commended at the highest levels for this reason.

Perhaps incoherent isn't quite the right word here, either. Subjectively, it seems that Jimmy has certainly gotten some sort of a handle on these things, but it is very difficult to utter the ineffable. Due to his obviously quite personal interest in these matters, our friend has managed something quite remarkable in the pages to follow.

The Will o' the Concept

Jimmy's book is a difficult read, but it is worth it. The prose is not always entirely clear, which has to do with the points the author is seeking to make rather than any sort of inability on his part. The brilliance of this work is in the utter novelty of the conceptual structure, which Jimmy has more or less brute-force calculated, not being as well-read as some writers are. His youth and strange experiences in life have necessitated this; and what he has to say is quite valuable despite being somewhat non-traditional.

For Jimmy, the concept of anarchy is the underlying motivator behind the piece—his experience was different than other people's experiences, and this stressful situation forced him into the difficult work of thinking through these issues, for the first time, on his own. In my experience, the university was a relatively two-faced institution: on the one hand, it's all about learning and creativity; but on the other it is a system of regrettable hierarchies which has neglected spirits such as my own, and such as Jimmy's. The most difficult thing for people in our position to understand is that the system is what has broken. We conquer our impostor's syndrome bit by bit and are frequently overwhelmed by it.

Despite the feelings of inadequacy which accompany the lack of a degree from a top-ranked university, feelings I understand and know that Jimmy does too, it is important to allow the pursuit of the matter at hand to express itself. When this expression takes place, the most wonderful things can follow. In this text, which seems to have been spun up out of a very personal and likely quite a difficult inquiry into the nature of concepts and rationality, we see a talented author struggle very deeply to push his lived experience away from the framework

of words and concepts that have failed to inform it effectively. The result is nothing short of spectacular. A resounding conclusion has resulted: confronting our most difficult truths is the source of substantial value in our lives!

Stoicism: A Mini-Critique

Jimmy's work in this book spins its way through a variety of complex and rewarding investigations, but ultimately it seems to boil down to a push. In my opinion, the reader is thoroughly persuaded that 1. concepts and definitions are more complex than they usually get credit for; 2. rationality is parsed away from the general prevailing attitude that life and what can be logically evaluated are somehow equivalent; and 3. individuals are free to use logic as well as phenomenological inquiry to become aware of their surroundings. The thread which runs against stoicism, here, is the idea of flow state.

In *Taoism*, students are encouraged to find the "way" of a given task. In Zen Buddhism, expertise is disregarded. Enlightenment needs no schooling—rather, what it requires is a focus upon one's surroundings, such that one becomes a part of them. Both the natural flow of the *Taoist* approach and the no-frills Zen approach push back against the dominant Western paradigm of Enlightenment, rationality, and what should probably be denoted as a particularly *lingual* sort of understanding—both of these Eastern religious views provide significant insight into what Jimmy has created in this book, and both of them stand in something of a contrast to the ancient Stoic school of thought.

For the Stoics, the world was the problem. The goal of action was to put one's will in front of that of the world by a variety of mental devices, including the thought that the flesh is weak

among others. And there certainly are cases in which the Stoic toolkit comes in handy, just as Buddhist monks can make efficient killing machines due to their emotional training. But in this case, and for this work, what stands out in the sharpest relief against a potential rational background such as Stoicism is the sense that one has of an implicit need to *flow*. Stoicism seems to unduly interrupt said flow, and for this reason seems an excellent example of a decidedly unironic set of prescriptions for action. Jimmy wants us to carefully consider this situation and arrive with him at the result he has reached: we are ultimately responsible for what we pick up and run with from the world around us.

Even in cases where concepts and definitions become unclear and we find ourselves unable to straighten them out, which I spent a great deal of time researching to write *Formal Dialectics*, Jimmy's strategy of questioning everything himself and simply putting in the work to deeply understand his own situation has paid substantial dividends. I highly recommend this work as a way to challenge the way we think. Productive insights are highly likely to occur as a result! Insights such as the clear account Jimmy gives of the need for a tradition of Folk Philosophy are more profound than I may here enumerate, and such gems proliferate throughout this remarkable, challenging, and fascinating text. The times they are a-changin', and something tells me that thinkers such as our friend Jimmy here are likely to continue to stun us—we must support them and their work! That is the purpose for which WIP Publishing was founded, and it is the purpose which animates our struggle in this space.

Best of luck, dear reader! Enjoy Jimmy's book, I know I did.

Cheers,

T. Dylan Daniel CEO, Founder WIP Publishing

PROLOGUE

Why I Wrote This Book

I can pinpoint a series of events that would inspire me to write this book. When I was a young child, I was very imaginative, but my fever dreams were especially vivid. In the moments before slipping into unconsciousness, I would be forced awake by hallucinations that took place in my mind's eye. These hallucinations would come in many forms, such as visions of a canvas needing to be cleaned by thick and viscous brushes that served to fill the canvas up with colour or clean the dirt. Its vividness for a child was disturbing, but not as disturbing as the fever dreams themselves. The dreams would consist of some impossible task that needed to be done, such as feeding an entire population of people before a timer ran out. My mother would frequently come into the room to a manic eight-year-old boy that would not recognise her or have a way of explaining what was happening.

It was soon after that I celebrated my mother's 40th birthday. This came with the realisation that she was going to die. As if I somehow wasn't aware of this fact, I soon realised that I was going to die too. This desperate attachment to what I considered my life gave me a lot of fear, a fear natural to most in partiality. However, this fear for me was so particularly insane you would have thought me as deluded, as though I was going to die next week.

These fears dissipated and would come back to me later and later in life, evolving each time. By seventeen I had in my head the dichotomic problem of eternalism and nihilism as some

great problem that needed solving, determined that the answer was one or the other, but concealed by some metaphysical entity. We could never know which one it was, and it certainly couldn't be both. These would come accompanied with similar existential questions of identity, causation, free will, meaning, and love, questions that would all shake me and unrest me.

The teachings of Zen Buddhism, Daoism, and later the ideas (and uncompromising charm) of Alan Watts did me an incredible amount of good in relieving these tensions. They taught me of "non-dualism" of conceptual opposites, and the fundamental nature of perceiving "reality" for how it really was. However, this would become a new obsession of mine, attempting to reach the state of enlightenment, or Nirvana, or Truth, that the Buddhists, Daoists and mystics sought and advocated.

As I decided to soak in the general ideas of the western philosophies, I had found that some of their conclusions had rubbed me up the wrong way. There was something missing that I valued so much from the eastern philosophies, but alas, I was naive, uneducated and had no articulation to express my distaste. It was when I was twenty and discovered Wittgenstein that I had found someone who understood the semantic paradoxes of the metaphysicians and moralists of the west. Above all, to me, he was a philosopher to take seriously the problems of language. It was by then that I was already sketching out an idea of what this book could look like, and after reading both of his books, I saw that Wittgenstein was able to express something that I felt, but could never articulate.

However, this would come after two points in my life which would give the story of my life a sharp trajectory to the left, the

largest I would ever have. My dabbling with recreational drugs would lead me in August to get spiked with liquid LSD, and by November, I had a form of psychosis. One year later it would be confirmed during my time living in Finland, by the psychiatrists and English interpreters they would hire at our meetings, that I had HPPD, or Hallucinogenic Persisting Perception Disorder, with a chronic tendency to experience psychosis that would likely last the rest of my life. The experience I had on psychedelics was, in a way, here to stay. Where my depersonalisation and derealisation were already haunting me in my teenagerhood, the symptoms of HPPD and chronic psychosis would come in full form. They would be characterised by complete dissociation from original ideas of self, an intense connectedness of everything, the absolute saturation of colours and shapes of things, and occasional voices that would chatter like a detuned radio. The majority of experiences with the illness, however, would be indescribable. I kept a diary, and it was apparent years later reading it how much I wished for death. By then I had lived mostly on my own in a large empty house near Canterbury, and all I had was the internet and my thoughts. And it was shortly after I turned twenty that I had the experience of enlightenment, the most important experience of my life.

What was the experience of enlightenment? It was a creeping eerie sensation, to begin with. The creeping sensation began slowly, walking home. I let whatever was happening to me happen. And when it did, it was as if I saw my entire universe at once. The trees shone a brilliant light, the tiles of the house shone a brilliant light, and this brilliant light of reality shone into my perception like diamonds. My incoherent diary ramblings were at the time the clearest ideas I had ever had. What I had felt prior to such a wondrous experience was too, so

clear - the dominance of the lingual and the conceptual, as opposed to this wondrous reality it represented.

My experience was about *seeing*. Not what you see, but to have the ability to perceive, to see at all. It would later come to me through this that the visions and dreams I had as a child were concepts and language enacting itself into abstract diagrams of this and that, and the tasks that could never be completed in my dreams, were parallel to the tasks associated with our unrest with the world we think we know. The world had no mistakes within it, and it was all unified, all whole, and the experience of indescribable, intricate, and pure beauty and freedom would later give me the title of my book.

This is a philosophy book written to be inclusive to both those well-read in philosophy and those who aren't. It is meant to be as simple as it is meaningful. It is also a non-continuous book, which means that it shouldn't be vital for you to read each statement I make after the last. Rather, this book is a series of interconnected paragraphs, so while reading it in a linear fashion would give you best insight into everything spoken of, if a chapter or page or part bores you or confuses you, such as the first part which is the most technical of the book, you may skip ahead to the next part, chapter, subchapter, or paragraph. I very much encourage you to not let the more technical parts of the book put you off, especially A Theory of Dimensions, as this chapter intends to clarify and make vivid the structure of concepts in the mind and the falsity of assumptions. If these chapters bore you, please move on. You will still find continuity and find yourself engaging successfully with the book.

This is a book dedicated to attempting to understand concepts, language, reality, and the modern human experience. However,

it is as much a spiritual and personal book as it is a rational and philosophical one.

While this book specialises in what the subtitle implies, (language, reality, and the phenomenology of modern experience), this book intends to be the start of a conversation. Therefore, this book intends to approach this particular line of thought from as many angles as possible. Thus, I open up many points of enquiry throughout this book into the various ways my philosophy of non-conceptualism and conceptuology may be applied. I give exposition into what I believe corresponds to universal functions of mature language and the socio-cultural products which may have partially stemmed from such universal functions in The Lingual Instinct.

I attempt to make every paragraph as riveting as possible while remaining as concise as it can be. However, some chapters will be more drawn-out to make proper conclusions. If you want more colourful and to-the-point chapters that illustrate the point of the book, I would recommend “The Chaining of Concepts”, where I go over the ways we are bound to certain conceptualisations, “Genealogies of Knowledge” where I discuss how the conceptualisations of our knowledge are relative and so may be mastered, and the title chapter, “On The Ecstasy of Nothing”, where I talk about the experience of what this book's definition of Nothing is, a glimpse into the absolute and wondrous state of the Real. I also recommend “Folk Philosophy”, the final chapter, where I refer to the philosophies of the lived, the unlived, and unspoken - the integrity that most life on Earth follows.

There are many discoverable combinations to the mapping out of ideas in this book, from the several universal functions, to

what I call the major concepts, to the origins of words, to the exercise of the autonomous will. These, especially the universal functions and implications of the major concepts may be cross-examined. I do not write everything I imply for I feel it is unnecessary and those with further enquiries may do it themselves.

And finally, while I am the most challenged I have ever been in my life, I write this book as a culmination of things that led to me being the most knowledgeably content, happy, and free I have ever been too. In the current situation of viral outbreaks, environmental devastation, fear of nuclear annihilation, accumulation of mindless consumerism, global terrorism, political disparity, and war, my love for the World remains. It remains because I know that the World has hardly anything to do with such silly notions that we humans are faced with, and I know that the World and subsequently the world of the Real is the place of virtue, wonder, and the sublime. Such a world has existed before us, will exist after us, and if we pay close attention, is the majority of what makes us up, too. The process of writing this book has taught me of such a world existing, and existing higher than any notion of misfortune we have or ever will have, and this is what has led to my greatest happiness.

Wishing you great joy, freedom, and other virtues through experiencing this book in physical, digital, audio, or verbal form,

James

THE REAL AND THE CONCEPTUAL

In this chapter, we shall explore what this book means by certain terms which will be used throughout. In providing this context, the rest of the book shall be clearer in its description, evaluation, and action onto the situation we are in. I do not fully explain the central ideas in this book, for the rest of the book shall attempt to do that instead.

Definitions

Perception is different from reality. There are four combinations of reality and perception; the perceived real, the unperceived real, the perceived unreal, and the unperceived unreal. We shall now discuss the categories deeper.

The unperceived unreal is neither in perception nor in reality, and so in discussing either reality or perception, it is useless to speak of. The unperceived unreal exists outside of space and time, outside of subjectivity and objectivity and so nothing may ever touch it without modifying its category to something perceived or something real. It is the least present.

The real is for all intents and purposes identical to Wittgenstein's definition of the world, or "all that is the case" as exhibited as his ingenious first statement in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). The real may also be described as actual, physical, and in subjectivity as immediate, sensuous, present, and in another way - empty.

The perceived unreal constitutes all that is illusory, delusional, and hallucinatory - subjective, but lacking in objectivity. This unreality occupies our perception as well as perceived reality.

Perceived unrealities that cannot be abstracted constitute what I call psychosisms.

One cannot speak unless one abstracts. One cannot abstract without divorcing from the physical, the actual, or the real. Therefore, one cannot speak without divorcing from the real.

Perceived unrealities that can be abstracted and spoken of are what constitutes language. Perceived unrealities that can be abstracted and not spoken of are what constitutes concepts. Abstractability cannot be non-perceived nor real.

These definitions here are all spoken of. Therefore they are abstracted. Therefore, these definitions too, fall under the perceived unreal.

Clarifications

This book is dedicated to discussing the limits of language, concepts, and representation, and a new conception of an external world - the world of the Real. In discussing what I believe each unreality is and thus their philosophical place in phenomenology, I mainly speak of language as it is the verbally communicable form of the concept. However, I am aware I may come under fire from those more qualified (and better suited) to discuss psychology, neurology, and lingual determinism in what place language, for example, specifically has in perception. As I speak of the will of language, and the autonomy from language in this book, I wish to defend myself

by clarifying that I do not assume that language itself, that is everyday speech alone, has a more primordial place in immediate perception than other elements such as mood, culture or environment. I am certain that the theories of my book pragmatically point to the social and functional elements of how the lingual and the conceptual operate to distort our view of the world. I am uncertain of the psychological and physiological elements but hope to open discussion on how psychological and physiological approaches may be conducted concerning my theories.

Despite my uncertainties, there are three points. The first is that there is another idea at hand - the idea of the conceptual - another form of representation far less clear, but more abstract and pervasive. I argue that the conceptual is a mode of perception with far more influence and perhaps even primordiality to phenomenology than we have assumed thus far. And I speak of the lingual and the conceptual oftentimes together because they are both forms of representation - representation of, for example, a book, and thus the perception of and action inflicted on being a book (what a book should be). This, I argue ignores, suppresses, and distorts the thing that is in reality, or the actuality of the book - and in subjective terms, *how we really see it*. This points to another idea at hand - a perception of the world devoid of representation, which I call perception of the Real. This idea of the Real to some may not seem accessible to us, but the Real in the way that I often speak of in this book is very much a subjective experience, as all experiences are. However, there are two forms of subjective experience - experience chained by the conceptual, and experience unchained. Experience of the unchained and therefore dismantled unrealities we so often are faced with is

what I call the experience of the Real, for we see, albeit subjectively, how the book truly is.

The second point is that while language itself may be a more fleeting stage of perception than environment and culture, I argue this: where did our specific culture and even human-created environments come from, if not from the lingual and the conceptual, and what lingual and conceptual assumptions are thus carried beneath such cultures and environments? If everyday speaking is fleeting, but our culture and environment, and perhaps even mood, are embedded, even swamped in linguistic and conceptualised assumptions on what *is*, how truly free is our perception from the foundations and subsequent repercussions of language and concepts?

The final point is about the properties of the lingual to affect the conceptual, and vice versa. If we were to imagine language as existing on the surface and concepts to exist on a deeper level, can we not also imagine a symbiotic relationship of influence by the two, where language affects the concepts beneath it, and the concepts also affect the language?

This book itself is titled The Ecstasy of Nothing - a state of perception of seeing the Real and all its transcendence beyond language and concepts, This experience as I have had it is met with a feeling like ecstasy. It had been the most important view of the world I ever had.

Nevertheless, any philosophers will perhaps assume this notion shares the same sort of connotation as “Nirvana”, and do it quite dismissively. It is a tragic case that the most simple and wonderful perception of what I refer to as the ecstasy of Nothing will be dismissed as unimportant or irrational by those

who view themselves to practise serious philosophy. Not only that, but it will also be inevitably associated with other notions of Buddhism, Daoism - perhaps even incense, chanting, and all the rest.

I resist this view. There has been no mode of perception more rational or more important in my entire life than the ecstasy of Nothing, and it was not in a drunken stupor, narcotics, delusion, or even pandering to Eastern tendencies that it came to me. It was rather a state of absolute psychological sobriety and clarity - *the* state of psychological sobriety and clarity.

However, such a perception may seem unimportant or impossible for the sake of rational and philosophical discussion which intends largely to discuss how the value of thought may move forward.

I resist this too. My conclusion has been firstly that language and concepts themselves both dismiss such an experience as being real, important, or viable for communication to other people effectively. My second conclusion is that the ecstasy of Nothing points to an opposite experience that does *not* possess such wondrous qualities – a far more ordinary experience, but one that very much can be talked about. What is the experience of the ordinary, how did it arrive, and how are we so suppressed, deprived, and perhaps completely unknowing of an experience, such an experience being completely rational, physical, and ecstatic, but beyond effective communication? Such conclusions have been the basis for what I wish to discuss as what is real and what is conceptual, and it seems a whole book was formed to discuss exactly that.

The Dichotomy of The Real and the Conceptual

There is a dichotomy present in modern life; the dichotomy of the real and the conceptual.

Language and concepts have differences. I oftentimes speak of language and concepts together because they are part of the same family - representative unreality. Language uses words that represent or invent new seeming states of affairs in reality. Lingualisations are conceptual too, but non-lingual concepts might be thought of to use more abstract, spatial, and diagrammatic means to seemingly represent or invent new notions of states of affairs in the world, such as routes, borders, diagrams, and graphs. Thus, lingualisations are linear, and conceptualisations are geometric. What is important is less so that language behaves in different ways to concepts. Both simulate an unreality that projects itself over our world.

Representative unreality is always prejudicial. But speaking of language and concepts rather than mere “representation” I find myself to be more focused on that which I believe is more pervasive to our unfreedom.

There is a main difference between the conceptual and the representational, and that is that the conceptual may invent new notions of states of affairs in the world. But even when speaking of non-abstractable representation alone it will be apparent that the representation is *not* the thing it represents. A painting of a vase is not the vase. The representative unreality behaves in completely different ways to the thing it represents, and it is sometimes entirely independent of the thing it represents. Concepts and language, the abstractable sort of representations, bear an even smaller connection to

reality. To first know this is crucial to understand the rest of this book.

Representation needs an interpreter to be a representation. The painting and representation of a vase are openly subjective and to some context benign as a representation, and so bears no rigid or even fascistic qualities. On the other hand, lingual and conceptual representations embody incredulously many of these rigid and fascistic qualities, if they are not stripped of their prejudicial assumptions. This is because language and concepts portray themselves as objective - they are not, and while there is always implicit context to what is being said, the syntax of the structure of concepts and language appear as if their truth or falsity is like a light switch. This is not the case.

When this book refers to a “concept”, it does not meaningfully refer to, for example, the blueprint of a car, although this definition is not mutually exclusive. Rather, a concept is organically defined here as an abstract idea, the idea not physical or concrete to reality.

Language differs from concepts in what they are what I call “integerial” - or perceived solid units of representation that may be spoken or written. A concept may instead be diagrammatic, geometric, and, as previously mentioned, holistic in form. Language, however, is composed of what one may call lingual atoms - or words - and where concepts bear a more spatial and holistic quality to them, language joins lingual atoms together to create a linear sentence with logical intent.

What language and concepts share is what may be called the Trojan-horse of assumptions, imperatives, and processions that such representation implicitly endows in you - a

Trojan-horse that such represented reality never has. I call it a Trojan-horse because concepts and language appear benign and directly representative, but in fact, contained within all concepts and language are implicit social norms, ideas, imperatives, processions, oughtnesses, and all the rest. Reality does not have such assumptions, imperatives, or processions, and is as it were “empty”. In other words, reality does not mean anything.

What follows then, is a requirement for one to be aware of the Trojan-horse of prejudices of representation and to ask the question: are these assumptions useful, and have I rightfully decided them? Are they good, bad, true, or false? This is an important key to not only be aware of them but also how to think ourselves free of them in all their many branches, to strip them away at will. Concepts and language will always come with this Trojan- horse set of assumptions for language are always in some way contextual. We, however, do not need to follow the principles of language in our mind.

To speak of this idea simply, we may say that: language's external *structure* is logical and mathematic, but language’s *essence* is illogical and incongruent to mathematical law. If we say,

“I need to go to work”,
the external structure appears logical for the grammar implies that it has a truth-value or not. If it does, we are pointing accurately to states of affairs in the world. However, language’s essence is illogical. There is nothing in the world that says we need to go to work or not. There is no truth-value or non-truth-value. The phrase is swamped in subjective prejudice. If the utility of the sentence is benign the sentence is

benign. But when we view the structure of language as the same as its essence, we believe that we really are logically describing the world. We are not. The world is free of notions that we need to go to work or otherwise.

I also separate a concept from an idea. Besides the epilogue, ideas are not mentioned much throughout this book. Ideas, as said in this book, grow and cultivate themselves in the mind, inhabiting the potential to direct themselves towards the world in ways that are not obvious or directly present to the self at first. We may imagine the idea as thought of in this book as creative. For example, one may produce the idea that sufferers in totalitarian regimes should be photographed and documented for the public.

So, the idea in this sense is cultivation for the potential for a fact of the world to be presented in an expressive and visceral way. It is the initiative to photograph. The concept, however, is entirely abstract and is characterised by its divorce from such reality. Such an example would be the seeming conclusion made from these photographs, such as “totalitarian regimes ought to be overthrown”, or that “totalitarian regimes are immoral”.

Such a concept may point towards a reality; totalitarian regimes may indeed be immoral. However, the reality of totalitarian regimes being immoral is completely divorced from the concept - the concept would still be tangible and understood even if it was not true. Malformed ideas wither and cease to exist fruitfully and practically if they do not direct themselves towards cultivations. Concepts, on the other hand, do not need to have any direction towards states of affairs of the world at all to be believed - and indeed to embody a

powerful and tyrannical grasp on perception of what reality is, a perception potentially completely untrue. These concepts exist in all those who use mature language, While ideas only exist due to their potential practicality, concepts may not only cease practical and free modes of being for human beings but also prevent oneself from seeing the Real directly - that which I argue is the biggest tragedy.

This book will raise questions for those who are sceptical that the Real may be communicated at all. The Real is, as put here, a concept. It is a word. However, one must allow this semantic contradiction to happen and understand that the thing that the Real refers to ought to be considered, not the term “the Real” itself. It is as plain as that. We must pull ourselves up by our bootstraps first, and recognise that all words, including words referring to the Nothing or the Real, are simply spoken of to gain insight into what they refer to. Hence, this book must use language - but be aware that the language is representative, not a means to its own end.

The Birth of Instrumental Communication

Concepts exist from an evolutionary origin point. We have marked ourselves, in a particular context, as the dominant species on the planet, survivalistically, technologically, and communicably superior to others. The rationality and accompanying conceptual thinking we were endowed with enabled us to plan for the future, create complex weapons, and distinguish things as conceptually separate, such as good berries being separate from bad berries.

I distinguish two unmarked eras of communication. These eras are expressive communication and instrumental

communication, or immature communication and mature communication respectively. Immature communication was reactionary, instinctive and similar to animals; reaction to pain, reaction to pleasure, or reaction to whatever else. The step into mature communication was marked, so to speak, by the boundaries of things being sharper, more distinct, and more absolute, such as the good berry from the bad berry. Eventually, the language was able to talk about itself, and mathematics would be created as the logical and lingual form without the need for worldly reference.

The majority of the popular and ordinary language we find ourselves using has instrumental, or mature, qualities. However, all communication is at least partially expressive. To groan in pain has no instrumental qualities, but is still communicative. To say “Damn you!” possesses instrumental qualities for the words indeed embody syntax of logic and sense. But this expression still very clearly embodies expressive qualities that come from emotion, passionate intention, tone of voice, context, and of course metabolic variations. Even a mathematical proof is
not entirely devoid of expressive qualities in speech form. We imagine them read out to us if we read them through text, and this conversion to spoken word embodies a tone of voice. This tone of voice, is too, lacking in a logical syntax, and must be acknowledged to be understood outside instrumental, or mature reasoning. Make no mistake, logical programming can be understood by a computer - but for us, we use the expressive feature of language to make sense of it and the world.

Instrumental language is not defined by it being logical, sensical, or self-reflective in an objective sense. It is defined by language *appearing* to be logical and sensical in regards to the

format of its grammar and its interpretation by rational creatures. When we say “The cushion is on the sofa” we are not directly pointing to a state of affairs of the world with language in, so to speak, an instrumental way that would be objective - absolutely true, or absolutely false. We have a motive for saying such a thing - perhaps the cushion shouldn’t be on the sofa, and this is why we speak of it. We have a subjective interpretation of what a cushion is, and what a couch is. And finally, the grammar we use may appear to be free of subjective and cultural etymology. However, it never is.

The culminating result of human consciousness to lingual and conceptual thought as we know it today must have come almost as if from the periphery to the centre, from a dream-like state of consciousness to a lucid one. It must have been that through our evolution we discovered our own ability to use language after we were already doing it. We speak before we realise we can speak, in the same way that we walk before we realise we walk, and breathe before we realise we breathe. We couldn’t have had the tools to analyse the tools to analyse the world before we had the tools to analyse the world.

It concludes then that the difference between immature and mature language is not a light switch, one that can be switched on or off, but a gradient or a continuum, in which there are slow minute advancements from the former to the latter.

The Unfreedom of the Conceptual

Whereas before the sociologists had determined society was “sui generis”, an empirical reality that had its own will so to speak, this book wants to propose that language, and concepts, have their own will as well.

What is the crux? It is that the will of this language will often be separate and contradictory to our best interests. The axioms of this will are both based on the restrictions of language itself and also what I call socio-lingual, the result of the ways a social group communicates to each other in a specific space in the world and a specific time in history. The language then, embodies its own set of implicit rules to not merely represent the world in the guide of its own will, but also to forcefully change the world. We lack the knowledge that not only language has this will to represent and change the world according to its own interests, but also that our own will, our own freedom of decision, could at all be capable of being independent, separate, or autonomous to the will of language at all. Language's will very often overpowers ours.

This leads me to the most fundamental idea; we are chained by concepts. We are possessed by them, controlled by them, and enslaved by them. Where before we may have created and collectively utilised concepts to construct and organise our lives as we saw fit, now it is the lingualisation and conceptualisation that has its own life and power, us being its subordinate, its servant. Our observations and actions have become perverse, in which we have forgotten why we exercise a will that is apparently ours but is not so diligently and so hastily, and we have lost touch with reality. We rarely allow ourselves to be aware that the Real is in front of us at every second. To see it is the most profound experience there is. It is the great paradox that the language that we have relied on to rationalise itself is irrational and oftentimes perverse. Unfortunately, it is true.

Over-conceptualisation is the primary reason for our existential unfreedom among many other unfreedoms, and

once in a while, we may experience what I have called the title of this book, the ecstasy of Nothing, or the proper experience of the non-conceptual or the Real. The ecstasy of Nothing, however, does not reduce the world to undefinable sense-data or lead to the incomprehension of reality. The conceptual structure of music may still be vastly appreciated in a state of seeing the Real. The definition of concepts in this book is characterised by what one might call an excess of social conditioning and possible overworked physiology.

I recall that a few days after my LSD trip when my dependent connection to concepts was severed, my friend
Matthew paid me back ten pounds he owed me. Normally, I would see that as something significant, as if in a higher realm, the realm which language seemed to exist, a particular debt had been paid off. However, this prior experience was illuminated by the experience I had now and saw no outside or "metaphysical" debt or tally being crossed off whatsoever. A note had been passed through space from one person's pocket to another, and that was that. At the same time, the awareness of what a ten-pound note was in its physical form remained.

What had changed was the excess of the Concept. This, in turn, brought about the highest freedom and awareness of the beauty of the world I could imagine attaining. So, in this experience not only was I free from the chains of concepts, but I was finally able to see that these chains existed at all. Furthermore, I saw that I was their prisoner. It is reality itself, be it a subjective or more notably objective reality that we are finally in view of once the veil of conceptual thinking disappears. It is as if we awoke from a dream we can then no longer recall.

What has prevented and continues to prevent Sartre's prescription of realising our freedom pragmatically? Sartre turned largely to societies of those both capitalist, consumerist and otherwise, but as far as I can tell, he did not so much turn to conceptualisations themselves. However, if the individual is unfree by his concepts, and societies are comprised of individuals, and oftentimes individuals are the ones to stand themselves out to change society's will from a determined direction it travels in, then it is the individual who may find him or herself largely responsible for untangling the structures concepts have inflicted in their mind. From there, they may discover their own will.

The most prevalent unfreedom we have is the unfreedom done unto us by language and concepts. Therefore, we may call language and concepts our biggest opponent to freedom. This shows that to be free, one cannot be entirely dependent on lingual and conceptual paradigms to obtain freedom, such as abstract ethical rules. To do so is a denial of life and a denial of reality. However, one cannot attempt to act in an anarchic, chaotic, and potentially barbaric way that ignores his hidden lingual and conceptual prejudices.

Think of the gangster that ignores all moral and social imperatives to obtain money. By that token, however, he is still then very dependent on the concept of money as virtuous and worth having more of - a concept he may not have willingly decided to praise. Both attitudes ignore a careful self-reflection of the very thing that binds us
- the chains of language and concepts, and the ways it prevents us from being autonomous and free decision- makers whatsoever. This is not to say that one must ignore their imperatives, responsibilities and goals in the real world.

However, the answers for decisive action come only when one asks this question. What is real, and what is not?

My friend told me a story about taking LSD in the London Underground. Their perceptions of the world, soon after, were of course much different. People were cramming on the escalator, and would not even consider using the stairs, which were empty. He and his friend decided to not only just use the stairs but sit on the stairs, use it as a place for introspection and thoughtfulness. This was a new place to them, a place free of preordained lingual structures and conceptual packages of what the stairs actually were. Was this a heightened, enacted autonomy and freedom to decide to sit on the stairs that others lacked? (I do not advocate taking hallucinogens of course. However, I do not ignore the perceptual consequences of hallucinogens to dismantle conceptual structures either.)

Freedom is not of the highest moral authority - freedom is still a word, a word carrying its own lingual and conceptual weight. It becomes increasingly difficult to advocate something without that thing being perceived as being the highest authority and priority - and as a result, one becomes chained by grappling for imagined freedoms.

However, to ignore the cause to realise our freedom, even in the face of preferring one's security of happiness, is naive. Our security in Western society may be toppled at any time. When situations get more demanding and challenging, the choice to be morally courageous and civically responsible will never require more such freedom from language, concepts, and their ideological substrates. Nevertheless, one must always proceed almost ironically - to seek out freedom but not dependably, for it is the nature of opposites, freedom and unfreedom, and civic

or moral duty and the lack of - to be symbiotic. To ignore the symbiosis of the world is to ignore the world.

This book does not advocate to be instead to our primal instincts rather than languages - language is another kind of instinct, and the instinct of language is intimately connected with the particular primal instincts of a human being. The rage and potential desire to hurt someone is rarely merely an act of primality in the case of a human being - there will almost always be a lingual perception that the person is bad, that the person has upset you, that the person ought to be hurt for some benefit, that the person ought to be hurt to impose authority, that the person ought to be hurt because one identifies themselves as a sadist, that the person must be hurt for art, and so on. There are many other cases where the instinct of language, or the will-to-conceptualise, is one or overlaps with what might be called the will-to-rage.

Nevertheless, there are cases where our unfreedom and chaining by primal instincts supersede languages. This, however, does not defy the point of the book. The point of the book is that we are more commonly inflicted by the unfreedom of language than the unfreedom of primality, and so our primary concern should be to free oneself from the confines such language imposes and not the primalities we have already done so well to repress and hide from ourselves.

Advocacy to the Real

This book advocates a return to having power over our concepts and more radically, to see reality outside of these concepts. The Zen Buddhists and Daoists attempt to speak of “nothingness”, “emptiness”, and general non-conceptual reality

using concepts. So when the concepts are portrayed, posing as what Zen, “enlightenment”, or the right way of seeing the world is, the reader will assume there’s an element of perception or even character in themselves that they are missing. Rather, let’s thoroughly investigate that which opposes concepts using concepts themselves, and after we have deduced what the non-conceptual world is not, shall we see what the non-conceptual world is.

The majority of experiences and what I call the most profound experiences arise from the negation of those concepts. Taking inspiration from Schucman’s (revised in 2008) A Course in Miracles in one her meditations seeing the world around you and negating the concepts from what I call the Actualities of the World, affirming that a basket is not a basket, a pillar is not a pillar, and the sky is not the sky. An alternative way to do this is to say such a basket does not mean anything, a pillar does not mean anything, and the sky does not mean anything. Doing this alone may both briefly bring one’s awareness to the tangibility of what it is like to experience the Real (as the realities of the world are separated from the concepts), and furthermore, why the conceptual is its rightful contextual opposite. My friend recalls doing this meditation and noticed that the world initially appears frightful and unreal. On the other hand, I regard this as a stepping stone to seeing the world as it is, and the unrealities he had assigned the world were unrealities in his mind that needed to be done away with.

The universe exists first. Only after does language come to represent it. We are the masters of our own language and concepts and thus the perceptions that language and concepts inflict to portray reality. This radical notion need not be taken for a war against all that is orderly. Rather, we must be

responsible for the concepts that have overpowered us, and in recognising our responsibility, perhaps make better concepts for the future. However, one must not take the latter advocacy for a command; it is our choice to control our perceptions of the future itself, and then decide how we approach it.

To see the ecstasy of Nothing may be within a minor Glimpse or a major Vision. Glimpses are the common experience, but the Glimpses are the least likely to be spoken of because there is not and can be no language to describe it - this is precisely both what makes it profound and is the primary reason for its profundity. They are also very unlikely to be remembered properly, for while memory is not necessarily lingually and conceptually bound, the way we socially reinforce and encourage forms of memory is. There may also be no way to formulate and intend for other Glimpses or Visions, for communicable formulation itself is built off of lingual and conceptual paradigms and frameworks - that which completely oppose such an experience in the first place. This is not to say that one cannot adjust themselves in their life to be more open to these experiences, just that one may never schedule their arrival.

Concepts are the opposition to reality because, as I see it, they are the most unreal thing that still exists in our world. Think of it; what could be more unreal, more separated from reality, yet still part of *our* subjective experience? Even the imagined may still relate to memory and tangibility of the Real, but concepts are experience itself at its most removed from reality.

Human natures, such as the desire to seek morality, would be better founded if we paid more attention to the

truth of the world of the Real - and the truth of the world is devoid of unrealities, unrealities of the illusory nature of concepts, language, and fascistic representations of reality which hold no credence.

Finally, I advocate the golden rule when it comes to the real and the conceptual. The concept is not real, so if a concept does exist in the mind, one must ask the following questions. If it is not real, is it instead useful, valuable, or leading to virtue? If it is not, why must it and its nature of being an illusion exist for us in the first place?

This has been an introduction to the central ideas, definitions, and clarifications in the book that will then be explored in more detail throughout. I have done my best to explain my general assumptions of the anthropology of language and concepts, how the world appears to us the present day, particularly the West, the problems we find ourselves faced with, and advocacy of what we should do about it. In the next chapter, we shall explore what I call universal functions of mature or instrumental language, and then generate a thought experiment regarding what we mean when we say we want to be happy and in what ways such a statement possesses a majority of implicit assumptions that were never ours.

FOUR UNIVERSAL FUNCTIONS OF MATURE LANGUAGE

No truthful foundation of reality I could find to lead up to the rest of my philosophy is more apparent than existence itself. That is to say, what is, is. Therefore it goes to say that what is not, is not. In language, it comes from here that we distinguish Things of the World as having their own distinct “isness”, and from there, also deduce that there exists a multitude of potential things which lack such existent “isness” in the same respect.

Here are four universal functions of mature language this book wishes to provide knowledge of and insight on. These universal functions may have already been addressed by other philosophical texts and practices both East and West in some form. However, they are used in this book here contextually to build a foundation for the rest of the book.

Language as Affirming

In mature language, when we speak of something, we imply that it exists.

Language as Separating or Discerning

To speak of something that exists is to then imply that as there is an entire language dedicated to speaking of things, then other things must also exist, and therefore exist separately. So, the next immediate thing language does is separate. That is, this function of mature language separates the whole world into what we might call things. From this, we are granted a

catalogue of what we might call the Things of the World, all discernible objects, events, people, and others. Even actions (verbs), properties (adjectives) and relations (adverbs) count as such things. Prepositions and conjunctions, too, are Things of the World, if we characterise them too to have their own distinct "isness" that can be discerned. These Things of the World, as it appears to be, are subsequently denoted words or concepts, and our entire library of language gives us access to speak of each corresponding Thing of the World.

Under the notion of mature language, the thing is not its Not-Thing. That is to say, what is not the thing could in contextual correctness be classified as the things opposite.

Black is a clear opposite to white, but in the same sense, when we talk about a book, quite equally we may say that the book exists as a sharp opposition to the thing it isn't, to make it what it is. Nothing can exist without what we call its opposite, for, without the opposing Not-Thing, the thing would be everything, and so the word would be meaningless. For example, let's pretend there was a thing called a "gnoeltchwua" and we removed everything that was not a gnoeltchwua from the world. Then, nothing would not be a gnoeltchwua, which means that everything would be a gnoeltchwua, and so the word would be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, if we took everything that *was* a gnoeltchwua from the world, and so could not even imagine a meaning, the word would too be rendered meaningless. Without opposition, language does not exist.

It appears to us as though the separations are either dichotomous due to the integerial (that is, as holding properties of an integer) nature of words, but it is more true

that things are continuous. Language permits this, but to a point. Subsequently, a thing either sharply divides against its opposite or they blend together. For example, a star seems to sharply divide against space, while the head of a body smoothes into the neck and body.

The reason for both dichotomy and “continuousness” to be present in our perception together, is because of the conflict between lingual and non-lingual perceptions of the world correspondingly.

What is the crux? The crux is that nothing is ultimately or initially separated or discerned and all things may be said to be continuous in nature - to a point, since continuum has its lingual limits and too, universal functions. Nevertheless, when does the book sharply divide against the not-book? Is a novella a book, a magazine a book, a pamphlet a book, a poster? And of all things, when does walking become running, the head become the neck, fast become slow? From this, we can see that the Things of the World are not actualities, but concepts that we use to communicate. The Things of the World are then, dichotomous to the Actuality of the World.

Language presumes to us that all things are dichotomous, or sharply divided - and to believe this presumption is from our autonomous will alone is naive. The word “book” compels itself as an integerial and atomic unit, an abstract concept but with an idea that, as with the word, is so sharply distinguished from its surroundings. So too must the “book” be, such that all other Things of the World bear no connection, interdependence, or co- existence in any fashion with it. It is as if from the moment we learn about the completeness and integeriality of the word that we are commanded this, “Go out into the whole world, and

separate all books from things that are not books!" The words in our modern language are ultimately separate, unlike the communications of the past. In the past, a man may have grunted loudly over a bad berry, cheered over a good berry, and grunted in between over a medium berry. The spaces in between, then, formed a continuum. The words were not precise, but informal, reactionary, and absolutely contextual. They were not mature. Now, words present themselves as precise. They may not be used precisely, but they stand in our minds as precise objects, perhaps even outside of the Actuality of the World, and projecting metaphysically into the world. These are the Things of the World.

Continuums are not safe from lingual and conceptual prejudices - these are too contextual and imply a structure in which the thing of discussion is the utmost extreme, and opposes all other things in the context of said thing. While a small point, it is still one to make. The conception of the world as continuous still blurs and distorts our perception of the Actuality of the World, in which the world does not have context based on one particular thing in it, but with its own "context". The actuality of said context of the world is free of all supposed separate things that exist within it. Perhaps even while reading this you find yourself dividing the world into books and not-books, and so are still chained by concepts. In performing this task, while free of the more present illusion of dichotomies, we still compare entirely to the book.

If we think of the command of dividing all books from non-books as the lateral command, then the vertical command would be to find or perceive The Book that all other books exist from. Is it then as if all books in the world were a shadow of The Book. The Book in this sense comes from a generalisation

of what all books have in common and is then heightened to being perceived as something that existed prior and supreme to all worldly books. If those who subscribe to Platonian Forms that viewed things this way would come to understand this, they would then hold the notion that the Forms are not metaphysical truths. They are how concepts and words exist structurally in our minds.

All opposites to things are contextual, and the assumptive definition of the word will depend on its opposite. The person is defined in opposition to the animal, but the individual, while still indicating the same thing technically, has a different context, in some senses opposing the society or community. Therefore, in most cases, an opposite is not something we view objectively in the world. It is a judgement made with our own implicit biases.

However, with leniency, we may identify what we could call a book's true opposite. This would be, in this book's definition, everything in the world that is not a book, or the book you are referring to. This is the true opposite because it is in some context the truest thing we can separate from the book to make us identify the book for what it is. The individual stands not only against his society but in a different respect, against the entire world. What the book or the individual is not is what makes it what it is. The quality of something black may compare to and oppose the quality of being white, but also compares and opposes every other thing in the world that is not black.

The true opposite is dependent on what we call the book, and so in reality, is still contextual. We may refer to a single book or

all books, but what either of these things mean is still dependent on the cutting tool we separate with.

While language compels things to be separate for communication, it is also the universal function's greatest lie.

Language as Dominant-Judging

If the first universal function is that all concepts and lingual forms separate into two opposites, the next thing we can know about concepts is that they infer some "domination-judgement" upon the thing and the presumed opposite. For binary code, the 1 triumphs over the 0 in contextual domination. Not because 1 is the value and 0 is not, but because such domination simply needs to occur in our language to pry them apart. If both are seen to be, as it were, with The Value in equal merit and equal context, no discernibility can be carried out, the same as if you infer The Value to neither of them. For necessities of language, one of the two concepts needs to be identified as the "thing", and one as the "not thing", to make communication possible. This is the simplest form of domination-judgement.

This merely refers to mathematical opposites with no reference.

Language, however, also infers these domination-judgements in most other instances as well, and all states of dividing the world into things. If we speak of a Thing of the World, we also imply either that everything else is the Not-Thing, or the thing is designated a special relationship with another specific Thing we call its opposite.

The issue with domination-judgements is that they are purely brought into being for communication purposes, and they may not necessarily say anything about either the world or how we ought to perceive it. The Thing comes from what needs to be spoken of the most, be it a true opposite or a contextual one. This is a universal function for in the structure of perception, all designated things appear to have more truthful or contextual existence than its opposite. This is crucial to understanding this third function.

The perception of a dominant-judging property occurring in the world varies in degree but is always in some part essential to how language dictates such perception.

As an expressive example, we may imagine two contextual “opposites”. We may imagine the helicopter and the sea, with the sea being flown over by the helicopter. For the helicopter flying over the sea, the domination- judgement is present. However, the domination-judgement is contextual. We may infer some sort of “narrative domination” over the sea from the helicopter because the helicopter shows more signs of structural intelligence, freedom of will, and contextual storytelling in how we talk about events in our lives - the helicopter is the agent. However, in another context, we may infer some sort of “physical domination” over the helicopter from the sea for the sea is bigger, more physically powerful, and should there be a storm and the helicopter were to crash, the sea would claim the helicopter. This is its condition, in which the condition is the thing that determines what thing dominates over its contextual opposite, or when regarding true opposites - what is the most rightful thing, and what is the most rightful Not-Thing.

Things are not, as language compels them to be, dominant or submissive to their contextual or true opposite. To truly understand this is to truly understand the second universal function of mature language, that things are not separate at all. Even the cheetah that chases the antelope is not in any objective sense superior to it - we may always infer a context in which the antelope is the superior creature, even if it is killed. We can do this by attributing honour of self-sacrifice for the ecosystem, its self-sufficiency for largely being a herbivore, its lack of need to kill another creature for its survival, and so on. Superiority and inferiority are always projected into the world, not received from it.

Instead, even if we must perceive things as separate, the useful antidote to domination-judgement might be the concept of harmony. The harmoniousness of things bears much more truth to the Real than what the structure of language conveys and encourages us to perceive; a binary of dominant and submissive things. However, harmony, like all words, too bears these universal functions, and so the concept of harmony must be approached carefully. To speak of “harmony” is to imply a domination-judgement over disharmony, in which harmony is the most truthfully and dominantly present in the world. Therefore, one must see outside of language and its functions. It is not that the world refers to the lingual atom or word “harmony” - it is the other way round. Harmony is merely a tool used to refer to a state in the world used specifically and carefully, and as said, one must approach with caution.

Every statement made dominates over other statements that haven't been made. The statement itself implies its own domination.

Language as Value-Dominant-Judging

The necessity to speak of a word or Thing over its opposite implies the function for value over either it or its opposite.

The value-domination-judgement is an extension of the domination-judgement. In the context of two opposites, contextual or true, it refers to the desire spread from the domination-judgement onto what opposite ought to dominate over the other. The need for language to have utility carries value domination through simple domination. The Things of the World carry their own sociolinguistic assumptions, the subtext of what it means to be a thing in any socio-cultural paradigm. For example, a chair being more of a thing than the concept of breathing. The chair is an identifiable object and the act of breathing is less recognised as such. However, it is still a Thing of the World. Value domination will carry this further and always infers that, in the opposition of the thing and its antithesis, one of them is in some context more valuable. This is because mature communication always intends to rationally change things for some cause to make things “better” - or a deliberate improvement of some kind, and in dividing the world into things, one thing will always call itself out as more valuable in any specific time.

This comes in two forms. The first is the value domination over the things one speaks of over their opposite, and the very act of speaking itself intending for betterness. This I have labelled the fifth function, which I discuss more in The Lingual Instinct. For now, we may focus on value domination alone, and focus specifically on value dominations that are almost always permanent in their judgement. In the most obvious cases, good ought to triumph over its opposite, badness, life over its opposite, death, benignity over its opposite, evil, and

intelligence over its opposite, stupidity or ignorance. However, if there is no obvious superior thing to its opposite, language will necessitate there seeming to be one.

In the phrase “Let’s have sex”, there is an implied value-domination of all three words over their contextual opposites.

The word “Let’s”, or “Let us” opposes, for example, “Don’t let us” or “Let them”. With the latter example, the phrase value dominates “us” over “them”. “We” is in this context more valuable to be spoken of. This is because we are the central agents of our subjective world. So, self-communication about what we ought to do is more important in this context than someone else. It is a simple matter of distribution.

“Have” dominates over its contextual opposite, for example, “Not have”, in which “have” implies a pragmatic utility of us being free agents and taking advantage of it by the action of *doing*, or having.

Of course, the advantage being taken is contextual to the next word, “sex”, in which “have sex” is to imply “enjoy sex”. Therefore to “not have”, is to “not enjoy”, so the value domination here is predicated on us being free agents of communicative abilities, and taking advantage of this rational freedom to its advantage to enjoy something together, and not to not take advantage. The “have” here only implies enjoyment because of the last word, “sex”, for this is assumed to be an enjoyable activity and so contextually more valuable, for example, more valuable than to have an “argument” or a “fight”. Sex could be contextually opposing either of these. What is important is that this function, like the third function

(and all functions), entirely depends on the context. But a more stripped-down contextual opposite may be the negation of sex, the non-participation in sex. Here too, value domination is present, for the utterance of the phrase “Let’s have sex” value dominates sex over the lack of it.

Of course, these variables aren’t consciously considered in their entirety when the phrase “Let’s have sex” is uttered. However, they are implied, hidden by the lack of need to explain what is already socially agreed upon as properly communicative. Nevertheless, think not that the non-lingual reality of libido and attraction to another is the cause of syntactical value-domination. The value-domination is exactly that, based on the syntax of mature words, and their existence as exhibiting integerial or atomic behaviour. To describe a word as integerial or atomic, that is to describe words as behaving like units or numbers, is the cause of both value domination and all other universal functions. This is because to speak rationally is to speak to deliberately affect what is being spoken of in one way and not the other. It is to affect the value dominating concept or word and to affect the contextual opposite of the value dominating word oppositely.

Just because we do not put rational consciousness on universal functions such as value domination does not mean they do not exist inside the language itself. They do exist, and if lingual and conceptual consciousness is not given to the universal functions of mature words, we will speak of the mature words as absolute and not carrying their own socio-cultural and relativistic baggage of assumptions. These assumptions may be descriptive, ritualistic, or otherwise. They may exist both inside the sentence or outside the sentence. For example, for one within the sentence, to speak of a desire to have sex implies

that you think sex leads to value of some kind, even if this value is selfish, otherwise you would say a sentence that in some way opposed the said sentence - or say nothing at all. This is the crux of the fourth universal function.

However, an outside implication of the sentence is that you want to have sex because you are attracted to the person. But with anticipation that the person you want to have sex with wishes for you to explain yourself, you may end up explaining that you find them attractive, which then becomes spoken. Perhaps the intimate and greatly complex social ties human beings have together may not need for this to be verbal in order for the second phrase “I am attracted to you” to be rationally and lingually considered by both parties.

But what follows if one looks carefully, is a continuation of assumptions made lingual and conceptual that go further and further. This results in language in some sense enacting its own will based on its structure and not the autonomous agents of communication. This is because words are not integerial or mathematical, and conversely, they do not directly point to an objective state of affairs in the world. The phrase “sex”, implies sex of this way and not another, at this time and not another, using these objects and not others, involving these people and not others, lasting this time and not another, leading to this form of a later social contract and relation and not another, implying these feelings and not others.

These implications are partially but never fully agreed upon by any two or more parties of communicative engagement which will lead to inevitable miscommunication of some kind (which is usually rectified naturally). However, with all the instances in which the language appears firm and absolute, a world

cannot be conceived outside of the assumptions of such language. Perhaps it would be better suited for both parties to not have sex and to instead draw each other nude to make things more interesting and passionate. Perhaps it is better suited for both parties to hold off their urges, and in turn lingual conditioning, and wait for a time when the sparks are brighter. This is obviously speculation. One may only consider these possibilities when one retracts from the will of language.

Unravelling the Four Universal Functions

All language carries affirmation, separation, domination, and value domination within them. However, entire phrases will often carry a multitude of universal functions in varying layers. When we examine them closer, we may inspect the assumptions being made that stem from these four universal functions. In the next chapter, we shall discuss more about dimensions, assumptions, and breaking out of concepts through recognition of their more complex properties. In the chapter after that, we shall speak of more universal functions and what I call their "socio-cultural products". This is an exercise in freeing the unseen conceptual structures that hang behind the structures of sentences in everyday life.

But for now, let's experiment with merely these four universal functions. What isn't important is the truth-value of the antithetical ideas, but merely what assumptions come into being. Empirical discovery is unimportant. We are more directed towards unravelling these functions for good / pragmatic use on our perception of the world, rather than mere theory.

Let us reverse the four particular universal functions present in the phrase “I want to be happy”. If we call the idea brought about through these universal functions as its assumption, how many of these may we analyse for good use?

The most obvious is the notion that happiness exists at all. The word would make there appear to be an omnipresent and specific feeling that every instance of the utterance of the word points to. Is this truly the case? As I shall explain later in the book, happiness is merely the sum of its parts - the total amount of times a specific example of the word has been used in practice. Is it an objective, somewhat transphysical reality that we are
always rigidly pointing to? Is this merely useful for communication, or does it also oppress and repress the many colours of emotion and feeling?

Creative endeavour and fever may not be categorised as happiness or unhappiness, and it may be the wrong thing to do when one attempts to categorise it as such. It is language as acting integerial that compels us to do this, for without language’s own necessity to prove its validation, we do not need to describe an emotion as happy. The only reason would be the utility, to experience more happiness. However, as explained, if some examples of the referent (that is, what the word refers to) of happiness cannot be reduced to such a word, this endeavour is both futile and senseless.

The second most obvious would appear to be separation; specifically separation between you and happiness. It appears as if happiness was a separate entity that you come into contact with occasionally. It may be so that, as it is a universal phenomenon, happiness may exist in some breadth outside of

your individual and personal need for it. However, it is only ever happiness if it is experienced by a person. You need happiness to be happy as much as happiness needs you to be happiness. Perhaps the lingual imperative to separate the self from the emotion is an unnecessary and illusory separation to make at all. Can anything other than selves be happy?

With thinking of happiness and you as two separate entities, the next assumption we can reverse is the one brought about by domination-judgement. That is, the domination of you above happiness. We will more often than not regard ourselves as dominant in the relationship with happiness, perhaps because we are rational creatures and happiness is a non-personified emotion. However, this supposes that happiness is something you can conquer and possess, something you can control. This is because the “to be” usually implies that if “A is 'to be' B”, then A is usually and especially in this context the dominant element.

We do not say that “I want happiness to be me”, not because we have already determined that happiness is not the dominating element, but because the structure of language compels us to have this frame of mind. And is this really so, even speaking on a practical and pragmatic level? Try and imagine what it would feel like to conquer this emotion, to have it fully in your grasp, like possession of an object you own. On the contrary, does one conquer or possess sadness? Or does one simply become one with the emotion?

Curiously, as we have concluded that sadness is a bad emotion, something we ought to get rid of, we may have as a result put ourselves under the notion that sadness owns us, possesses us, and we are its subordinate; I must get rid of this sadness, this

emotion that has me hostage. This is because when we say we don't want to be sad, we attempt to repel ourselves from it, while still being connected to it. In a certain context, this makes sadness the dominating element. At the same time, we think that happiness is something we need to possess or dominate; I must dominate and possess this happiness. It should be clear that neither of these facts is true, and neither would it be the case, if it were true, that we observed it in reality. It was created by our language.

There is also the illusion of consciously assuming you believe that A dominates B when really you might believe that B dominates A. The term "I want to be happy" as nearly all terms are, is actually shortened from a subjective meaning that exists outside the spoken sentence. A more precise way to say it, while also exact in meaning, is "I have 'wants' to be happy". Now we can focus on the term "I have wants". We have indeed implied, like with happiness, that it is us that have conquered and possessed "wants" But when we look at it closer, do we desire this need? Or do we simply want to do away with it, to not want anything at all?

And if this is so, why is it that on the surface we can speak of wants as if we own them? In our language, it would be incorrect for us to say "wants have me", but perhaps this is closer to what we are truly experiencing. Do the wants have you, do they possess you? Are the wants not something that you want to get rid of, something that compels you through your biological and social programming against your will, an impulsive want to be happy? Would one live more freely without constant want to a particular state of being?

The phrase “I want to be happy” further implies a separation of two polar emotions, happiness, and unhappiness. This portrays that with the will of an independent agent such as yourself, happiness is brought to win over unhappiness. This compels the fourth universal function - value-domination-judgement. Does sadness not need to be felt for happiness to be felt? I encourage you to question what you mean when you say these emotions. Why do we enjoy crying at sad movies? Why do we enjoy listening to sad music? Is there not what we might define, especially in our culture, a guilty pleasure for experiencing these emotions? Is it not true that one may get sick of the sugary sweetness of what might be categorised as “happiness” being directed at them at all
times?

The implication that happiness is valuable in the sentence “I want to be happy” implies that happiness is at a present time, or at all times valuable. Why is this true? The ritualistic assumptions that happiness ought to be felt at any given time are not explained further. There are times in which we feel guilt, shame, self-reflection, ceasing of traumatic repression. And very often these feelings are required to be felt, and it will often be the case where unhappiness is the valuable emotion.

There is also the separation of yourself from others and the domination of what would be your interest from others. This is apparent in the word “I” which opposes its opposite, where the happiness of a “them” may not be considered. Reversing the domination of yourself from others only further highlights the case that emotionally we may focus on individual cases for happiness rather than turn to collective or communitarian causes when we utter the phrase “I want to be happy”. We must master our own emotions, but what is the difference between

happiness directed at me, and happiness directed at my community? Is happiness a zero-sum game? Such a separation may indeed imply far too much autonomy and responsibility on the individual to earn happiness, and ignore the social element of happiness - happiness as communitarian.

While any of these antithetical ideas may be untrue, it will never be considered unless one considers language as possessing universal functions.

Here we have gone over what I illustrate as four universal functions that act as laws with mature language; affirmation, separation, domination-judgement, and value-domination-judgement. I argue that these laws are immutable when one speaks in what I call a “mature” fashion - that is, using a language in a logical, sensical, and self-reflective manner. I argue that these laws, or “universal functions” alone may compel us to think in a certain way about ourselves and the world that is contrary to how the world really is. I have then used an example of the phrase “I want to be happy” and analysed several universal functions that are implicit in the phrase, which has allowed me to illustrate and apply new contexts to the world we are attempting to talk about.

In the next chapter, I shall discuss what I refer to as the dual conceptual will, going through into how the way we conceptualise and lingualise the world is inseparable from another force that compels us outside of our knowledge or best interests. I shall then discuss my theories of concepts as operating on dimensions, dimensions that carry a multitude of further assumptions, assumptions we have the freedom to do away with.

A THEORY OF DIMENSIONS

The Dual Conceptual Will

In the previous chapter, I discussed four universal functions of mature language, 1) affirmation, 2) separation, 3) domination-judgement, and 4) value-domination-judgement. Now, we shall explicitly discuss the duality of the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts. As these wills are dualistic and interdependent, I shall often refer to them together as the dual conceptual will.

The will-to-conceptualise is a human instinct to transcribe the world into concepts. This is an instinct like others but on the other end of the humanistic spectrum, an instinct growing from the uniqueness of our humanity. The will-to-conceptualise, simply, is a will to transcribe the non-conceptual and non-lingual world into lingual and conceptual perception and thought. This will extends beyond the minimal demand for the world to be conceptualised and extends beyond bare sensation into complex thought.

The will-to-conceptualise is the instinct to map and judge both the external world and one's mind. It reaches from mapping and judging spatial environments (determining what things in one's immediate environment are important and what things are unimportant, how certain objects may be used functionally), to mapping the properties of directions (such as improvement on a skill, estimated journeys towards destinations and goals) to the judgements of others (what sort of category they fall into, how virtuous a person they are). The

list does not end there, but such examples might make the will-to-conceptualise more vivid.

The will-to-conceptualise is fundamental to the social human. It is also a motion from the internal to the external, from the possibilities of the imagination to the imagined. This will proceeds consciously and unconsciously.

The will-to-conceptualise is symbiotic and interdependent to the will-of-concepts. The will-of-concepts refers to the prejudices of concepts themselves to judge, map and proceed outside the person's autonomous ability. It, so to speak, takes matters into its own hands. It moves from the outside representations of the world to the inside, and it follows its own judgements on what things are and should be.

Look closer and ask the question; what starts first, the will-to-conceptualise or the will-of-concepts? The answer is neither - they are two sides of the same coin, and act together. It is a chicken and egg situation; the necessity of a hammer comes from the need to hammer something, but the concept of a hammer comes with its own notions of self-worth and importance. These notions are not decided by any single person entirely, and so are not fully chosen by anyone at all. Worth, importance, and other notions of what a "hammer" is, have already been decided by both itself and the person once conceptualised, so the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts are inseparable.

Where the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts is its own duality, what of language? Well, such a duality is not far off, for we too have the will-to-lingualise as well as the will-of-language!

The will-to-conceptualise and the will-to-lingualise are the instincts to decide to use a hammer for putting a nail in a wall. The will-of-concepts and the will-of-language, on the other hand, have already decided that a hammer is useful for hammering, and then once the hammer is picked up, proceeds to identify you as a hammer-person. The will-to-conceptualise and the will-to-lingualise may intend to categorise what kind of person a hammer- person is, and this intention may come from the autonomy of the person. The will-of-concepts and the will-of- language answers this by saying a hammer-person is strong and masculine.

The process has no beginning; it has already happened. It is only that the will-to-conceptualise and the will-to- lingualise come from within the person and stem outwards, and the will-of-concepts and the will-of-language are the phenomena of the "outside" reflecting and altering within.

As the dual conceptual will is a circular dialogue, it may never cease without inspection of the Real. The dialogue may continue with saying, "Hammers are tools, and tools are for tool-people, and tool-people are strong and masculine. One may allow themselves to feel more masculine with a hammer and better able to deal with DIY. And tools ought to be used in these occasions and not those, for a hammer is fundamentally for hammering, and any other interpretation of what a hammer is and can be used for is absurd. And tools ought to be put in a toolbox. The oughtness of a hammer to be put away is to be followed diligently for the sake of security and order, but not too diligently for one is partially a free spirit and one must allow themselves to be free by a certain fraction. One must balance order and freedom and this will enable one to improve as a

person. Improvement is a necessary virtue and one must follow this virtue as much as they can".

Thus, the will-to-conceptualise and the will-to-lingualise appear to be autonomous as that is the will that we are empowered with. But it is not. It is always chained by its other side, the will of the conceptualised phenomena that one observes.

Where is the Real in this picture, devoid of either the will-to-conceptualise or the will-of-concepts? When the will-to-conceptualise no longer becomes a tool and instead intends to create an imaginary world on top of the real world it becomes perverse. When the will-of-concepts propagates itself as a constant interpretation of endless signifiers in the mind and world of a person, how may we have any bearing on actual states of affairs? Where is the notion that a hammer merely is, and is free to be contextualised in any number of ways dependent on the freedom and resulting decision or even non-decisions of a human?

Beyond the Dual Conceptual Will

As the will-to-conceptualise is like an instinct such as the will-to-copulate and the will-to-nourish, as they may be called, it is characterised by an instinct shared more speciesistically than an individual's will. So, the other side of this will carries its own intentions rather than the specific intentions of an individual - the will-of-concepts.

A squirrel's will-to-copulate may have little to do with self-reflection or autonomous choice of who to copulate with and so may be called primitive. A squirrel's will-to-nourish may

have little to do with cookery or choice of diet and so may also be called primitive. So, our will-to-conceptualise has little to do with willing choice or self- reflection over how, why, and what things we are conceptualising. It is then, so to speak, in a primitive form.

We borrow from the socio-cultural specifics of an inherited language and conceptual framework over what ways the world is conceptualised and do not consider to explore and experiment ways to create different conceptual paradigms. One simple answer to why we do not is - we can't. This is not merely because we lack the tools to invent language from thin air. The will-of-concepts determines us to see the world as a result of prior prejudices that it has created and so we may never be fully free of its prejudices. Even the specific notions of changing our concepts, and how to do this, are too based on prior concepts. We are never free to see the world in representations according to our autonomy if the representations bear their own life and power - that is if we consciously disregard the Real.

One example I can offer on how the will-to-conceptualise is a primitive will is the transition from the paradigmatic power of the institutional church in this country to the paradigm of rationalism. Previously, conceptualisations of what were deemed to be according to the will of God and conversely that of the Devil choked out dissenters. This choking out was far more brutal and vicious than the attitudes of what would later turn into rationality, the Enlightenment movement, and a specific form of lingual and conceptual freedom.

However, this particular sort of rationality would still be reliant on the previous conceptualisations of Christianity. It would still

imply a mind-body duality almost exactly like the soul-Earth duality. It would still view the universe as an artefact, only later as an artefact with no creator. And rationality of science would come to view our planet as contextually irrelevant and within an uncaring world. Make no mistake; this viewpoint would still stem from the conceptualisations of the church, sharing the exact same set of cosmological and meaningful principles. It would only oppose rather than affirm them. As the implications would go, we are meaningless *because* there is no God or higher-order, we are nihilistic to moral duty *because* there is no sacred moral text to follow, and so on.

The principles of rationality, while in many ways opposing those of the church, would still embody the same dichotomies. It would still embody the same conceptual paradigms of a theory of personhood, metaphysical content, and what it means to be meaningful and moral in the world. So, while rationality was an important step for the sake of liberty and scientific truth, many principles of rationality are still of the sort of primitive conceptualisation. This is because the paradigms are still formed within the same conceptual containers as that of Christianity.

There was and is still no methodology, then, to make the will-to-conceptualise any less primitive than the will-to-copulate or the will-to-nourish. This is at least partially because we lack notions of what the will-to-conceptualise actually is.

It, of course, seems that we would have little utility to reorganise and discern the conceptual world in the same way that a squirrel has little utility in roasting and seasoning a nut. How wrong this is! If the squirrel had rational intentions and an aim for wellbeing like we do, and saw a better way of doing

things, the squirrel upon discovering this new information and experience would act differently. This is precisely the issue with the dual conceptual will, for it is often perverted, overworked, and conceited to continue its process without being questioned. While the dual conceptual will shadows the Real in place of its own interpretation and imagination of the world, we will not see the world. The dual conceptual will requires a rightful antithesis.

A single element of language does not lead the rest. Rather, all elements of language arise together. However, the particular power language has is characterised by our identification with a particular part of our brain, the brain, in turn, being a particular part of our body. The conceived model of ourselves has, for the most part, the part of the mind responsible for conceptualising and reinforcing conceptualisation appearing dominant over other elements of the human body. We base one's entire experience on those conceptualisations, leading the rest. The dual conceptual will, in this sense, *is* this identified part of the mind, and our intention to have it guide over our entire experience of the world makes it so - the perception fulfils its prophecy. What may have stemmed from simple useful communication to others has evolved into its own living and breathing organ inside the skull, no longer a tool, but something with a will of its own.

While it may seem as if its primacy is inevitable, it is not. It never has been, and our reflection to invent and subsequently change our ideas about the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts will enable us to get access to experience both outside of it and newer, more fruitful experiences within. The will-to-conceptualise is entirely to do with the imaginary and the non-liveable. So, while we may pride it on efficiency,

calculability, reliability, social agreement, and whatever else, it is the organ that has the most to do with the denial of passion, of wonder, and of life in the Real itself.

Are we just overthinking? If this text were to be a guide, it would not merely be to not overthink. Concepts are aligned with particular perceptions of external as well as internal chatter. When one sees money in their hand, they do not think of the money, but they still reinforce the notion that it is valuable and valuable in a specific social, historical, and personal way. This alone is not as harmful, but it is our conditioning that makes us unable to totally strip away the perception of its value. However, this perception of money in the ecstasy of Nothing has supreme and sublime value. So do the pavement and the trees. Furthermore, the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts not only reinforce prior conceptualisations of money being valuable but also intend for further conceptualisations that exist concerning money, some of these conceptualisations being willingly thought out - and some not. For example, ten pounds may be seen as a small amount, or a large amount, depending on an individual's will-to-conceptualise and will-of-concepts.

To merely do away with thoughts does not solve the issue, for the concepts do not need to be spoken or internally conversed to have their possessive grasp on you. Rather, the lack of thinking should come not with the possessive grasp, nor with a restless silence, but direct observation of the world without concepts. We should see the money as intrinsically valuable because it was made from a tree just as much as what its buying power is.

Finally, thinking may be the direct way we can strip ourselves of the tyrannical grasp of the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts - by thinking about them, and subsequently questioning them.

The Structure of Structure

What is the structure of structure? Particularly, what is the structure of the part of our minds that is dedicated to creating and perceiving the world conceptually, and by extension, lingually? On what walls and angles do the structure of concepts reside within us?

We are pioneers of the box, both in how we construct the physical world and how we think. And yet, once in nature the box becomes natural, only our perceptions of the box compel it as if it were saying “I exist, and I exist separately to everything else!” And yet once without us, the box, the block of flats, the table, and the television set would be just as natural as the moss that grew on them. Nevertheless, where lies the idea for the box and why does the box bear little significance in the growth of nature but exists so primordially to us?

How does one identify the structure of structure? Let us think again of the nature of opposites - the opposites of black and white, and all in between. Let’s think of this continuum or gradient as a line. Then, let’s think of the structure of dimensions. The line comes first. Then, a plane. Then, a volume. These are the four markers of the three spatial dimensions.

But while nature has no necessity to care about rationally understanding universal physics, the dual conceptual will does.

This leads to our truthful but specialised understanding that spatial dimensions of the universe come off at right angles, and we build the box as a reflection of this fact. The square tessellates into itself in a way the honeycomb of the bee does not, for our chosen shape proves itself as the shape most reduced by logic. However, if the logic that preceded the physical square too, had a shape, what would its shape be?

Let us discuss what dimensions are and how they relate to the restriction, and subsequent expansion, of conceptual and lingual thought, both through the immediacy of an individual and also through Western history.

A Line

The most reducible dimension is the first dimension.

What have we conceived to exist on a one-dimensional line? We have time, for example. Time goes along the line, from the past into the future. This is the most physical reality we can conceive in our universe as going along a line.

The two extremes that the line is created by may be called opposites. From this, not only may we conceive time, but also all other opposites, with the gradient in between the two opposites being the line. Lightness and darkness are the two extremes and the gradient of all brightness is on the line. Absolute heat and the lack of are the two opposites, with all levels of heat being on the line. The absolute past, or the beginning, and the absolute future, or the end, are two opposites, with time being the line.

Just like physical lines of such things, we may also think of concepts and the necessary opposite as creating a conceptual line. Happiness and sadness create a line of particular quantifiable emotion. Freedom and slavery create the line of what might be called “freedom”.

Some “lines” have names, and others do not. Time is the name of the line associated with the opposites of past and future. However, the happiness-sadness line may only be named after happiness, one of its opposites. It may be the same for the line of freedom and slavery.

All concepts have their opposite in the context that they are understood, and the gradient between all concepts and their opposite creates a line. Therefore, all concepts have a line that can be drawn from it to its opposite.

All opposites to concepts are contextual, and often the definition of the word will depend on its opposite. Time itself can be seen as a point, a point opposing space, with space-time being the line.

A Square

A square is a two-dimensional shape that has two variables, length and width. Any two variables can be represented by a square or a two-dimensional graph.

What have we conceived to exist on a two-dimensional square? If we have time as the first dimension, on the second dimension, we may have entropy. With time as the constant, we imagine entropy as on an incline throughout time. This is how, in this example, these two dimensions relate to one another. The incline may be a line, but the line graph itself is

the shape of a square and must be a square for the graph to exist properly.

A word, too, is a line drawn from the meaning of the word to the meaning of what would be called its contextual opposite. Not all lines have contextual opposites in the same way that all words have contextual opposites, but all opposites are contextual. This is because the definitions of words and concepts themselves differ according to context.

Lines may themselves exist at right angles to other lines. The line of time opposes the line of money, and the line of time also opposes the lines of space. Here, the line of time opposes the line of entropy.

While abstract and non-conclusive, the right angles of different conceptual lines come in two perceived forms that might be called “partial contextual relevance”, and “total contextual relevance”, Partial contextual relevance may be a similar relation to how time relates to money in a general non-conclusive sense, and total contextual relevance would directly build from the rules of the initial line, such as the second spatial dimension in accordance to the first. Through this, lines of total contextual relevance seem to bear a more fundamental relationship, while the partial, merely a transient socio-cultural one. At least this is how it seems to be.

However, the distinction between opposites of partial and total contextual relevance is not universal and especially not concrete to fundamental reality, but too based on the socio-cultural mechanics of language. For example, the opposites of the second spatial dimension and the first may seem to be of the total contextually relevant kind, as different

dimensions of space seem more bound together and interdependent than time and money are, but this is all due to our learning of what it lingually means to be a group of spatial dimensions. Time and money may not seem to bear this kind of relationship.

But if the definition of time in the socio-lingual sense was also dependent on the same sense of the definition of money, it would. An example of both particular definitions existing in this way is the common phrase “Time is money”. Here, the particular definitions of time and money used in this sentence necessitate a total contextually relevant kind. This case is if the relationship of this kind is dependent on the particulars of the definition, which it always is.

Similarly, a tribe who lives on flat land with stagnant weather and little need to explore the sky may indeed see time as more closely relevant to the spatial dimensions of length and width than with height. It is our inhibitions to categorise space for the necessity of architectural, aeronautic, and astrophysical efforts that compels us to bind the spatial dimensions closer than to bind the spatial dimensions of time, money, happiness, entropy, light, heat, and whatever else.

The conclusion to be made here is not a negation or dismissal of the conceptions of partial and total contextual relevance. They very much exist but exist purely in the structure of language. It is important then, to use the distinction or gradient between partial and total contextual relevance to our advantage. This is to empower us to better untangle ourselves from the structure of concepts.

A Cube

A cube is a three-dimensional shape that has three variables, length, width, and depth. Any three variables can be represented by a cube or a three-dimensional graph.

What have we conceived to exist on a three-dimensional cube? If we have time as the first dimension, entropy on the second dimension, on the third dimension we may have the development of intelligent life. Time and entropy are marked by a line that goes across the two dimensions. Intelligent life, however, may be characterised
by a zig-zag that goes through the third dimension. This would be such that as the intelligence of life in the universe grows and grows, becomes extinct, newer and different forms of intelligent life come to evolve and develop as both entropy and the passing of time increases. The zig-zag itself may be transcribed into a one- dimensional line, but not in relation to the other dimensions. The line graph itself is the shape of a cube and must be a cube for the graph to exist properly.

We may take a practical example of a real-life situation involving three dimensions of thought. For example, someone who works hard may associate stress with productivity.

The elephant in the room is that productivity and so stress, corresponds to goodness, otherwise they would not pursue such an effort. Thus, it is at least partially the structure of language that will compel the person that works hard to continue along this path of what might be described as monotony or drudgery based on the conceptual frameworks that have been reinforced in their mind. One may attribute goodness, productivity, and stress, all as lines from them to

their opposite. One may then also understand that the ways these lines relate to each other are like a physical cube, with three dimensions of thought all relating to and coming off at right angles to each other. This, however, does not make this cube in any way a reality.

If we investigate the structure of concepts, we will lead to these conclusions of their relation to each other.

The Reality of Structure

Concepts do not directly represent reality. Rather, they are based on assumptions.

Not only do concepts imply affirmation, separation, domination-judgement, and value-domination-judgement, as well as many other universal functions I list in the next chapter, they are also contained by conceptual packages. These conceptual packages refer to the opinions, social cues, rituals, and processions of how the word exists in practice. In short, they refer to the concepts' prejudices. However, the conceptual package also refers to how different words relate to each other, and all such conceptual packages that come from such relationships. Firstly, the notion of work does not only point to the reality of work but also the importance of work, what it means to be a hard worker, what it means to work more than your neighbour, how successful you are, how happy you ought to be. Secondly, hard work is linked to success and happiness among many other words, lingual and conceptual entities that act with their own assumptions.

Do concepts rooted in physical reality have prejudicial assumptions too? For example, we see time as its own unique

force outside of the other physical forces of space and matter, and in the Western world, we see time as moving on a line from left to right. We also see time as something that ought to be used for something important. As a result, every individual has been unfree to determine what time is, the direction it goes in, its separation outside of other forces, or what time may be used for. The definition of time has with it a guideline on how to specifically define, view and use it. We do not consider the opposite of the descriptive and ritualistic assumptions behind time in the Western world, such as the opposite of productivity, action, and hastiness.

Even merely dealing with the line of the two most obvious and physical opposites, black and white, I can think of numerous assumptions about them, axioms, some socio-culturally dependent, others “universal;”

that black refers to its referent properly,
that black is the most extreme point on the line, that black is the rightful opposite to white,
that white refers to its referent properly,
that white is the most extreme point on the line, that black and white are separate in some sense,
that either black or white has the existent property and the other is the lack of said existent property,
that based on the value-domination-judgement function, either black or white ought to be maximised over the other,
that there is a definable medium ground that we may call its proper medium,
that black and white are competing for power, in which power may refer to a multitude of different sorts of relationships,
that the medium, grey, refers to its referent properly,

that the concept of black either empirically exists in the world or projects its metaphysical truth into it, that the concept of white either empirically exists in the world or projects its metaphysical truth into it,

that the concept of its absolute medium, grey, either empirically exists in the world or projects its metaphysical truth into it,

that if the referent to true black and white is indeed metaphysical, that the world hangs in a sort of middle place, in the middle of these two extremes,

that all existing visual entities in the world may be defined as having a property of brightness existing in between these two extremes, meaning that all Things of the World referring to brightness exist on the line,

on a more contextual basis, that all things either referring to brightness or otherwise, such as music, exist in some relation to the context of what black and white line outside of the scientific definition of brightness,

that the physical meaning of black has some connection, personal or otherwise, to a more contextual meaning of black, such as evil,

that the physical meaning of white has some connection, personal or otherwise, to a more contextual meaning of white, such as good,

that if one exists, so must the other,

that black refers to the extreme point as well as an area of liberty given to what may be considered black before it becomes dark grey,

that white refers to the extreme point as well as an area of liberty given to what may be considered white before it becomes light grey,

that besides the explicit or implicit connotations of black, that black does not connote anything else, that besides the explicit

or implicit connotations of white, that white does not connote anything else, that besides the explicit or implicit connotations of grey, that grey does not connote anything else, etc.

What is important about these assumptions, or axioms, is that they are not proved to be true, and can never be proved true by language or description alone. The assumptions predicate the lingual form and so cannot be reduced by logic. If we were to conceive of some rigorous method to determine whether these assumptions were true, that rigorous method would too, be based on other assumptions. Would the rigorous method, and a different rigorous method, and their potential to synthesise or otherwise, not also form a line? Would the components of the method, its opposite method, and the forms of the language not also replace the line of black and white in the list of their own assumptions?

This is not a dismissal of the rigorous method, but a recognition that the rigorous method itself may only be communicated by language. Language carries universal functions and socio-lingual interpretations and assumptions of the words it uses. One may never reach the bottom of lingual analysis communicatively, for all analysis is communicated with language.

For example, you may intend to apply a rigorous method to prove the first assumption of the black and white line, 1) that black refers to its referent properly. The rigorous method may be this: “if the majority of people that communicate the word “black” agree on its meaning, then the first assumption is correct. If not, it is not correct”.

However, this method is too based on assumptions, such as that language is sensical when the majority of people agree on what it means and not because of some other reason. We can call this first theory, “Democratic Referent Theory”, one akin to the descriptivist principle. One may now infer a line between Democratic Referent Theory and whatever its contextual opposite may be, and this may be Authority Referent Theory - which might be the theory that language is created by the elite, or scholars, one akin to the prescriptivist principle.

We are now greeted with all of its assumptions;

that Democratic Referent Theory refers to its referent properly,
that if Democratic Referent Theory is true, then it is the truest of the two language theories and therefore on the line at the point most extreme,
that Democratic Referent Theory is the rightful opposite to other opposing theories, such as Authority Referent Theory,
that Authority Referent Theory refers to its referent properly,
that if Authority Referent Theory is false, then it is the most false of the two language theories and therefore on the line at the *other* point most extreme,
that Democratic Referent Theory and Authority Referent Theory are separate in some sense, and so on.

This is not to say that Democratic Referent Theory is false, or the first assumption of the black and white line is false either. It is a mere demonstration that a rigorous (and language-based) method to verify assumptions of language will never reach a “bottom” or base level. This is because language is both the thing being used to communicatively analyse *and* the thing being analysed.

The assumptions behind the simple opposites of black and white may go on forever, and may furthermore be unrecognised. Then, imagine the assumptions behind a day of everyday speaking, lingual thought, and conceptual perception of the world. This would be in a situation in which all speaking, and more particularly words, have opposites. And imagine the immense archive of socially constructed concepts that have little to no bearing in physical reality, and the assumptions they have within them. Are they questioned? Are they mastered?

Think not that the message here is to dismantle conceptual frameworks. What is important is whether the decision one carries out is their decision, and not language's. Think not that ignorance of these lingual and conceptual structures prevents their existence and subsequent power. These structures are immanent in every human being, regardless of the variations of the particulars of conceptualisations between humans. To even say "Time is money" is to prove this fact, demonstrating the imminence of what I have now described as conceptual dimensions.

Language's mutation to command itself as the primary experience is the mission with the least fruit, for there is nothing to taste at the end. And it is certainly so that this mission is followed by its many senseless followers, and this mission is of course endowed with the promise of metaphysical fruit, and so, fruit we may never receive.

Sociology and Conclusions

A simple abstraction of Hegel's dialectics, while popular, may not be entirely reflective of the reality of the historicism of human thought. In other words, the reality of human thought

may not be easily purported like this; thesis, antithesis, synthesis/new thesis, and so on. This is because the synthesis has no location concerning the previous theses when it becomes its own thesis, intending to seek its own antithesis. This is true of many areas of human thought. Perhaps we may do better at understanding the reality of dialectics as *dimensional* dialectics. Dimensional dialectics is the process of looking at things dialectically, but through a multitude of dimensions. Unlike the thesis-antithesis-synthesis paradigm, which is mostly one-dimensional, we may expound to higher ones.

For example, illustrating and imagining a crude history of sociology, we may have positivist functionalism as the thesis, studying society as a social organism that, on deeper analysis, is the sum of benign institutions.

Then we may have Marxism, that which would firmly oppose positivist functionalism, studying society as a class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, these being according to the Marxists the two only true institutions that form the social organism. Marxism would become the antithesis, and these two opposing perspectives would form a line.

If we were to speak of the following school of thought, social action theory, with basic dialectics, we would not recognise the dimensional dialectic means for how it came about. Rather, social action theory had characterised positivist functionalism and Marxism as both equally *structuralist* sociological frameworks, or macrosociologies. They would come to both view society from the top-down, viewing it as an organism, then with its institutions, then with its families, then with its

members. However, the bases for which each side disagreed on would be the same. Social action theory and subsequently interactionism, sociological phenomenology and ethnomethodology would be *microsociologies,* inspecting the basis of all society as enacted and performed by the individual first and foremost. Here we have opposing theses in multiple dimensions, together creating a net.

Now sociology is not a line, but a square, with two dimensions. This crude imagination of the history of sociology is portrayed to reflect the nature of dimensional dialectics. It is only once we view this through dimensional dialectics that it is clear that human conceptual thought progresses largely in this fashion.
Dimensional dialectics does not necessitate a resolution between the thesis and the antithesis, for a second dimension may be created, this second dimension consisting of concepts that together antithesise the new synthesis. In this model, both sides to the synthesis may still be unresolved. Functionalism and Marxism may never cease their hostile resistance to each other for an antithesis of both to be born.

So then, the question must be asked: what other conceptual lines are capable of forming into conceptual squares? Does the line of subjectivity and objectivity have capabilities to form into two dimensions? What of the opposing concepts of meaning and meaninglessness? What of God and godlessness? What of idealism and materialism? And speaking less in states of philosophical queries and more in states of everyday problems, what of wealth and lack of ? What of love and the lack of ? What of happiness and unhappiness? If we cannot free ourselves entirely of the structure of concepts by ceasing thought of them, how may we exercise a will to experiment and

expand the concepts that reside within, and so, come to further recognise their falsity?

If the dual conceptual will is inevitable in the human condition, we may at least investigate dimensions themselves, and upon seeing how concepts are really organised and come to develop in the mind, see how self- reflection of this fact may expand human thought.

I have now discussed the dual conceptual will, and from there, explicitly discussed ways in which concepts and language are structured in the mind. I have portrayed this so descriptively, for I did not, the reality of the structure of concepts would be less tactile and less vivid to the individual that reads this, and so the individual would not be elucidated to see the conceptual structures for what they are. I have also explained the fallacy of assumptions so vividly so we might understand the immanent gap between concepts and reality - there is no bedrock in which they firmly touch.

In the next chapter, I shall discuss more universal functions, such as that which relates to oppression, the insistence of rationality, completion, and otherwise. The question is this: if we may never speak of states of affairs without succumbing to the laws of these universal functions, how may we knowingly engage with and thrive in the world at all? It is clear we can, and this further illustrates this glooming existence of that which language may never touch - the existence and acquaintance of the Nothing, or the Real.

THE LINGUAL INSTINCT

Other Universal Functions of Mature Language

What are other universal functions of mature words? What are some other universal properties that come from the nature of what it is to be or to speak of, a word or sentence that is filled with logical, sensical, unitary, and self-reflective intent? For a handful of universal functions we have;

1. affirmation,
2. separation,
3. domination-judgement,
4. value-domination-judgement,

that we have already discussed, and then, more universal functions that infer direct references to the self- affirming, primary, and centralised properties of language;

5. intention for deliberate change and aspiration for subjective betterness,
6. forceful action over the non-speaking world,
7. the insistence of proof of the validity of one's lingual based experiences,
8. the insistence of proof of the rational-lingual self,
9. the insistence of proof of a form of rational superiority in some division over others,
10. the insistence of proof of a social agreement in some sense or another,

11. the insistence of proof of the validity of one's lingual based experiences as opposed to those who speak different languages,
12. the insistence of proof of a form of superiority over the non-speaking world,
13. the organisation of perception of the lingual world,
14. economic exchange of the rational kind,
15. intention to arrive at the completion of a process,
16. continuation of the development of one's lingual world through history,
17. oppression of perception,

And finally, in regards to the non-lingual view;

18. retraction from and resistance to the wordless condition,
19. retraction from and resistance to the ecstasy of nothing.

These universal functions come with not merely specific words of the mature kind, but with all natures of being a word, understanding a word, or using a word. In other words, the functional use of a mature word is inseparable from these universal functions.

Whenever I refer to speaking in this chapter, I refer to speaking in mature or instrumental language.

However, I do not intend to portray myself as believing language has an objective structure that can be analysed as such. Language's structure appears objective, but its essence is subjective, and the conflation of language's essence and

structure leads to many major confusions. Furthermore, words themselves are not objective or absolute either - to understand a word is to also involuntarily understand its assumptions, connotations, imperatives, and processions which are entailed within its deductive definition or its organic one. It is to understand its prejudices.

To properly understand the nature of the functions of a word, one must know the wordless condition and therefore the lack of functions that come from it - a state of being in the world without the prejudices that these functions cause. In other words, these universal functions intend to give light to ways the world is *not*. What is the
wordless condition of the world, the condition of the non-conceptual?

We may also investigate both the universal function and the socio-cultural product that stems from such a universal function. The naked universal function can never be removed from the speaking of a word unless one speaks purely expressively or immaturely. The socio-cultural product, however, is an evolved set of implicit norms, principles, behaviours, and attitudes that stem from the universal function. However, when I say the “socio-cultural product”, I mean specifically the theoretical and socio-cultural outcome that may be posited to be guided by the universal function itself, not all social attitudes that are aligned with certain forms of language.

For example, to say “Hello” will always imply intention for agreement because it is the way of mature language to be this way - if one did not intend to agree, one would not need to speak. This is the naked universal function. However, the

particulars of the word “Hello” also carry with them a particular social agreement, such as it being correct to say “Hello” back. This is to agree in a specific sense, and this specific sense is marked by a specific historical outcome. So, do these socio-cultural products come purely through random social change, or does the structure of logical, sensical, self-reflective language itself play a guiding role? This is the goal of this part of the book - to theorise what norms, principles, behaviours, and attitudes have been guided by the immutable conditions of such a logical and sensical language.

As an example, we may look at the separation of the world into things and the opposing Actuality of the World. It is clear to any scientist or mystic that separation is an untrue state of affairs in the Actuality of the World. All separations require a perfect dividing line, and this dividing line is always arbitrary. States of affairs may be essentially different in qualities, but this does not infer their separateness as things. Nevertheless, this separation may be a good function for our survivalist and communicative abilities as a species. The begging question here is of course, whether things would appear separate in the standardised view at all if we did not speak of them as being such. Their difference in appearance and functionality might occur despite language, but lingual separateness is unique and thus uniquely prejudicial when we perceive states of affairs.

For example, we may functionally see ourselves as separate from the world. However, if we were to describe our separateness to the world and cement it with the description or speaking terms, we take the separation of, for example, the self from the world too seriously. Thus, we will be terrified of the world’s innate power to destroy us - our fear of death.

Western culture separates self from the world, internal consciousness from external states of affairs, and life from death. Then, we see the world and death as a more dominant reality than ourselves - we need the world, and the world doesn't need us. From this stems our desires to have life win - through all our medical and technological efforts to postpone and halt death's inevitability. This separateness becomes its own world on top of reality; we talk of ourselves with a start and endpoint throughout time, as independent from the world in identity, as atomic and not holistic, and so on. These beliefs are *not* necessary functionalities to existing. They are what we may only call the prejudices of the lingual instinct. There may be differences in the intention of individuals compared to processes of the world, but not separations.

These, if we inspect closely, may be the socio-cultural products that derive from the first four functions I have labelled in this book. We affirm ourselves as existing and existing in a particular way, separate ourselves from the world, dominant-judge the world's brutal power over ourselves, and then value-dominant-judge our separate selves as more important.

We then act in a socio-cultural format that depends on these perceptions of the world, perceptions which stem from the illusion such functions bear, such as hurriedly pursuing biomedical efforts, establishing technological prowess to affirm our atomic identity, and so on. There was no process in which the self ought to impose such restrictions on oneself as against or fighting the world based on conceptions of identity, for these identities do not exist in the way we speak and think of them.

It is not merely the language that propels us into the direction of the socio-cultural product. It is also the influence we allow language to give us in our culture. These are, of course, a multitude of many chaotic historical influences in all social and cultural outcomes. However, the bedrock of all these processes is language and its specific forms, for, without language, society in any form as we know it could not exist, and Western society has established language as the most important element of the human condition. It is language's influence itself, then, and the influence we allow language to have on us, that I believe is the most unexamined point of conversation in such social and cultural processes - the most unexamined, for the height of its influential magnitude is immutable. This is why we must inspect closer the range of experiences that do *not* follow the rigidity of universal functions, for such experiences may very much still be available to us.

There are also non-lingual socio-cultural products that are present outside of the process of language - but these also very much originate from language. For example, deliberate action and aspirations for subjective betterness are not merely carried out through speaking, but also through many of the actions and thoughts we have in the world. These actions are in one sense overused, perverse, and obsessed over. Our constant desire to make things better as opposed to other experiences or attitudes may derive largely from our innate want to avoid pain or suffering. Nevertheless, the new formalisation of the universal function itself is another matter entirely, to formally and *deliberately* aspire to make things better, and to do this in every possible walk in life. These too, have particular connotations and contexts.

We may even project such notions to the natural world. Think of the world; even evolution itself seems to follow this universal function, to improve the species on the Earth. But it is not only an informal process but devoid of aspiration for subjective betterness altogether. The world does not “aspire” to improve the species of animals, to make things “better”. The process simply occurs naturally and randomly.

Nevertheless, it is to many a case we judge as following the laws of improvement - a law of human design. We, on the other hand, are compelled to improve in a formalised, conceptual and even metaphysical way - and at all times. Such a perspective is one that the world does not follow in any sense, so our devout mission to improve upon things too follows from the human condition, a condition pervaded by language to label betterness as betterness, and so on.

The most notably interesting thing to speak of may not be the universal functions of words or the socio-cultural products of such, but the potential experiences outside of these functions. One cannot speak sensically of experiences outside any of these universal functions because to speak of them is to portray them as with these universal functions.

These experiences very much exist - it may be referred to as the guiding principle of the world as separate from human lingualisations. They are the most important experiences a human being may have. There is a world of experience that does not require separation, domination, the insistence of proof of the rational self, oppression of perception, or any of the other of the functions. They are free of the tool using the tool-bearer.

Of course, the perceptual mechanics of language may never touch it.

So, we may investigate what elements of speaking in a certain way are benign - and what ways aren't. Furthermore, we may at will, investigate what socio-cultural products of these functions are benign, and what ones aren't, and from there, investigate how we may retract these socio-cultural conditions that have been guided by the lingual instinct.

5. intention for deliberate change and aspiration for subjective betterness

To speak is to have the intention for deliberate change and aspiration for subjective betterness. The betterness here is subjective, for those who speak it are subjective.

The reason we do this is because of the deliberation of speaking itself. To act deliberately is to act with a cause, a sensical way to say this and not that. Within this cause lies the idea of what might be called micro-improvement, or that this will make things better.

What may be the origin? We are generally always guiding ourselves away from displeasure or pain or maintenance of the painless. However, it is language that thrusts this aspiration to deliberate change and aspiration for subjective betterness, a form of betterness that exists on what one might call sharp edges. Our idealised betterness is valuable for the sake of conceptual progress, but within the lingual instinct there inhabits the compulsion for this function to be acted out at all times, and our desire for the better future conceals the present

Real. In other words, maintenance of the painless, when transcribed into language, becomes a unified, deliberate and self-reflective intent for the concept of betterness.

Philosophical practice ought to continue under scrutinised investigation into the universal function of words. As an example by what I mean, this book itself is philosophical practice, and like all formal philosophical practice, it is used with words. If we know the words to possess these previously mentioned universal functions, it is greatly important to understand that all philosophical practice will too, possess these universal functions, for better or for worse. So, all philosophical practice does not merely attempt to observe the world but to deliberately make things better.

Thus, none of these philosophies we may call conceptualist philosophies, or perhaps even naive conceptualist philosophies, are objective or unbiased, but all with intent to idealise the better future, and to contrive of ways to conjure it up in specific ways, microscopically or otherwise.

It is from here that this book recognises its paradoxical and oxymoronic nature with its attempt to speak of a volition outside the universal functions of mature words. It is from here that this book wishes to not merely produce more moral or even amoral knowledge into the world in such said aspirations for betterness and thrust to find a better future but to investigate what such a function means in the first place, to do something outside of the compulsion of this function of language.

However, it is true that in performing this action we too are continuing this function to attempt to make situations better. This is because this book perceives this investigation as

virtuous and possessing the quality of betterness - I write to improve the intellect and the spirit. But with attempted sincerity, it is not merely this, for now with this we are investigating the repercussions of such a function. So, we may investigate it for more than the single reason of the mere attempt to try to make things better. In doing so, we may act with differently established intent.

To escape this function when discussing reality, we must find this function's contextual opposite, the lack of intention for deliberate change and aspiration for subjective betterness. This state is, therefore, something that may never be understood or conveyed through philosophical practice (and in turn, the contextual opposites of all the universal functions, may too, never be understood or conveyed by philosophical practice). In other words, we cannot speak of something without the attempt to make things subjectively better to be present. And how most of our actions also seem to bear this deadening weight of climbing the ladder of improvement, where such an exercise may seem to never cease!

The major socio-cultural product present from the universal function is, of course, our infatuation with improvement as individuals and as a society. And how flawed this infatuation is! In the modern age, we do not even need to speak without a violent impulse to make things better, and we are violently idealising improvement at all times. Certainly, most of us do not even see a perspective where such an impulse is not necessary for existence. What is necessary for true presence in this world is being in this world first and foremost. Aspirations for subjective betterness may come after. If one permits the future to have a stranglehold on the present, all our actions that take place in the present will be perverse, for the imagined

future we act for has no connection to the present idiosyncrasies of reality. We must turn away from the disconnect of an idealised and improved future and turn more towards the present state of reality.

6. **forceful action over the non-speaking world, and 12. the insistence of proof of a form of superiority over the non-speaking world**

Man attributes himself, consciously or unconsciously, to be qualified, entitled and worthy to make decisions on how the world should function. This comes after his rational ability to discern and conceptualise, for it is an evolved notion that with the recognition of the man-made self, he may see himself fit to create his own world functioning on top of or against the natural one. This is due to the nature of conceptualisations. Once man conceptualises the things around him, the conceptualisations appear as objective knowledge, despite the assumptions they will have in their many varieties. So, man cannot talk of the world without distorting it into, most notably, a lack of what it should be, be it the natural world or otherwise. Man then becomes greatly infatuated with his notions of both forceful action on the world and, as a speaker that causes the conceptualisations of the world to be centralised and internalised in the individual, superiority over the world that bears no lingual voice.

The instinct for man to do this is greatly inspired by this sixth function, forceful action over the non-speaking world. Speech implies its own dominance in a way other natural expressions of the world do not, so all language comes with it a desire to forcefully act with sharp edges, that of a unified and

self-affirming nature. These actions may be benign in certain conditions (and we may not cease to use language even if we wanted). However, we may recognise it and understand forceful action to not be primary to our existence in the world. Furthermore, we may deny this function to possess us in its evolved and mutated form, a specific socio-cultural product and will to invoke forceful action over the world, oppressing it, controlling it, and taming it. Our actions and identity are conceptualised in the fashion of our ability to deliberate, and so we become “rightful deliberators”.

This socio-cultural product of man to wreck his environment and his fellow kind may be the result of our fear of the world; the world does not speak English or any other language. Our desire and arrogance to manipulate the matter and ecosystem of the world is at one with our fear of it swallowing us into its ether, like the ocean to pebbles on the shore. This fear, too, comes from the conceptual view of us being separate to the world, and the socio-cultural ideas of what it means to be a “self ” stand against our socio-cultural ideas of the world. As it stands, the world appears to have a “will” separate to ours. It does not care if we die, it does not care whether our species continues, and it does not care if we are adequately fed or sheltered. We must, then, act ourselves.

But, to speak of the world in a somewhat romantic manner, in the same way that a mother bird that nurtures after her over-matured young impairs the birds from their freedom, so too must our world allow us to manifest our own will. We must not, however, ignore or forget the ways of the mother bird, or attempt to destroy or warp her for our arrogant efforts. The important aspect is that as the world itself created us, understands our needs more than we do, and it does all of this

without such fashions to deliberate, unify, and self-affirm. In other words, it does it all non-conceptually.

To speak more critically, our forceful action and superiority come from within the space language is used in, language being primary - how we talk about actions and how we talk about ourselves. Our actions and ourselves, as it were, “pop-out” from the world and appear as the most important processes.

So, while we will always be allowed to exercise our efforts to manifest action over it to a certain and responsible extent, this is mere extra merit to a more fundamental truth of our existence - living in the world and being in the world. Being in the world has always preceded a forceful decision to affect the world. This is something that through repeated forceful action and notions of superiority we have forgotten, and so the experience of simply living in the world without any need to oppress or control becomes ignored through our infatuated desire to forcefully act onto it.

As this is a universal function, meaning that all language carries this function within it, we cannot speak of things without forceful action and superiority to come into being. As soon as we intend to speak about the world or ourselves, we are conveyed through this language as the principal agents to the world to perform our acts which then through lingualisation appear distinct and transcendent. We say as it were, this: “It doesn’t matter what the world consists of, my intention to get a newspaper is of the highest reality!” We become superior and forceful in everything we do here. It is not that this is the only way we may act, but the only way language may portray things as being when represented to us, and we follow it, willingly or unwillingly.

Subsequently, there is a need to acknowledge this universal function, and therefore retract the excess socio- cultural products and means of action onto the world we have been taught. To put it simply, we must speak with less intention of this further prejudicial action that stems from such judgements of language and the subsequent implication that the world is senseless and carries an inferior will to ours. It may be quite the opposite.

7. the insistence of proof of the validity of one's lingual based experiences

When one speaks the language carries an intention to affirm the speaker's conceptual view of the world at present. To communicate with both ourselves and others is to affirm that our conceptual world is valid, and this is the seventh function. The example of the seventh function existent in the phrase "Let's have sex" is "I want to insist to you that my conceptualised decision to want to have sex with you is valid (regardless of its appropriateness)".

This rational decision is exemplified by the fact that one has used conceptualisation, at least partially, to conclude
that one wants to have sex with the person, and these conceptualisations bear such a sort of validity. If one did not require such validation, one would not even speak in English, a language formed from the intent for social acceptance and rational understanding! Language does not only point to Things of the World, but also to the affirmation of itself.

Therefore, the will-of-language is constantly seeking to prove itself as valid. Non-lingual based experiences and the non-lingual world lack such a need - non-lingual experiences just *are*, external to the peculiarities of self- affirmation. The will-of-language then embodies its own uncertainty. It will assume there is an element of certainty that one's lingual based experiences are missing, for we speak not because we are certain, but because we are *not* certain. The insistence to prove validity means that we are contained by our lingual prejudices, such validity will never arrive.

The antithesis of this function is the undoubtful, the certain, and the non-lingual. For example, libido itself does not seek to prove itself as valid in the way that formalised desire and speech would, for the feeling itself is self- evident and cannot be invalidated. Libido simply is.

Nevertheless, the attempt to calibrate one's conceptual structures with an external person or community may either succeed or fail. To speak is to doubt, and to be free of the need of speech is to be free from such doubt.

This is not to say that instincts should supersede language as opposed to language superseding instincts. Rather, we should seek a third force in us, a force that transcends both the primitive urges of instinct and the humanistic primitive urges of lingualisation.

The socio-cultural product is present in our legal systems, in our books, our speech, and above all - our bureaucracy. We are keen to be precise, certain, and unambiguous - and very anxiously in that regard. This tendency has dominated all forms of communication and interaction with other people.

This is not harmful in itself, but our doubtfulness of validity is present in our forms of excessive conceptual mediators. We must, as it were, always be certain when we communicate, and yet by the exact ambiguity of communication, we never can be. The list of laws, codes, and regulations will grow without end!

Language will always be subjectively interpreted, and the nature of language will always distort the reality it attempts to represent in some way. Much as defining bureaucracy as a product of this function might be considered too simplistic and abstract, the point still stands as a criticism. Bureaucracy in a way then becomes an implicit way to stamp out the *non-proof* of the validity of one's lingual based experiences, by a repetition of systems, codes, laws, terms and conditions that fulfil themselves as being the only possible experiences that one could have.

However, we will never arrive at a perfect translation. Language will always come with doubt. We must embrace the ambiguity of our social and legal systems, and subsequently the meaningful ambiguity but substantive certainty of the Real.

8. **the insistence of proof of the rational-lingual self**

To speak is to insist proof of the existence that one is rational in mind, and that one a rational-lingual creature first and foremost, and this is the eighth function. In the evolved socio-cultural product stemming from this function, language implies very successfully that our conceptual rationality comes before all other elements of the self, even if this is implicit. This is because language is portrayed as an exercise of expression of rationality, and this portrayal is present no matter what ways

language is used. Language and concepts affirm themselves in a way that other parts of the mind and body do not, so as a result, the lingual part of us self-determines that it is the most important part. The rest of us, lacking a voice to disagree, simply submits.

Speech may never remove this function for it is universal. However, one may pay better attention to both how this function has become produced socio-culturally, and from there, investigate the experiences that do not bear the need for proof of this kind of rational or lingual primacy.

What sort of social world bases itself primarily off the rational-lingual self ? And is the rational self the element of man that is the best to base one's life and civilisation on? Language may never offer an alternative, for both
naked language and its contemporary socio-lingual implications reinforce a worldview completely entwined with the merits and prices of rationality and lingualisation. If we invest ourselves too much in language and therefore insist on proof of the rational-lingual self as primary to what makes us, us first and foremost, what antithetical experiences do we repress and ignore? What socio-cultural assumptions are made when one says and means "rational"?

These socio-cultural assumptions of the primacy of rationality and language are catastrophic if unchecked. Some situations where this function becomes a standardised premise indeed lead to fascist and authoritarian regimes, some bureaucratic and over-functionalised institutions, and some otherwise. They all in part grow from this eighth function. What of the emotional, passionate, explorative, and other experiences of this nature that do not bear these socio-lingual packages of

rationality, logic, and language above all other forms of the human being?

It may appear that if we simply describe such emotional, passionate and explorative natures of the human being, we may build better systems. What is the problem with describing emotional, passionate and explorative language in the face of this universal function? The problem is that such emotional and passionate experiences will always at least partially be portrayed through language to perpetuate insistence of the rational-lingual self, to prove it as to grow to rationality and lingualisation, for whenever one speaks of anything emotional, passionate or explorative, one will always attempt to demonstrate one's knowledge or knowledge of lack of knowledge on the subject.

The lingual instinct transcribes these experiences into lingualised experiences, and from there, views these experiences as part of the lingual domain. There is always a tinge in some respect of proof that they are rational and lingual, and not otherwise, for once the emotional language is transcribed into rational language, the self will always interpret that experience at least at partially as one of a rational and lingual nature. Passion, in this sense, will always be choked out, for passion does not need to be lingualised, rationalised, and conceptualised, and yet always will become distorted and prejudicial when it is transcribed into such.

So then, while we are always using language and conceptualisation, we do not always need to prove we are rational and lingual beings. To do so leads to catastrophe, both in the face of the rest of ourselves and the actions we perform in the world. However, language will always bear this function,

and so the emotional, passionate, explorative, and other non-lingual experiences that bear no voice can never be communicated maturely. However, a potential solution may arrive, but only once we recognise that the rational-lingual self is not primary, but relational to all other aspects of ourselves.

9. the insistence of proof of a form of rational superiority in some division over others

Rational division here refers to the insistence that one is adequately permitted in a rational way to say what one is talking about in a way that others do not. To say “I don’t know enough”, too infers that one is socially superior to hold the rational division to say that one doesn’t know enough.

This is a universal function because speech is always centralised to a unit of thinking, of a person (or group), and also a unit of thought, emerging from a self out into the world - it comes from the speaker. Language implies its importance as it stands out from the world with a deliberate voice, and observes and advocates in the world. Thus, as an exact structure and context of speech cannot be uttered by two separate selves or groups (for that is the nature of variance) and speech implies its own importance, speech will always imply importance in a certain division over others. In other words, as you are not saying what others are saying and it is implicit that your speech is important, you are implying your speech to be more important in some way to others.

This rational division is much like the seventh function. However, it is different in the sense that with this function

what they are speaking about specifically entitles them to speak about it, whereas the seventh function merely implies that the lingual and conceptual world one's words and conceptual structures are based on is valid. For example, "Let's have sex" carries the seventh function in the sense that the speaker speaks in a context that sex, for instance, is an acceptably conceptualised and rationalised Thing of the World. However, it carries the ninth function in that the speaker knows they have a rational superiority that it is acceptable to propose to have sex from their perspective.

The socio-cultural implications of this are too similarly tinged in doubt like the seventh function, but this doubt develops more into advanced competitiveness. Thus, the desire to speak evolves into the desire to be superior to others.

The non-conceptual and non-lingual does not bear this need for superiority, and this is the experience language may never gauge or give access to properly.

The socio-cultural product of competitiveness is one of Western society's driving forces, from the obviousness of the economics of capitalism to immediate social competitiveness, be it online or elsewhere. These may exist as two strengths for the sake of growth and improvement, but two questions must be asked. Is it your willing decision to exercise such constant micro-competitions? And the subsequent question is: if competitiveness is not of total necessity, what is the virtue of non-competitiveness? The decisions we make on competitiveness have, at least partially, something to do with conceptual frameworks of betterness and worseness, you and others, and will never consider the substantive nature of the Real. Competitiveness is formed on assumptions on what it

means to be better or worse, which has no bearing in real physical natures of things.

The virtue of non-competitiveness is the virtue of not allowing language to permeate the notion that we must enact superiority over others in any fashion that does not enrich our lives properly. Physical reality has no part to play in the games of profit, esteem, or reputation. If we acknowledged language to wrongly portray things as existing on rational divisions, transcending the Real, we could free ourselves of its grasp a little more.

10. the insistence of proof of a social agreement in some sense or another

To speak is to insist proof that the speaker relates to the subject in agreement – another or themselves. This is because not only is the syntax and grammar of the language shared by the speakers, but also the context is shared. Language intends to not only find validity in experiences, like the seventh function, but also agreement in perspectives, views, and opinions. Indeed, one may be found talking to oneself for one wants to assure one's worldview is not only valid but correct! In this sense, we carry such social tendencies to agree with other parties to the conflicting parts of ourselves. Language affirms itself in the insistence of validity of the experiences transcribed lingually. But, they also insist that the perspectives and opinions that come within perceived states of affairs are rightful and justified. Language, then, not only affirms to represent experience to be valid but also affirms to represent

interpretations of experience to be valid. Words do not present themselves without advocacy to appeal.

Social agreement in some sense is fundamental to the nature of appropriate socialisation, and this is the benign aspect of this function. However, this agreement relates an invisible and marginal but very real doubt, the doubt of agreement and congruence or the fear of disagreement or incongruence.

While marginal, it is important to highlight that under the right circumstances, the non-conceptual reflects an even higher state of “agreement” than any predicated by language - the agreement-as-is. The notion of the congruent and agreeing nature of the world was not killed with the concept of disagreement, but with the concept of agreement. Fear of disagreement is fundamental to all instrumental or mature communication, for if one did not need to insist agreement, one would not need to communicate.

What is the socio-cultural product? The socio-cultural product of insistence of proof of social agreement, as with all universal functions, extends beyond the bare demands of the naked universal function. This social agreement becomes largely inhabited in the political domain. The main result of progression towards the unification of agreement is centralisation or a central world that encourages all peripheral worlds to be aligned with it. Centralised government, globalisation, and homogeneity of social, moral, and legal systems may likely stem from this functional need to agree. And obviously, this comes with the subsequent fear of the lack of compatibility of the homogeneity of social, moral, and legal systems.

This is problematic in two ways. The first is that fear of the pressure put onto lack of compatibility generates hostility, insecurity, and alienation.

The second is more interesting, and refers to the evolution to the socio-cultural product from the naked universal function: if language is encoded with a need to confirm social agreement, then an apparent necessity to
make all language speakers think and believe the same things will appear. Fundamentally, language coerces this, and the meanings of language become unanimous. As long as centralisation and globalisation push things towards this fact, the question must be persistently asked: why not a variation of social, moral, and legal systems and beliefs? Why not a variation in both languages and opinions, and the socio-cultural products of languages and opinions?

For example, democratic systems that favour a 60% majority vote on any legal topic over a minority vote of 40% and implement the winning vote into law will induce a tyranny of the majority that marginalises the smaller voice.

More importantly to this book, however, it disregards the prejudices of the socio-cultural and lingual systems that generate those to vote in this way. If language becomes more homogenised and unanimous over time and sociolinguistics are relative and based on particular assumptions, then it is clear that even if any moral system was universally and objectively superior to another (which it likely isn't, as enacted moral systems are likely based on particular and relative conditions), it is not arrived at or to be known through language. The evolution of language has nothing to do with

attainment for the good, as many goods are precisely the opposite of what can be expressed lingually.

What is my advocacy? We should instead, like all forms of life, generate a variation of systems, a multiplicity of systems, for if one moral system is not superior to another in the physical world, one should not homogenise the totality of people in any way - and instead, encourage a life of colour and sparkling variety. A focus on intentional decentralisation, individualist and communitarian decisions on their own social, moral and legal systems should then be advocated. What great problems both the capitalists and the communists have, and how tirelessly they both fight to conceive of a future where it is the same for all - a homogenised future! What of the notion that individuals and communities themselves can choose, free of agreement from outsiders, what they ought to do, and practise the virtue of difference and disagreement? Such "disagreements" between communities are what could be a potential solution to a problem that may also be marked by its simplicity. It is not the ceasing of our problems that leads to virtue, for we will always have problems. It is the uniqueness of our problems that leads to virtue.

11. the insistence of proof of the validity of one's lingual based experiences as opposed to those who speak different languages

To speak is to infer consciously or unconsciously that one's lingual based experiences in one's specific language are valid. This function is very much like the seventh function, but this function particularly refers to opposition to those who speak

different specific languages. In my case, this language would be English.

For example, “Lovely” was never seen as a comfortable word for David from Madrid, an exchange student like many others living with me in a building in Finland. For him, it was too soppy and sugary when translated, as if the simple breakfast I remarked at was abundant in love. However, I would not cease from saying the word in the right contexts, because to me, my lingual based experience opposed his, and I wished to insist proof of the validity of those experiences where he did not see them.

This function does not merely refer to the instances when we do speak with a bilingual person, but even monolingual people, in my case both me and them only being able to speak English. This is because to speak English is to reinforce the conceptual view of English and to reinforce that English is a valid conceptual framework of the world, as valid as or perhaps more valid than Spanish. One may not even consider Spanish or Swahili when one speaks, but these languages nevertheless do exist with their interpretations of the world, and so speaking English reinforces its superiority in one way or another.

This is not merely due to convenience. Our languages seem complete and seem to represent the Things of the World completely. The seeming completeness of our language is the crux. If our languages appeared incomplete, we would be constantly adopting new phrases from other languages, in a much speedier fashion that the slowness that we have come to adopt “restaurant” or “café”. The apparent completeness of our language, therefore, reinforces its subjective superiority in our lives. Nevertheless, this means a silent lack of

acknowledgement to what other languages may offer in terms of what they deem to be Things of the World, the conceptual frameworks they offer, their socio-cultural products, and the ways it directs them towards wellbeing
and utility in ways that English could never offer.

The socio-cultural product of this function? The colonial culprit of the English language. Indeed. English has taken over the world, and this process means the suppression of the interpretations of the world given by all other languages. The steady unification of English to be spoken as the primary language across the world is a great tragedy for these very aforementioned reasons.

13. the organisation of perception of the lingual world

To speak is to organise and reinforce prior organisations of perceptions of the world. To say “Hello” is to do this, for we are organising and reinforcing organisations that “Hello” is to be spoken at the beginning of the conversation and not the end. Thus, when we turn to the assumptions of the Things of the World, we intend to organise them as best we can. Language is located and locates itself in a certain place and a certain time, built from the context of past conversations and lingual exchanges.

However, such organisations of the world are purely lingual and nothing more, and are almost always reinforced because of prior organisations, not actual states of affairs. These prior organisations may be virtuous, useful, or consist of well-being or they may not. One particular organisation of the world

quickly becomes fascistic and contradictory to the states of affairs of the world the more they are reinforced.

Adulthood is the prime example of the fascistic organisation of the lingual world, and the tragedy of memory loss of childhood over the total period of human life is that one forgets there is an experience outside of the fascistic organisation of the world in the first place. Childhood then comes not only without fascistic organisations but lacks the knowledge that these fascistic organisations exist in the first place, or what the experience of having them is like.

Nevertheless, such organisations may cease with intended disorganisation, and this not only comes from an opening of the mind to the wordless condition but also intent to vary one's experience spontaneously and wildly. The structure of the social world and one’s conceptions of progress may temporarily falter, but it is a small price to pay for the ceasing of the repercussions of this function.

The socio-cultural product of this has never been more apparent in the organisations of our worlds, particularly the Western world. Our social systems, our architecture, and our new systems of specific interactions with technology are completely embedded with specific organisations of the world that stem from the fascistically logical, sensical, projective, and thought out. These organisations not only come with their own physical organisational structure, but they also reinforce our subjective organisation of the world.

I offer one of a few potential solutions to this. It is to place ourselves in the subjectively disorganised. Firstly, we may spend more time in the places of the natural - the

socio-culturally unorganised! We may seek great joy in doing this, for the lack of organisation opens our perspective to the non-conceptual reality of the world. Nature, as it were, is the prime embodiment of the Real.

Secondly, we may travel to places of human design but those which are unfamiliar to us. While these are places of human design that still embody their own physical organisations, our subjective organisations have not been attached to them yet. To be lost in a new place is a grand feeling.

One must also inspect what organisations of the world are fascistic to them, and then, within reason, act contradictory to and freely against the subjective structures and interpretations one has attributed to these places. As such, one may do this in all natures where one's prejudicial organisations and interpretations of the world prevent a more life-affirming course of action in the world.

14. economic exchange of the rational kind

To speak is to imply that one is taking part in economic exchange, in which one trades units of knowledge on perceived states of affairs. One speaks, and then the other speaks and the conversation is thus built up from exchanges of dialogue, often happening one at a time. To speak is to be in a world of speakers, and to speak is to
intend to provide new context and knowledge, however prejudicial such knowledge is. Therefore, to speak is to intend an exchange of the rational kind. The grammar and syntax of the sentence or response are always measured in terms of units. One sentence may be classified as one unit, and the response

may be classified as another unit. This equates to seeming fairness. If a sentence was not compounded into units, the grammar would not be complete, and the sentence would be meaningless. This means this exchange always operates on the presumptive context of lingual economics. Thus, mature communication is transactional.

What of the repercussions of such a function? For as long as communication of any kind is interpreted as being funnelled through a medium of economic exchange, and subsequently, we infer that action on the world is of the kind of such exchange, our proper view of the world will be impaired, because the world does not necessitate logical economic exchanges or transactions. Words then will always carry the intention to get something from ourselves or another, something rational, something monetary, something emotional, something otherwise, and this effect will bleed into other walks and processes of human life. Language makes the self never content with its experiential purchases because the need for speech and speech-related actions will always continue throughout life. If the world were to be reduced to transactions, the speaker will always feel indebted to others and the world in some ways and indebted by others and the world in other ways. It will also imply that many experiences will be unsatisfactory to the pursuit of economic exchange, as speech does not always arrive at a desired conclusive point.

The two problems of the naked universal function too, evolve into the socio-cultural product, which is 1) lack of contentedness of experience, and 2) lack of satisfaction with what is called an exchange. Both are pressing.

The socio-cultural product of this function is most obviously found in the infatuation of capitalism and its fresh and rotten fruits, though it may be found elsewhere too. The first aforementioned problem refers to our disconnect from reality as creatures embedded in modern capitalism and our perception of others, in which not only do we perceive businesses and products as unitary, but we will also intend that the exchange will be equitable, something to serve both parties as individuals in their specific lingual prejudices, and not as selfless, non-lingually based, or even serving to a greater good. Physical reality does not see businesses, products, or the zero-sum game of equity of exchange whatsoever, and this reality is something we should exercise a partial and open return to. This is all true in the sense that we are never satisfied with the economic mindset, for we always wish to perpetually grow our material, knowledgeable, and idealistic "commodities".

The second point is an outcome in the case of our economic mindset in the first place, but still further illustrates our disconnect from reality, for the unsatisfactory points of exchange both imply that the exchange had a specific purpose in the first place and that it was necessary for the economic exchange to take place in this way and not another way, for this purpose and not another purpose. Thus, the nature of the actual transaction blinds us from the nature of how alternative potential transactions could go. It implies that such an exchange was based on anything objective in the first place, and was not too embodied in relative and particular assumptions about what it means to be an economic exchange in a specific socio-cultural situation in the first place, what it means to be a buyer or seller, what it means to perform your exchange well, what it means to be rich in commodities, and all

else. Missing the wider implicit context separates us from the socio-cultural specifics we are contained within.

So, once we may arrive at the realisation that all processes of the world are non-transactional at the fundamental level, we may see that conversation and subsequent inferred action is not one that necessitates unitary responses. In other words, we are not indebted to others, nor are we indebted by others, for if we look at the units of indebtedness, we see their fundamental falsity in the Real.

15. intention to arrive at the completion of a process

The completion of a process is contextual but always intends to be arrived at when speaking. To speak is to reinforce the existence of the temporal, for the sentence locates itself as a particular unit, in particular time and place, and with particular selves or others. To speak with mature language is to infer that one is engaging in a process, be it a monologue or dialogue, and subsequently, that that process has an end.

This varies. To say “Hello” may intend for some continuation of a social process by a responded “Hello”, or the intention may be to see how the person is. Alternatively, the intention may be ulterior, and to converse about something specific, to get something done. However, these processes always imply endings. Language
necessitates intention of completion in a way other non-lingual human activities do not.

This is because of the grammar of exchange. If the grammar of sentences forms into units, then a set of all language units may also be compounded into a unit of fair exchange. At some point, the conversation should end, and when the conversation is over, we may infer that the conversation was a set of units, a unit of units - completed, for both parties have now received their necessary exchanges.

We subsequently infer that the world has units that have arrived at completion as the language's structure implies that it portrays states of affairs in the world. It is as if we say "If I speak of the Christmas party, and as my discussion of the Christmas party is a unit, and discusses the Christmas party itself as a unit, then the Christmas party must be a unit". Both the discussion of the Christmas party and what the Christmas party is implied to be are classified as units. It is from here that we infer that the notion of completion ought to bleed into all our observations, actions and exchanges on events and processes in the world.

The issue with this function is that it implies that when the lingual instinct infers completion of a process, it implies that all processes, social, individual, and natural, may be ultimately completed, as well as that processes exist as beginnings and ends in the first place. In the physical or real world, they do not. The rarity of such a completion endowed in closure and satisfaction is immutable. Death of someone is hardly ever arrived at with closure. The ending of a relationship is always fraught to be muddy and discontented. Also, particular processes of the immediate kind never fully end - they may be returned to, brought up again, or amended. So, they are never complete. I give an example of writing a book - we may finish writing the book, but new editions may be made with new

forewords, new formatting, and new comments. As another example, one may intend to reach a certain point of one's ability to swim, but the process of finishing the task to learn how to swim is never fully and finally complete - one may return to improve again and again throughout one's lifetime, relearning the strokes and the confidence. Once we turn to the real world, we must acknowledge that these processes are never purposive to arrive at completion but to simply be natural ongoing processes with no definitive end.

The Actuality of the World has no bookends in which to define the completion of processes, and our infatuation of the notion that time may be put into chunks of completeness only wages conceptual war with the world. What is reality but a temporal infinitude and subsequent seamlessness? Without the acknowledgement that this universal function may cloak and shadow this immutable truth, we will be moved further away from it.

The socio-cultural product of this function in contemporary modern life is apparent in our organisation of events, and more particularly those events as concluding. If an experience is seen to be coming towards an anticipated end, this end will be sped up to be arrived at as fast as possible. In modern societies and more particularly the Western world, we decide to accelerate the conclusion of the process to be arrived at with maximum efficiency, and this desire to make this process efficient is rooted in several problems. For one, efficiency only accentuates the dissatisfaction of waiting, and the more efficient capitalistic processes become, the more impatient we too will become. More importantly, however, when we view actions as forming into units and thus moving towards completion, the perceived completeness of a task projects itself as more of a reality than

what we may now designate the unfortunate name of the “time in-between”. Such a time we should view as sacred, as this time is all time. Both the beginning and end of the process is infinitesimally small, and so has no place to be considered in reality.

16. continuation of the development of one's lingual world through history

History here refers to either personal history or social history. To speak is always to speak as adding to or founding on, all other lingual based experiences one has had in a lifetime. It is to explicitly or implicitly add to the history of your lingual based and constructed life over time, both in conversation, perception, response, and action.

One may criticise this function (and all of these functions) by saying that a toddler does not carry these functions. Rather, the functions develop along with learning to speak. With this function, a child may learn his father’s name, and he might not be considering the continuation of what it means to speak the father’s name over time. However, the continuation and establishment of the relationship with the father in accordance to his name being spoken develops with the proper eloquence of speaking his name, and so the child learns what it means to speak the father’s name over time and what the response is. Subsequently, he develops a constant
engagement and amendment to his personal history of what it means to speak his father’s name and what the response in the world is. The meaning of the father’s name may change, but it is still founded on the history of the lingual world of “Dad”, history referring to all the times the father’s name has been

spoken down to the first time. This is precisely why the distinction between mature and immature language exists in this book, for if the language is purely immature or purely expressive, it does not necessarily carry these functions, whereas mature or instrumental language always does in furthering its own rules. The gradient of immature to mature language refers to the gradient of both a culture's development from the first to the second and a toddler's development simultaneously, where language finally appears to be logical, sensical, thought-out, and self-reflective.

It is language itself that necessitates the lingual world through history being perceived and continued in a certain way and not otherwise, for language deliberates itself through its structure as provoking particular reactions and experiences. It is our lack of acknowledgement that language does not directly gauge access to states of affairs that subsequently causes us to view all historical processes, outcomes, and situations through this progressive modification of our lingual worlds. In other words, our discussion of individual, social, and natural histories being altered over the evolution of our lingual worlds itself causes us to view these histories as units, and too, histories that change along with us.

The socio-cultural product of the perception of history itself needs more elaboration than what can be described through this simple universal function, so I discuss it more later on in this chapter.

16. oppression of perception

Oppression here may not be cruel or unjust, but it still refers to the presence of power relations and their corresponding

suppression and control of either one's own or another's perception. All language uttered in a present reality affirms itself as of the most convincing state of affairs, and transcribes the world within the context of what is uttered. All different sets of interpretations get stamped out.

As this is a universal function, there is no way to speak that does not oppress perception. This is because the nature of speaking infers perception of states of affairs to both those that are around as well as the speaker, and the lingualised form of perception will always influence and control what it attempts to understand - it becomes a prejudice to what is.

Oppression is immanent. To say that it is a nice day is to oppress the conceptual baggage of prior context to what a nice day is and what a nice day should be. To even disagree that it is a nice day is to quantify the world into a one-dimensional line of "nice days" and "not nice days", thus oppressing all other interpretations of what the language appears to point to - in other words, all other interpretations of what is now considered as the "nice day".

To verbalise any opinion at all is to oppress either one's own opinion, or perceptions of the person holding that opinion. To even ask how someone is to infer that a person's mood can be lingualised and conceptualised into a set of pre-ordained words and concepts that conform to the particular set of interpretations of what is presently uttered. To greet someone, in turn, modifies the mere presence of one in front of another to become a practice of a conventional sort. States of affairs of the world become transcribed into the possible set of interpretations of what is said, and within all sentences and words, there is always such a present set.

Whenever one speaks, the language they use immediately becomes a mechanism to impose an alternating view of the world on another. The will-of-language takes hold here, with the lingual world and its assumptions and imperatives becoming a seemingly more prevailing truth than the one perceived to be “left behind” - the one based in perceptions of the non-defined. Oppression is the final extra step and reinforces the conceptual and lingual packages of what such words entail, and as a result, the grammar of language inflames the lingual instinct of the person. Thus, the lingualised perception oppresses the non-lingualised perception, and contradictory lingualised perceptions oppress each other.

It is language itself that forms this specific form of oppression of perception, not other human activity, for if human activity in the world were devoid of language, there would be no capability for prejudice of the world - the lingual mediator would not be present to conceptualise it. If there is no prejudice, there is no oppression. Oppression may exist without language - the stronger caveman may punish the weaker cavemen for not obeying
him. But the oppression of perception may not exist in the form we speak of here, for there would be no mediator by which one person may lingually or conceptually oppress their perception on another in a way that implies precision and unification of thought. Oppression of perception if unchecked for its inevitable prejudice becomes a prejudice of the most precise, unified, and unreal kind.

What other socio-cultural product could proceed from the oppressive universal function but all the ways we are manipulated to see the world? Our oppression is not only

feudal and oligarchical, but panoptic - we oppress each other, and we oppress the world together.

But think not that the most brutal form of oppression is that which pertains to our action on the world. There is a form of oppression both far more deadening and primordial, and that is how we experience the world around us as defined by the oppressions of others - and especially as defined by ourselves. Think not that the oppression of language and concepts defines all arenas of experience - rather, we have firmly attached ourselves to the lingualised and conceptualised form of perception as the dominant one when rather, a democratic set of all perceptions both lingualised and otherwise should be considered as holding a potential to virtue. In this sense, we may never need to take one set of interpretations too seriously, but rather, allow space to see the world for ourselves as it was before it was transcribed into concepts and language, and allow room for every interpretation before we may, from our autonomy, choose which interpretations suit us and which do not.

18. retraction from and resistance to the wordless condition, and 19. retraction from and resistance to the ecstasy of Nothing

There is a world outside of description that for that reason we cannot envisage or see ourselves to be acquainted with. This is the world outside of language and concepts. I have divided the phenomenologies of this acquaintance of this world into two types, both we are resistant to - the wordless condition and the ecstasy of Nothing.

If we ever learned to stop speaking, both to ourselves and others, we might eventually find ourselves in the wordless condition. Conceptual thinking may remain, but it would be significantly reduced. This is because the emergence of refined language from unrefined concepts works both forward and backward - concepts refine to become language, and new uses of language carry the baggage of pre-ordained concepts that when considered are also imposed once the words are said. The wordless condition, to the one addicted to speaking, becomes a scary and mysterious idea - a restless and deafening silence. If only we knew to treat words by their utility and not by how addicted we are to them! If so, we would find ourselves more comfortable with the wordless condition. It is daunting both because of its novelty and its indescribability. There is no way to fully bring the realities of the wordless condition into the domain of words.

The socio-cultural product of the eighteenth function is present in not only the relentlessness of making everything we create something with communicative natures, but also more dangerously, to make it communicative in a way specific to the technological and social climate of our era. We are always reminded of the time, of the space, of the weather, of world events, of our friends' activities, opinions and aesthetic choices, and all other recesses of useless and life-deadening information. We will fight such peaceful and wondrous experiences of an alternative to the end! And what other cause could there be but a function inherent in language itself to duplicate, reproduce, and proliferate itself onto the world and into the minds of others, announcing itself as the finalisation of any silence that preceded it? But there is another experience, for while even objects such as clothes and furniture possess a sort of perverted and specific communication of a trail, there is

a sensuous, immediate, and expressively non-communicative wonder that all things, even the curves and lines of words and speech, possess, despite such communicative, conceptual, and symbolic undertones - their inutterable reality.

If the wordless condition is something that is met with mild resistance, the ecstasy of Nothing is met with our resistance to the greatest experience of our lives. The blinding bliss of reality in all its completion, emptiness and ecstasy is something too hopeful and radical for our lives filled with the opiates of substances, work, and culture. Such movements into the ecstasy of Nothing are met with an awareness of the absurdity of the world, delusions one is faced with through the conscious and unconscious concepts, words, and narratives one grasps onto, and such a transition into the experience is felt physiologically to a grand degree. For obvious reasons, we resist it completely. What socio-cultural product could be thought of to stem from this universal function but the deafening distractions we are involved with every second of every day, ignorant to and despite such boundless truths? We are here already - we do not need to arrive.

The Adding Principle

The amalgamation of the universal functions of mature words has mutated to a principle of both words and other lingual based actions that I call the adding principle.

What is the adding principle? It is a result of our particular conceptualisation of time. It refers to the instinct of adding deliberate actions onto the world through a rational, agreeable and oppressed format and attempting to reach a desired and

conceited conclusion. It is the event we fool ourselves into believing will lead to our completion when it is hardly ever so.

The adding principle may either refer to microphysical actions or large life decisions. As long as the action is deliberate, conscious, and predicated on certain assumptions of attaining a more complete world than what precedes the action, it may be referred to as the adding principle. All things from making dinner, to smoking a cigarette, to having a cup of tea, or moving house - to reorganising how one sees a tree or another person - are all likely to be predicated, at least partially, by the adding principle.

What separates the adding principle from the motion of unified life is that the adding principle perceives itself to be adding anything in the first place as if life were a neverending set of rungs on a ladder, but one believed that each rung would be the last and final ladder that would lead to all joyous and jovial things. The truth is, the substance of life was already complete, and any action that attempts to complete it will lead to silent despondency over something that feels missing. In everyday life, we despair of getting a task done, the adding principle, and then once the task is done a quiet empty and unrestful feeling sits. This is a key principle of our engagement in the world that separates us from reality.

In conceptual terms, the adding principle may see the world as separated into two things, the past incomplete world or life, and the future completed world or life. We infer value-domination-judgement over the completed world and attain it. The truth is, we have numerous assumptions about what it means to be complete, and upon further investigation,

will find that this idea is senseless. Where in reality does one action or another result in completion?

This adding principle may either be owned by us in how we use it, that is, we use it with conscious regard to its unreality and subsequent attempt to consciously regard reality, or we are unaware of the ownership we have by the adding principle.

One useful exercise when bidding to cease climbing up the ladder so hastily is to look down. How much has already been added to your life, and how much of it is ignored for the promised fruit ahead? We see that we have so much, yet are not aware of it. How far does the Spirit march on before the Spirit rests? The adding principle wants to add more as much as it does not wish to acknowledge the adding that came before. Truly even from a conceptual point of view, we are immensely rich in all we have added. We only suffer for we are not infinitely rich in all that the adding principle could add, and this perspective is why we suffer in this way.

Another exercise is to distinguish between when one is chained by the adding principle, and when one may own it, be a happy master of it. This requires a silent acknowledgement of the world's boundless and infinite completion but to act within it anyway, to have an ironic attitude to adding things. This constant understanding of the empty wholeness of the world dissipates the quieted but still very manic urge to add for its own sake, to be owned by your restlessness. To approach our deliberate actions on the world with irony also opens up gratitude for all that is, and deflates the overworked muscle of seeing the whole as a series of layers that are built on one another, rather than a unified and fluctuating playing of all actualities that simply are. Destined neither by us nor the

world but non-destined to go anywhere at all, and moving of their own accord.

And think of the dissatisfactions that come when the adding principle is reversed and our additions become undone! What is the salutary view? Perhaps it is the view of time as if it were a mountain. One does not rejoice its peaks and curse its troughs. It is the perspective that any one element of time may be separated from the rest that shows as much delusion that the peaks of a mountain may be separated from its troughs. Also, it is the view
that a mountain's peaks have more virtue than its troughs that is as much delusional as the perspective that the peaks of specific moments in time have more virtue than the troughs of other moments. Rather, the experience of the bliss of totality that understands no peaks or troughs in time whatsoever, and instead looks at the world as-in-motion through a different aperture, the aperture of the non-conceptual. The only correct aperture to view the world is through the aperture of the Real.

History

We have an obsession with progress in the Western world. There has been a battle of conceptions of history between the West and East, and the West is winning.

The West has a perpetual instinct to add new layers of progress on top of history, and then resent the past that came before. This is an addiction to the adding principle, to add onto reality from what is produced "elsewhere", but with brute force and lack of clarity. The exponential growth of better moments on top of worse ones leaves only a sea of reflected past suffering and trauma which darkens every hour. Our empathy is

misplaced, and in five hundred years or so our descendants, upon looking at our lives, will be too, for the representation of historical events will always be seen from the perspectives of those who inhabit the time that comes after.

The reason the West wins this conceptual difference is due to the nature of language itself, its power if it is taken too seriously - and subsequently how seriously we do indeed take it. The East's subtle inference of language relating time onto reality was far too tame, too lacking in a solid structure, lacking in lingual "certainty" - and has been conquered and dominated by a much more solid and dominant Western view, a diagrammatic and rigid view of time. Progress, then, is no longer something built upon the foundations of the past, but through a hurry backwards through the finalisation of ideas of the future. However, such finalisation of the future can never be reached, for not only does every era conceive of what ought to lie in the future differently, but also what it even means to be the future.

This is not to say that progress is pointless and ought to be stagnant. Rather, the view of progress is possessed by the concepts of history itself. Do we master how to progress, or is the hurry towards the future necessary for the concept of time? If the latter is untrue, then this view of the future only serves to further reflect our lack of touch with reality, for not only do we not live in the physical world of the now, but also how future generations may exist in the physical world as well, and so what their reflections and expectations may be. This becomes, then, a constant restless and offbeat dance between the generations of the past, of the now, and of the future, all acting with each other as with best intentions but with no clarity on what each generation actually may see in their own world.

How does this perversion of progress exist in a conceptual lens? We separate the future from the past, which separates both in a certain context of what we call the context of time, and then by having the future dominate over the past. Indeed this may stem from our inference that something ought to be enjoyed tomorrow rather than today! The assumptions behind this are incredulous, such as the idea that something should be enjoyed later in the first place.

What sense does such a proposition have in reality? Haven't the attempted enjoyments of high modernism, of utopias, of wars and many revolutions, of imperialism, of industrialisation, of globalisation, of neoliberalism - all with intentions of enjoying an imagined future over a present now - all led to precisely the opposite result to one of betterness? And haven't these enjoyments been attempted from a perversion and obsession of the future, all merely constructs of a need exaggerated by the structure of language and concepts altogether?

In this chapter, I have gone over fifteen other universal functions, concepts I offer which, as stated, are always implicit in the function of language.

I too, offer the idea of the socio-cultural product, such a product of society which has been guided by these universal functions. Such conclusions have been made that the world acts indifferently and contrary to these universal functions of human lingual instinct, and as such, these perspectives of what the world is and how we ought to act in it are unreal and fraught with delusion. Even though these universal functions are immutable, I advocate an acknowledgement of the

existence of the universal functions, conscious awareness of the flaws built from concepts and from there, describe ways we can retract from the conceptual tyranny of such systems.

Finally, I discuss a constant action implicit in all our lives which stems from an amalgamation of all universal functions, the adding principle, the unreality it serves to portray, and too, the perversion of our view of history.

But what of concepts' assumptions and prejudices when focused on more intensively? How may concepts be organised and packaged in our lives? And if there are some concepts that are more heavily packaged than others, may we identify and criticise the major ones, the ones that play the largest influence in our day-to-day lives? What of work, love, space and time? These enquiries shall be discussed in the next chapter.

THE CHAINING OF CONCEPTS

We are chained by concepts. This has been the case since almost immediately after their inception, with societies and individuals both using concepts, but also concepts using them. This is not as tragic a case as it sounds; the stories of many have been wondrous and benign. However, one must recognise the case of chaining, since it impairs the ability to live fully and freely.

To talk about the prejudices of the conceptual is to recognise that the prejudices largely lie in the language and concepts themselves, not us. In the same way that we didn't choose where we grew up, who our parents are, or what gender or ethnicity we are, we did not choose the structure of language and their assumptions as free agents. The blame of how the language affects our perspective of reality is not solely ours to blame, but within how language itself is structured, both mature language in general, and our current languages. Our transcendent nature - that is, our ability to realise our potential of what could be autonomy as individual agents - must be equipped with turning the stone of such a structure. This does not simply reflect in the universal functions of mature words - that is, the way grammar of instrumental language compels certain thoughts and behaviours. There is also what we may identify as the conceptual package - the totality of implications, assumptions, processions, imperatives, and prejudices that come dependably on both a concept and the subsequent concepts that relate to it.

The Conceptual Package

Concepts do not directly point to reality. Rather, we may identify the conceptual package, with its own implications, social cues, and processions on how they relate to attitudes, methods, and actions on the world. We are not given a naked representation of reality through the lingual and the conceptual, but rather a series of prejudices, assumptions, and imperatives that come with it. Work is not a signifier of the naked reality of work, but rather, what it means to be a hard worker and the importance of work is ingrained within the communicable quality of the word itself. Time is not a signifier to the naked reality of time but is inseparably tied with how to spend that time, both in an individual sense and a socio-historical sense.

The reason is largely contextual. We may never understand a word without historical or socio-lingual reasons for the word coming into being; what words it is used with, the occurrence of it being said in certain situations and not other ones, the power dynamics of the persons you hear speak of the word on you, the influence speech has in varying degrees over a culmination of your life, and other notable points of interest regarding such context. Nevertheless, the most notable piece of information is that language and concepts may not justify reality at all - they need only justify prior conceptual frameworks to be considered as fact.

What of conceptual packages within conceptual packages? The conceptual package will often get hijacked by another dominant conceptual paradigm, a further prejudice. The joy of creating good art exists with its own conceptual package - such as the idea that one must create good art to self-actualise. However, when hijacked, the conceptual package turns that assumption using that art, for example, to make money. Good art becomes

indistinguishable from its monetary value. How perverted such ends are! It is the concepts and language themselves that compel us in this direction, not otherwise, for, without the world of concepts, the artist would see the nonsense in the game of the value of money over the value of art.

For as long as we are guided and possessed by the dual conceptual will, we will be blinded by superficial and ephemeral value over what might be considered true value. It is our lack of recognition of the conceptual package, and the hijacking of that package, that enables for such a swift and discreet conversion of what we really deem valuable. It may be so that to an entrepreneurial art dealer, they have made the autonomous decision to value money over art through non-conceptual means.

However, to the self-actualising artist, this must never be the case. It is merely sociolinguistics and the learned value of money leading to residential and commercial "goodness" as valued over authentic art through lingual conditioning that leads the artist to this conclusion. This is one example of how our priorities may be discreetly switched due to more dominant conceptual frameworks that run in societies.

I give the story of a barista named George that owns a small café called "George's Coffee Shop". He makes enough money to live comfortably and very much enjoys his job. However, his café in time becomes more and more popular, and soon his café is always extremely busy. Eventually, opportunistic marketers, networkers, and other assorted business executives tell him that his café is very franchise-worthy. Priding success and the making of more money, he accepts. After a while, several more of George's Coffee Shops are planted and

established across the county. George would come to spend the majority of his time in an office, discussing business plans with accountants, advertisers, and the rest. He isn't aware of it, but he has less vitality and enjoyment of his life than he used to, but still perseveres with the acclaimed success and profit-oriented lifestyle he has made for himself.

To what extent has George been directed by his society, and to what extent has George instead been directed by the structure of language itself ? For it is not only the conceptual package underneath the individual word and the concept (ones we are rarely conscious of and so led by them) but how those words relate to each other within the web of words. What about the conceptual spirits, packages with their hidden assumptions on right and wrong that have no words? Surely an uncountable amount of the notions of ghostly and hidden Things of the World reside within us, but as we have no words for them, how could we ever speak of them and evaluate them? What view of reality may vanquish these shadows of perception if they may so very well exist?

The assumptions led behind lines of concepts themselves mirror the assumptions made in what we might call ordinary life. We stop drinking coffee. After all, we intend to go to sleep at a specific time, because we have said that so many hours of sleep is ideal for a job we may work, a job we keep because you like money, the money we wish to earn to not only keep a house we live in but also to buy specific products, a house in a neighbourhood we have told ourselves we like to live in, and products we wish to buy because we have told ourselves they enrich our life, a particular enrichment we have told ourselves is a better kind of enrichment than other enrichments we are either aware or unaware of, the circumference of awareness we

have told ourselves is ideal, for expanding such a circumference would waste our time either because we have told ourselves such expansion to look for other enrichments would not work or suit us, or because we have to get up for work.

Neither the world nor the society gives one such particular assumptions in the way that we think, for both the world and the society are blank, absent and empty. Only one's inheritance of conceptualisation converts this world and society into specific interpretation and means of action. A coffee shop is both the place to test the quality of coffee, to anxiously wait for a date to arrive, a place to meet strangers, a place to judge decor, a place to draw customers, a place to perceive a hierarchy of employees, a place to have a meeting at or a place to listen to conversations for script prompts. It is our inheritance of conceptualisation that gives us these assumptions, not the world or even society, for, without a means to conceptualise, the potential interpretations of such a world or society would be infinite.

To conclude, what bearing do concepts and conceptual packages, ones so major to many, have concerning universal functions and dimensional dialectics? It is the grammar and syntax of language that compels us the ways the universal functions advocate, for example, the separation, domination-judgement, and value- domination-judgement of the coffee shop from other places. These basic universal functions extend into others that necessitate agreement, completion, competitiveness, validity, and others. From basic rules we come to understand the coffee shop in a way entirely guided by the initial grammar of language and how seriously we consider language to be in modern societies. It is also

guided by the structure of dimensions in our heads; e.g. a line graph of good to bad coffee shops, the line graphs of the utility of what to order, the line graph of the possibilities of finding a loved one, the line graph of the joyfulness of the judgement of weather, and so on. These unrealities are where we live the vast majority of the time, and we will always fall into one prejudicial interpretation of the world without either exploring different interpretations. Perhaps there is a glimmering light that we may see the world without such interpretations altogether. It is with the evolved and developed prejudices of *all* of these aspects of the dual conceptual will in all walks of life, in all modern civilisations, that we finally arrive at a conceptual package, where mere communication has arrived at something much, much more monstrous.

We have in our lives what I call the Major Concepts. They are not just the concepts that are most embedded in our minds as humanistic states of affairs, but also concepts in which their conceptual packages have the least bearing to the actuality of the Real. Language's role with our perception of the world appears metaphysical - it creates a new world on top of the real world, barren of life or qualitative content. So, high profundities of experience may be found from digging deep and discovering what we might call the Major Concepts. Thus, the rest of this chapter shall now deal with experimenting with what this book deems to be the major concepts, and seeing ways to dissolve the conceptual packages associated with the major concepts to come to better grips of seeing the Real.

These major concepts differ from person to person and can be generalised, but I have chosen the following.

The Chaining of Space

The most notable thing about space is that its first function, affirmation, is not as conceptually assumptive as self or work are. Space is a physical reality. However, when we combine the concept of space with other elements, such as people, it becomes confused. Ownership in the modern socio-lingual sense is highly conceptual.

As we look at the states of how ownership is implied to exist in modern society we may see that it is a perverted conceptual outcome of what otherwise might be considered a real fact of right to freedom over a space of land around you. We may suggest the latter is a fact for the right to freedom of land comes first. The right is negative; the absence of interference or tyranny from others - something which very well may lead to a virtue of the Real. This is a far more benign aspect of why the concept of ownership is useful.

The present concept of ownership, on the other hand, has a far more complex conceptual package. The political debates on ownership of space may never cease easily. However, what if we merely negate the contrived parts of the concept of space and all other concepts it gets contextually tied to? Perhaps we should instead consider space as a negation of lack of freedom from other people.

Ownership in this sense should instead be seen similarly to the right to freedom over land, as a negative concept
- the physicality of being in a home, uninterrupted and free to engage in private affairs - virtuous privacy, but not one entailing the positive connotations of ownership. The positive connotations of ownership entail a variety of assumptions detailing what it means to own, what it means to let or

mortgage homes, and sees the land you own as submissive to your desires. We become entangled and obstructed.

If we look at ownership in the physical sense as a negation of interference of a Thing of the World, such as an area of land, we may at least individually arrive closer to an experiential account of what space is in the Real. It, like every Actuality of the World, is empty at its core. That is, it is free of conceptualisation. To imply otherwise is to muddy notions of such reality.

Why do we not simply and experientially know the land as empty and free on an individual level? Does this not partially aid the socio-political issue at hand? Despite such concept games not being pragmatic enough to solve socio-political issues fully, if one negates both the conceptual package of individual ownership of land, and the opposing concept, collective ownership of land, one may arrive at a synthesis that may help to solve the problem. This means to consider ownership as a negative concept, utilised to allow privacy, freedom of right, and freedom from others - and not a positive one, implicitly detailing means to self-identification, opportunism, and above all, greed. These latter concepts are what comes with a conceptualised ownership coming before a real co-dependence with space, for conceptualised ownership centralises the agent and leads to all aforementioned means of perversion.

What of the usefulness of space? Physical space, like all concepts, is associated with performativity - what productive activities might be done with it. We establish, then, a prerogative of how to “fill up” space. The reality of the human instinct to utilise the land for their benefit, however, is not

equivalent to the instinct superseded to convert all emptiness into functionality. The emptiness of things we have forgotten due to our nature to conceptualise into Things of the World and thus infer certain notions of how those things ought to be.

So, as an antithesis, one must know the emptiness of space as with more universal primacy than space as existing
to await a purpose - for this is the truthful notion of space. The emptiness of space is a reality we have forgotten. The ontology of the space of nature has no necessity to fill it up purposefully. And why would it? What virtues does nature enact in using space *fruitfully*, but not perversely utilising it for some end?

And what unvirtues does our unsatiated need to have space functioning as properly as it can come with? This contrived mode of productivity in its present form must come as a side effect of mature communication, for this kind of utility in the communicable form itself cannot exist without such communication. Language portraying itself as being useful comes with the idea that language portrays everything it represents as being useful, and the usefulness of space is no exception. Nevertheless, we are in a situation where it seems that the utility of space comes before the existence of space. How best to approach it? There is the obvious; to acquire a more virtuous use of space, we must know what it is in reality - devoid of requiring usefulness. But if there is an insistence that physical space needs to be used in some way, we must at least turn away from what web of words “space” is entrenched in - webs of capital, ownership, possessiveness, idle comfort - and even an infatuated sense of progress, authoritative societal reform, and idolisation of legal prerogatives for the government of space.

What of the concepts of one’s personal space? The identification with one’s home, school, work, and bar may indeed turn to stagnation and staleness if one does not dare to venture outside. One attaches a piece of one's mind to the doors, walls, rugs, clothes, and possessions of these spaces. Without self-inspection, this will recede into being in those walls for the sake of some form of comfort. This comfort becomes wretched and I indeed infer that even the concepts of a house, for example, become one of suffocation.

What is the comfort of stale permanence compared to the virtue of freedom and livelihood away from the possessively conceptual, and when do the walls of your home become the walls of a personal prison? One involves oneself in a Room of Concepts, each carrying their assumptions, prejudices, and imperatives on how to perceive it, how to behave in your house, and subsequently how to perceive the outside world - perhaps as comparatively hostile and not one of the stale rooms of “comfort”. Personal spaces then become tyrannical over you - tyrannical, because they determine who you are and how you act without input from what one can call an overcoming or truly self-actualising self. Such wonder of exploration, namely exploration of the outdoors, might come from its lack of connotation to concepts. Indeed, when one is lost, does one not experience a glimpse into the actuality of the space they are in?

What of the space of the nation? For the sake of discussion of identities of the national kind, one should pay attention to the artificiality of many conceptualisations of space. From investigating the real and the conceptual, one may assert that countries do not physically exist! While governments and national attitudes may physically exist in terms of the people and the emotions of those people, the countries themselves

have no physical reality. The borders that separate countries are arbitrary and the identity of one's alignment to a country is in the mind. Why is this important? It is due to the course nationalism, eurocentrism, xenophobia, and subsequent schizophrenia of what people identify themselves as - a member of a country first and foremost, and then a free creature of belonging to an entire species.

However, with liberal experimentation, what of the conceptual package of the word "land"? Lands, more free of conceptual packages relating to identity, do exist, for the borders of lands are ambiguous and more importantly, lands connote a much more tangible physicality. What is important is the speculation of what "land" and "country" mean outside of their direct definition, so this book will then choose a means of pragmatism to identify land as a more benign lingual representation of reality - free of the confines and assumptions of the word "country".

The country is an artificial construction so that the communications of laws and ownership of property by a government or manufactured national identity may be done properly. However, the perversion of the concept of the country results in rigid and nationalistic identity both on the individual and the social scale and then compels it to oppose other national identities, oftentimes violently. Modern war in the contemporary sense is a new version of war and comes from the formalisation of the concept of the country or the nation-state, which both turns all inside the borders as one moral, social, political and identitary unit, and from there, makes itself distinct and opposed to the units of those outside said borders.

There is also another aspect of ownership of space that should be discussed - privatisation, and specifically privatisation of public space. One should not take the privatisation of urban space as a necessary given. Rather, the concept of ownership itself is most effectively used by those in power, along with those who may carry the
signs and the flags to say that a space of neutrality, or non-ownership, may be owned in the first place. What is such power but mere conceptual power, once other forms of power, such as force are seen to not be needed to possess public thought?

We, so chained by the visibility of the concept and the invisibility of the Real will swallow this new categorisation of space and all its elements. It is the concept and conceptual package of ownership itself that leads to our pacifism over the privatisation and ownership of the spaces that were indeed, once conceptualised to be for everyone, everything, anyone, and anything - a concept closer to the Real. If our attention was focused on the Real, one may conclude that every person is free and responsible for one's own rules of what public space ought to be, and the perverse politics of space may cease conceptually.

However, it may far more importantly occur in the mind of the individual that such concepts had never existed at all, and that fundamental space despite all of the persuasions from the elite, is totally neutral to what we, as modern beings, imagine ownership to be. If we reclaimed urban space by conceptualising it in fashion for it being 'for everyone”, we could dismantle its conceived ownership by the elite easily.

However, what would likely arise from the new conceptualisation is a set of personal representatives of the “everyone” that the space was owned by who would induce their own systems of what the ownership entailed. Even if this didn't happen in such a way, it would still misconstrue the reality of the freedom space ought to have. To be totally free in this context then, one must not bow to the whims of private ownership, but not set up new conceptualisations either.

It is clear to me then, that the unchecked identification with the concept of space results in one's chaining of said space. The comfort of the stiff warm walls of the house, the school, and the workplace becomes our prison for we lack the freedom of will to go outdoors, to the less comfortable, the less certain, the less tied with the concept of ownership. We identify ourselves with a nationality, a country, and so neither exist as part of the lands nor the world in which we inhabit. If we did, it would only exist as opposed to another land, another world that didn't in some way belong to us. All of this stems from the highly conceptual, in which the lines and diagrams here are borders, and are all based on the prejudices behind ownership and identity, non-ownership and non-identity.

The Chaining of Money

When does money stop being the mere advantage of representation of labour and goods for practical reasons, and start possessing its own perverted value? Now our money is of fiat currency, rather than representative of a valued commodity like gold. Fiat in this sense means 'let it be done' - value for the sake of value. However, as modern money points to nothing truly representative at all, our infatuation with its supposed worth has only grown larger.

If we equate money to value, we will conversely equate things that have nothing to do with money as having no value. Try as we like to out-think it, but the state of valuing money will inevitably trigger its inverse process. The spending of money becomes an overworked muscle and compulsion, while the things that are outside of this highly specific and reduced means of ascribing value become forgotten as being the most valuable of all. The value of love, happiness, nature, and freedom - direct representations of values, rather than money being a representation of a *representation of* value - become less conceptually viable, less communicative in the social sense. So, they slip under the radar more and more over time.

What is such an antidote? It is to regard the conceptual package of money, consider it in its current form as a specific outcome of history. The value of money has a specific category of value, and as it is the only category that we have for value itself, the non-categorised, while the most real, becomes redundant and meaningless.

There is an undeniable pleasure that comes from the world of money. The idea of making more and more money appears in the conceptual mind as an incline of money over time. But what of the sensory reality of this fact? A number in a bank account! It is an arbitrary number that signifies a number of notes that further signifies what it can buy, in which these objects are too conceptual, imaginary, and their worth is merely decided in most cases. All of these steps are packaged within the phrase “I am making more money”, and one may never say such a phrase without these implicit assumptions hiding beneath! However, these assumptions are sealed away. The means that brought the pleasure of this statement (and all

the meanings behind such a statement) are conceptual and are second to the boundless pleasures brought by the Real.

The concept of money is adjacent to the concept of space - and one's infatuation with money may also be equated to the infatuation of living in a luxurious space. How wretched may such a dream be, for luxury is impossible! One cannot escape the blizzard of the world, for we will always be occupied with emotional and rational sensitivity, idiosyncratic issues, and insecurity of identity. Such end goals of what money may do "for us" too hold a great ignorance that we misidentify other realities that concepts misrepresent. As it were, money promises to grant us access outside of the motion of time, to a place we may be free from idiosyncrasy - an impossibility. And finally, money may appear to separate us from the poverty of "other people" - but how such poverties are entirely to do with the perceptual, and so in affording these luxurious houses we will likely never own, we fall into the perceptual poverty of the misidentified wants of other people! So, in escaping poverty, we only succumb to it more. We must embrace the blizzard of the world, and know that monetary poverty can be re-identified as a doorway to great freedom.

The economic leftists and rightists alike affirm the notion that a certain form of monetary distribution is theft. The leftists affirm it is profit, while the rightists affirm that it is taxation. These arguments may either be built off of willing conceptions of equity or freedom as virtuous alike, or the mechanisms of conceptualisations that have brought each to their conclusion may be followed without such will. Either way, the discussion may never be brought to a synthesis, for in both cases the conceptual package of both theories carries assumptions that rarely can be converted into lingual thought that can be

synthesised with its opponent. In other words, the assumptions of one economic theory speak a different language to the other, and so communication can never even begin. To remedy this, both sides must consider money as a representation of value, and so virtue - representation of a real process that entails real consequences.

Money is not a virtue in itself. It is a medium that in most societies creates hospitals that ensure health, establishments that ensure pleasure and properties that ensure freedom of space. The principles of leftism and rightism must never be based on lingual and conceptual axioms that hold themselves up, and if one intends to form a synthesis with one who disagrees, one must form a unified language to communicate with.

While a futile effort in full, this language must be based as close to the Real as possible, and any beliefs that money is based upon and should be based upon assumptions one has organically defined in one's own circles, in the principle of effective communication, should be cast away. Instead, money ought to be recognised for what it is - an ideal pointer of something still lingual and conceptual, but more tangible - virtue, whether such virtue is freedom, equity, both, or neither. Such recognition will help to cease perverse ideology on the sides of both capitalism and socialism alike, both as conceptual entities far removed from the complexities of real social life and its idiosyncrasies.

The impulse written within us to spend money may be synchronous with our desire to not have money - to do away with such an artificial object of value altogether. Money taints pleasure with buying pleasure, and its replacement of virtue is

what has led to a profound loss of direct perception of virtue itself. And such pleasures of money are substantially impaired by the one primary way to obtain it in the first place.

The Chaining of Work

The conceptual package of work is most prevalent in terms of the specific sociolinguistics of the word. A more virtuous definition of work, and the common deductive definition, refers to the ability to undertake a task for a purpose. The modern sociolinguistics of the word “work”, however, now refer to employment, job prospects, and importantly - making money. As we see money to be valuable, many of us, in turn, believe that the value of money ought to be negated by some suffering - the suffering of work. If the range of tasks humans have set themselves are done in exchange for the representation of value, and so a form of pleasure, the tasks must be carried out with misery. It is only appropriate to us civilised creatures that this is so.

The person may or may not intend to choose a job they prefer or even ideally enjoy - but if they do, this “work” must still be met with the intent to be miserable, for conceptual structures contextually imply that as the spending of money brings happiness, the inverse process, the making of money, must bring unhappiness. As a result, all processes that lead up to receiving money must be carried out with misery, guilt, or some other negative emotion. Look no further than sociolinguistics - it is the web of words that initiate these conceptions of the Things of the World, not realities, for as the Concept is all we will instrumentally communicate, it is all we may see. It is the idea that any form of happiness must be met by necessary suffering in the first place (as is the nature of

lingual opposition) that has led us to this pessimistic conclusion of what “work” is. The sociolinguistics, however, betray the potential nature of the reality of work to be wondrous, pleasurable, and free - with money being a necessary outcome, but an afterthought. If work in this exclusive sense refers to the mere range of tasks humans have set themselves, then are these tasks, not themselves worthy to give life to these positive feelings?

To see work beyond its conceptual package, one must look to the reality of work, or work in the Real. To see work as a tangible process of motion and progress towards something and that alone, is vital to relinquishing the connotations that work as being an entity that affirms itself as existing as a thing at all, and existing separate to other tasks or processes that are not designated the arbitrary title of “work”.

The reality of work is closer to a specific form of deliberate and intended motion, like all other motions of the same vein, than of the conceptual package of work being under someone, over someone, for some desire that is or isn’t filled with one’s passion, as hierarchical, as stressful, as commercial, as capitalistic, as enforced, as rewarded, as successful, as corrupt, as formal, or otherwise.

With liberal experimentation, simply to say that one is “working on” something has a completely different socio-lingual game to it, and its organic definition, in turn, is met with far more enthusiasm to undertake such a task than mere “work”. One must turn to the differences of utility, value, or the process leading to virtue even when one merely considers either the concept of “working on something” or “working”. From there, one must ensure that in either case, such utilities

and values are enforced through such Concept, for if not, it is withered of merit and subsequently possessive in its grasp of the mind.

The identity of self with work is a great sacrifice to the identity of the boundless human being. Rather than bin- men, care workers, or waitresses first and foremost, we are free human beings with no conceptually fixed structure.

This may sound obvious but think of the preferred grammar when speaking of your job. It is easier to say “I am a waitress” than “I do waitressing” but they mean very different things. One is something you are and one is something you do.

Thus, work becomes oppressive, not in destroying a part of identity, but creating an artificial one! One may not be free unless they recognise one's boundlessness, for conceptual boundaries ignore the potential to both all other infinite interpretations and what we are in the Real. If we understand ourselves to be empty of concepts when describing ourselves with our work, we will come closer to a realisation that what we do is not fixed, and with leniency, change what we do whenever we like. The blizzard of the world may be waiting outside of the confines of the workplace, but without accountability that what we do is not conceptualised by an institution of work and so we may never fix our identity to such, the blizzard within will rage unrecognised and discontented, and thus will be painful. To take accountability to how we write our lives and thus how we may exist in the real world, we must eventually step outside.

The precarity of career paths in the present age has only led one to construct an identity further detached from work, and so feelings of pride or self-actualisation that come from such

work have been stripped away. However, this too can be analysed conceptuologically, and with it discover that the appearance that “precarity” is intimately tied with negativity or deficit is merely an appearance. Rather, the freedom to decide what careers to find, and now what careers to create, has never been greater. This precarity, once viewed as a neutral or potentially positive process, gives one the mastery to decide what careers are worth your time. This lack of work-identity frees one of the ideological assumptions that careers and identity necessarily go together at all - the needless intimacy has been partially released.

With awareness of one’s freedom, one may now be free to *not* work - work as a lawyer, a doctor, a bin-man, a care worker, a waitress. The freedom to also consider the consequences of boycotting certain professions enhances the freedom to not work - the freedom of that profession to be in more demand, and for it to pay more. This potential consequence will only be met if people discover what powers lie beyond conceptions of precarity needing to be avoided - to see rising precarity as a reason to tighten one’s grip on the conceptual and paradigmatic bottles of the previous century. Instead, there lies the potential to feel able to switch what work, or “task”, enables self-actualisation and self-identity in what it means now, at any given time, and to any imaginative end.

We work to attempt for the world of other people to better properly conceptualise us. But how may a person be conceptualised properly when the constraints of their identity as free human beings are nothing but a falsity?

There is a disease that capitalism produces - the disease of the ritualistic worker. He works a job he does not care for, unaware

that the concepts of work, commitment, loyalty, lack of passion, and existential stress are not essentially tied together at all. He works to raise himself on a ladder he did not choose - unaware that all ladders are our choosing and in the face of the Real, non-existent. He values the contemporary conceptual package of work over all other efforts, for they are rewarded with money - and even worse, status - such status even more illusory than the buying power of the already illusory money itself. He works out of guilt of existence - such guilt assuming he exists in any specific sense at all. And he works to run from the face of the Nothing of the Real itself - a face that if welcomed would bring him to far more profound conclusions than such heights of a corporate ladder ever could.

The concept of work ought to point openly to a nation of, in a phrase, “getting things done”. But the modern concept of work is one of chaining. We work in specific ways, for specific people, and for specific purposes, none of which bear any facticity in what is necessary for human beings. We work to affirm ourselves as existing in a certain way - unaware that even in the absence of work, we would not exist in any certain way at all. And we work because we fear a life without the occupation of work and the subsequent reward of money - otherwise, the blizzard of the world awaits us. However, no matter what we do, we face a blizzard, internally or externally, so we must not recognise the particulars of our work as a necessity, but one we are choosing. If we understand the concepts of ourselves, others, and monetary value as unreal, we may be endowed with a capacity to act that follows the Real. No statements here strictly advocate leaving your employment; but they advocate the recognition of your boundless freedom, for otherwise, we are half-people.

The Chaining of Self

Separations do not exist in the real world. We are nonetheless provided with perceived personal identity through the socio-lingual. The separation of self in both the simple fashion and the particular socio-lingual construction of self are both illusory and constantly changing. Nevertheless, the utility of the conceptual package of personal identity is present, and perhaps merely present for the civilised interactions we enact. Nevertheless, this conception of self must indeed be recognised at times as illusory and transient, for the paradoxes of certain problems, both philosophical and otherwise, may only be solved with the recognition that the self as we know it is far more lingual than empirical, both in terms of separation of self from other, and the separation of self from the world.

What of the boundlessness of self? I present a dilemma of the conceptual self and the human being in the Real. We have three ways of looking at ourselves; the present rigidity of one interpretation of ourselves, the awareness of an infinite set of interpretations of ourselves, and the lack of notion of ourselves at all. One may call these three ways the “single face of self ”, the “many faces of self ”, and the “no face of self ”.

The “single face of self ” is the most rigid and least accompanied with potential, but the most ordinary in the social world. We are continually stuck in redefining ourselves to one interpretation in this sense.

The “many faces of self ” is a nauseating condition of seeing ourselves as many at once, and many of us are stuck in this schizophrenic outlook of ourselves at all times, unsure on how to define ourselves. We, then, fight the ambiguity of lack of

single interpretation with an attempt to find the one we deem to be prominent.

What of the “no face of self ”? This is the condition we arrive at when, similar to discovering we are not a waitress or a care worker, we do not need to interpret ourselves in this way at all. To be free of both the description of ourselves by language (I am me), and the centralisation of ourselves through the action of speaking (I speak therefore I am) is to recognise that just like the Nothing of the World, underneath the veil of lingualisation and conceptualisation, we too are this great Nothingness.

This interpretation is fought by the constraints of society and other people, where we put ourselves into one interpretation or one set of interpretations. The definitions of self now are far more complicated than the simple “human being”. In Western cultures and societies, we are given the obvious labels of name, age, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, occupation, ideal weight, ideal height, ideal intelligence, economic background, and subcultural identifications - all of which further even more complex socio-lingual prejudices, implications, assumptions, and processions. All of the above appear to point to an actuality but are far more intimately tied to further conceptualisations.

But there are the far less obvious components of an identity that may be revealed, and these are revealed to be more false through thought. For example, to be a self is, in many respects, to be assigned specific responsibility to a specific community you have no essential connection to, a set of arbitrary ethics on what a self ought to be responsible for and by extension be proud of, a certain connotation behind what appearance they have, a certain connotation behind their goals and motives, a certain connotation behind what they enjoy and do not, and so

on. None of these newer and complex connotations of self refers to the simple deductive definition of the self, and the self in the Real is simply a human being, with a body and mind. Identity is the conceptual outcome of self. To be in the world is, of course, to face responsibility and ethical duty, to appear a certain way, and to enjoy certain things. But this is the crux. It is time to turn to the reasoning of why these complex propagations of self exist in the face of the Real and investigate the prejudices of the unrealities of responsibility, ethical duty, appearance, and all else.

Therefore, it concludes that the self as defined through society has many prejudices that cloak the reality of what we really try to refer to. We may, then, enact an ironic self to perform well in the world. However, we must tread carefully with all conceptions of self, however ironic they may be, for society has the ability, but no God-given authority to control the boundlessness of who we are.

What of the self as opposed to the world? It is a great shame that the conceptual package of self implies an opposition to the world in the first place - as if the self knew better what the world ought to entail. Why not propose a synthesised will of self and will of the world? A better conceptualisation may indeed posit that the process of the world is a cosmological democracy rather than a war between man and cosmology.

What of a cosmological democracy? One may argue that democracy must be informed to be virtuous - however, one may also posit that a better way of thinking of it is that a virtuous democracy should not be misinformed. Nature is certainly not misinformed, and while it has had no formal education, it has met every single one of our needs - let alone

creating the needs in the first place. This is why I speak of a cosmological democracy - not a democracy in the same sense of a democracy enacted by people, and not a democracy devoid of natural disaster, but a democracy in the sense of synthesis of the will of nature and the will of our own. Our selves may have only come into being at all through the democratic force of nature to create and support living conditions for our birth, and the path our selves take is only informed through the democracy of cosmology in the first place.

So, when we talk about ourselves in the modern sense, our opposition to the world is a great problem and must be rectified. A will of man as socially conceptualised, as opposed to nature, is mostly misinformed - misinformed by illusion, by unreal and abstract thinking, and by our unique ability to do wrong (or misplaced rightness) with deliberate and so contrived intent. A will of man devoid of the will of nature is a will devoid of all that is good and Real in the world. We are fundamentally boundless, and the rationale of such will of nature may only be spoken of through language and all its oppressive and assumptive features, one being that it excludes the full nature of human beings, to begin with.

With the recognition of falsity of face of self, one may be free to determine what face of self one intends to wear, a costume not bound by reality, but the beauty that may be found from certain elements of superficiality. Therefore, all criticisms of self here may be equated to the frequent usage of a very particular term - *ego*.

The Chaining of Other People and the Social Contract

How are we chained to the concepts of other people? In what ways may we regard ourselves concerning others? How may the perceptions of ourselves in accordance to other's perceptions shape our habits and determine our futures? Is it not true that we generally see ourselves as either wedged in between the flairs and characteristics of other people or wrongfully outside of and detached from the sphere entirely? And is it not so that we all perceive ourselves to be chained by such panoptic views of ourselves through others' eyes? And it is not actually so that we are all our own centres, free to be guided by no one other than ourselves?

I present a problem with the connotations of personality-based psychology. The problem concerns the divisions of personality traits, such as extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, etc. It is the subsequent perception of the traits themselves; we perceive ourselves as either sitting comfortably between the less and more extraverted people around us, and if this is not so, we deem ourselves an anomaly. The truth is, these traits are plucked out for the functional purpose of psychological evaluation, not an over-conceptualised notion that the trait inherently exists free of all other traits - named or unnamed. The psychological evaluation too has a foundational place and purpose, be it ambiguous. It is founded in the reduction of harm, statistical analysis, or lifestyle advocacies. Where the psychological evaluation oversteps itself is the perception that the scale and the assumptions behind that scale have some more apparent reality than the directly present. Instead, the psychological evaluation should bear no power over the person when the reasons that stem from its foundation or purpose are no longer of use. In a sense, the only truthful notion of personalities is in what way they are valuable to psychological

efforts in the first place. With leniency, one may question *all* aspects of a person as compared to others in the same fashion.

The imagined trait of betterness or worseness in self and other people is far more problematic and at its worst, entirely toxic. To ignore our free spirit as self-reigning centres and to organise everyone on a chart of betterness is not only crippling but absurd. Better on what foundation? Betterness is relative to the day, and a world may need strong people one day, logical people another, wise people another, beautiful people another, and artistic people another. Not only does the idea of betterness put oneself down too low or raise oneself too high, but it also rejects the nature of opinions of the standards of people as a dialogue, both of fluidity and one lacking in seriousness. Most states of affairs are delegated to the authority of society, set in stone as a standard, and not something that is negotiable in every moment. The social good is something that should be seen as a dialogue and not a competition of clashing monologues. It should also be something that is based on localised and immediate compatibility as opposed to generalised hegemonic social attitudes.

What of the panoptic view of other people? As we speak of other people in the conceptual sense, we conflate everyone into one unit. We are all ourselves, but we are all other people too. So, we too get conflated into such conceptualisations. What are the repercussions? With the primacy of language becoming more prominent than the actuality of the Real, we conform ourselves to the unit of others. The reality that could exist to be stripped of the formalisation of people into one unit disappears, and the imperative of language to compel

definitions and thoughts of this nature will become its own fact.

The great crisis is, then, that everyone else tries to be Everyone Else. Everyone Else, is not, as it should be, the direct representation of the simple sum of all engaging personalities. It is, rather, an external standard and means for attainment. This is the crucial part, for there is no standard outside of meaningful or meaningless dialogue, for the standard uses itself as a reason. It is not what is authentic, or attainment to a conceived good. We must be aware of new standards of goodness that exist outside of tradition, habit, and the panopticon of Everyone Else.

To better understand the complexities of our relationships with other people, one should inspect language. For an understanding of the simplicities of our relationships, look to the Real.

What of the social contract as a whole, the conditions of this "Everyone Else"? The social contract stems farther than normally perceived. We are contracted socially to be indebted by and to others at all times. Furthermore, in inspection, we may find the social contract to be entirely conceptual, located in the minds of individuals. This too is formed from a generalisation of Everyone Else and ought to be exercised as something to steer away from, for the unchecked social contract turns into silent fascism. Our relationships with family, friends, and co-workers would become finalised and set in stone if not for our attention that the social contract does not define the reality of these relationships, and that relationships are in a greater sense authentic, real, and non-conceptual.

Our social contracts are of course formed differently and uniquely according to individuals, but there is another present problem. To step out of one social contract is to step into another, and once reinforced and maintained conceptually, this too becomes fascistic. To ignore the implications and assumptions of what a social contract is, both to immediate individuals and to the wider society, is to neglect the freedom that comes from the lack thereof. Even an established and rationalised opposition to a perceived hegemonic social contract, such as an established counter-culture, comes with its own set of social contracts that exist to either synthesise or even support said hegemonic social contract. This is because the opposition is still led by the same single dimension of rules to either obey or disobey.

Furthermore, the opposition only serves to further reinforce the solidarity of the hegemonic social contract, for the hegemonic social contract knows better what it is, and what is secure. In other words, the hegemonic social contract, if faced with a direct counter-culture, will either ostracise the counter-culture or, because the counter- culture shares the same implicit rules, incorporate it in its hegemony. One must not merely go against the grain, but carefully inspect and establish one's own rules of what freedom from established social contracts is, both in creating new rules for oneself and exercising freedom from conceptual rules altogether.

It is clear then that we are all conceptualised into something more than a mere sum, but something of a perverse and formalised standard. We standardise rather than describe psychology, and the unique person must conform to the conceptual standards of an imagined ideal. Our return to the Real comes when the social contract is recognised to be entirely

false and always negotiated in the present moment by individuals, and we return to the Real when we understand ourselves to be a free-reigning centre before any notions of a standardised set of people are necessitated to be placed over it. We do not need the social contract to recognise our sameness, and our capacity to realise ourselves as free-reigning centres endorses the capacity to love each other precisely in spite of the social contract.

The Chaining of Love

Oh, sweet love! To many the highest of all virtues! And yet like all concepts, once such feelings we may call love are identified and thus conceptualised we end up becoming a slave to artificial unreal “Love”.

What if I truly love someone? I may merely decide to say that I love them, but what of the power of “Love”? On the one hand, the emotion one feels is not merely “Love” - it is many different complexes and intersubjective emotions and feelings and ideas and perspectives all at once. This feeling is one that the concept and its subsequent conceptual package will never match up to. And on the other hand - the idea of “Love” itself, or Love as the Concept, will also embody many other assumptions, imperatives and processions that are not mutual with the feeling one has. So, love is never just Love, and to assume one may repurpose it willingly without getting lost in the dual conceptual will is naive. We may, in this context, never simply love to be in love, but to be in a form of love swamped with the prejudices of Love.

Neither the monogamous marriages of the past nor the polyamorous arrangements of today reflect a free love. Even

the loves of today are swamped with perverse notions of liberation and political intentions if one is felt by the concept of love and not instead namelessly and indescribably in love. Both of these loves are conditional loves - conditions that culture, society, and history must conform to. Even hostile acknowledgement of love today becomes a form of conformity - for we love to distrust and disgust over such hostile acknowledgers and so it validates our political love.

And too, how senseless is any sort of reproach of political love and any talk of a return to monogamous marriages of love, for this too demands economic exchange to and from the loved one, only this economic exchange is bound in contract, certificate and the sharing of material goods. Could it be that both sorts of curses inflicted on the lovers of the world are inflicted when one calls love “Love”? For the concept has a definition, and definitions expect the bearing of some things and the lack of bearings of other things. For only if we were face to face with “it”, not the love we speak of, but what we only may call *it*, there would be a great boundlessness to our love, free of demands and definitions. Whenever we speak of love, this is the love we truly hope for.

Both loves of this sort expect a conceptualised arrangement - an arrangement chosen by the minds of people - but arrangements that demand an economic exchange of touches, gifts, sensory pleasures, material goods, or otherwise. Boundless love both expects nothing and gives no expectant favours in return. It swims in the nothingness.

Language is ultimately possessive. Whenever we say we have any sort of relation to anything at all, we imply that

a part of it is in our possession. This is especially true of love. We would suffocate them in our grasp if we did not have any notion of a world outside of such perverse love - non-conceptual, real, boundless love - a love we understand implicitly but can never speak of. Think not that such attachments are different from the described love - all descriptions of love are that which embody some nature of attachment.

Such notions of so-called boundless love may not even be conflated with spiritual or thoughtless ones - we may only turn to the prejudices of language and concepts and their syntactical opposition to the truth of the world that we may reason these things. Truthfully, nothing owns anything, for there is fundamentally no-thing at all. What part of ourselves might we dedicate to be of the possessor and what part of them may we dedicate to be of the possessed? Is it an intention of our action that possesses, and a subsequent restriction of their action that is possessed? Are we in the knowledge of this possession, and are we in possession of such a possession? This is not what we mean when we attempt to refer to real love, and both semantic and empirical efforts may lead us to this conclusion.

Love may be ruined by an attainment for boundless love being met with an artificial and manipulative love. But once true boundless love is reached, no expectations for any other form of love are created nor does the boundless lover instil any expectant favours in return, so even in the face of reciprocal failure boundless love triumphs.

What of the many perverse natures of love, a love we see today? It is formal love, arranged love, capitalistic love, expectant love, “harmonious” love, compliantly sexual love, compliantly

non-sexual love, material love, ideal love, romantic love, platonic love - and never anything but a love that pertains to a particular perverse nature. Can we speak of any sort of love at all without also referring to these perverse natures?

The conceptualisations of the adjacencies of love and time are immutable. We love to plan for the future, a specific formalised future, and subsequently, never intend to love today.

It is clear to me that boundless love is indescribable - and that is what makes it the thing we really attempt to refer to. If we had not been able to describe this love we would not know what it was rationally. But what is rational understanding of boundless love? Once we had turned to description and conceptualisation we had lost sight of any notions of genuine intimacy, joy, and freedom - that which pertains to a love that completes us and completes us timelessly.

The Chaining of Time (and Memory)

Time is defined in the English language as linear, progressional and a joining of three concepts, the past, the present, and the future. Furthermore, the representation of time is too conceptually packaged with its prejudices. These prejudices may be of determinism, of causality, or progress, of time as a force that pushes things forward. What of an alternative representation that bears far more facticity to the world, namely motion? Motion is a sense of time divorced from prejudicial attributes, in which things simply move without record, and free from the judgement one makes about some external thing forcing things to march towards some imagined end.

Whorf ’s (1936) thoughts on the Hopi model of space-time having an entirely different metaphysical model to ours does not indicate that their view is somewhat inferior to ours, namely English, merely because we are scientific in how we carry out procedures. Rather, the way we speak and think in the everyday is still bound by prejudicial assumptions about time, and the foundations of our language were created before the scientific method. So, there may be three models we can conceive of time. The first is the English language. The second is the Hopi language. Lastly, the third is the paradigm of modern science, of general relativity and space-time. Neither English nor Hopi may deem themselves fit to perfectly explain the processes of the universe through scientific eyes from their languages alone, and both will carry false and prejudicial assumptions in the social and functional sense. If even the mere direct language we use to talk about time has limits, then the complex social and psychological concepts of time must have even greater limits and prejudices. We may, with experimentation, then focus on ours in the West.

I had a recent dream as I write this, on speaking in a seminar on conceptuology, a possible future discipline in philosophy. Someone asks if the concept of time should be considered as a dimension like spatial dimensions, or its own unique type of dimension. I respond as if out of proper lucidity (which I did not have) that it does not matter what time is, only how we speak of time.

I reflect on this answer in waking hours; there is a truth in this. Importantly, we may never consider the perception of time through an omniscient or objective lens. We may perhaps never properly consider it outside of the unconscious conceptual frameworks that have been made part of our

essence from birth either. Despite this, employing contradiction similar to the mathematical technique, one can approach a closer idea of what time is in the Real by considering the assumptions about what language purports time to be - things time in the Real is not. For example, “time” often shares intimate ties with other modes of direction in space, in which the direction should be efficient and as quick as possible. The concept opposes the reality of time, and the concept deludes us with notions of desired efficiency and quickness. What is such efficiency in the subject of mere motion? Truthfully, time is an element of all being in this world. Therefore, it should never be assumed that certain parts of time should be associated with one particular method *within* time - such as it being fastened or even hastily removed from experience. Time is never a race, like other concepts time is intimately tied to also seem to imply. The bookend of an event is infinitesimal, and so does not exist.

What else do we assume in the West? We assume that time runs out. This, to me, is laughable. If we were to properly discuss time outside of Western interpretations and attribute the referent to a more scientific and lingually non-prejudicial basis - motion in a continuum, we may strip ourselves of such prejudices. On what basis may time run out? Is the fear that we grow old and sick and find ourselves marching towards the door of death one moment at a time? Rather, the connection time has with self proves imminently problematic if we view things objectively. Over what self are we worried of holding in one piece throughout a line we call time, as opposed to a pattern that we afterwards designate a self following through motions that we designate time? In this context, both self and time rely on each other to be conceptually viable to us, and the removal of one removes the other.

We are under a pretence of habituations of the past. We are caught up in habits. However, there is no real sign of the habitual in the Real, for the past consists of an infinite amount of interpretations of the meanings behind the events within them. We are not free from the absolute past, but free from all relative interpretations of the past, for these interpretations, unlike the physicality of the past that is only real in the present, are subsequently unreal.

As I spoke at length about the progress of history as prejudicial in The Lingual Instinct, perhaps I may focus differently on things going wrong throughout time. Our view of the prevention of constant linear progress throughout time as a stunt to how things should really be going is also a prejudice carried out by the assumptions we make of time. An adoption of time-as-motion would too cease this perspective. If we remove events in time as happening in any specific or desired order we may hopefully arrive at this concept as entirely unneeded in our lives.

We may also arrive at the closer inspection of events within time themselves. Events are conceptual, and events are not separate or dominant in any way, speaking from the appropriate universal functions. There is one event, and there are no events. Furthermore, the idea of certain events being more important than others is entirely relative to the situation of the present. At some points, some particular events appear to stand out as of the most important (and of always being the most important!) before perspectives change, and other events come into our direct view with notions of their new and “ever-present” importance. Rather, not only does no event have any objective or even subjective priority over others, but

furthermore, these events have no sense when talking about the Real.

We may also talk about the assumptions of the past, the present, and the future, or more specifically, what I might call the past-me, the now-me, and the future-me if we were to illustrate an image of the particular sorts of assumptions I am referring to. For example, as the past-me may no longer decide their actions and may never exist again, I may shun their name all I like without consequence, and they may not fight back or ever be called upon to criticise. This assumption of the ability to shun the past without consequence is true of all states of affairs regarding the past, as the past may never be the present again. However, the present is built from the past, and so to shun the past is to shun the present.

Furthermore, we may anticipate the future with uncertainty, or in this particular example the future-me as transcendent of all the difficulties regarding the present. This assumption is built from the notion that the future has no tangibility and so transcends tangible suffering or idiosyncrasy. Therefore in our mind's eye, it embodies a sort of idyllicism. So, we may not only look too hopefully towards the future as embodying this sort of transcendence, purity, and idyllicism, but also put off major decisions to this future. This assumption of the future impairs us.

Rather, the only future that has any sort of reality is indeed the future being received *right now*, and this constantly-arriving future still embodies the present-day sufferings and idiosyncrasies, as it always will. This is not a pessimistic or anxious notion whatsoever. Rather, the only situation in which to act is right now, where the imagined past and the imagined

future are coming into being right now. In other words, the conceived transcendent, idyllic, or perfect future has no bearing in reality, and if we were to speak of any temporal state as idyllic, we need only look towards the present.

Lastly, different assumptions of the past and the future in their abstract form as existing as equal events to the present (as in, on the left and the right of a line), may be dismissed quite easily. There is no past or future in this sense. There is only an infinite present moment, and this infinitude is spacious, boundless, and whole. One may characterise such notions of past and future in one's physicality in this way: we are not trapped on an infinitesimal dot in a line at all. Regarding the physicality of the past, we are everything we were, from our place in the world to our biology, to our psychology, to our subatomic structure. The past is located entirely in the present, and the present organisation of matter may be seen as equivalent to the totality of preceding past moments. We are also, in this sense, everything we could be, since the potentiality of all we could be is located in the choices we have to make right now. If it was located in the future, as in, our choices were already determined, we would not possess this freedom at all, because the particulars of the choices we could make would be shut off somewhere else in time. We would, in other words, not have the choices of what choices we could make, and so they would not be choices of any free nature at all. The future then is also located in the present. For example, it makes no sense to form my retirement plan in my twenties. The only choices I make of this sort are dependent on the money I have right now, and how to spend it right now. The choices I make now affect my retirement plan, and choices of this sort are the *only* choices that affect my retirement plan.

Finally, we may speak about memory. A common folk philosophy is a connection between personhood, identity and chain of memory, with our memories as it were, making us who we are. However, this is not quite true, for if we really do value our identity over many things, which we do, and this identity were entirely to do with memory, we would be grappling to record and remember as much as we could, and feel fearful, lost, and psychologically mutilated if any memories at all were lost. Not at all! For personhood is as much the space of unidentified non-memory as it is the solid of identified memory. The senile elder or amnesiac remembers less, their conceptual identity is in a certain way lessened, but they are still just as much a person – a whole human being. This is not to say we don't value memory over non-memory. However, it is the dual conceptual will that favours the former over the latter, and as non-memory cannot be spoken of, we cannot communicate it to ourselves and others, and so we do not identify it as having any value. How both memory and its opposite are crucial to being, and how a lack of balance on either side leads to the detriment of free and strong character!

If we viewed memory, identity, and the right to live in the way we think we do, the fifty-year-old would be perceived as having more right to life than the ten-year-old, because they have more memories. The opposite is more true. The ten-year-old's lack of identity made from fixed memories is directly linked to what gives them more right to life as they can make new, different, and better memories. They have more potential and so they are freer. They are still yet to have their first kiss, their first home, their first love, their first dance, their first epiphany. What is it then that we must protect but absence above all things?

If this subchapter were to offer anything of value, it would be to say that all past and future pre-occupations are swamped with prejudices and false assumptions. If there were to be any sense of temporal actuality in the Real, it would be the present moment, the most eternal and infinite of all places.

Conclusions

Here I have discussed the conceptual package in more depth, outlining what it consists of and what problems it poses to us. I have also identified a list of some of what I have called the Major Concepts, the concepts we commonly use the most and those that embody the highest conceptual packages. I have then gone through the prejudices I have identified with each of them and with many have posited a different model of the concept that would strip such prejudices away.

We will now talk about the concept that led to the title of this entire book, the Ecstasy of Nothing, the most profound experience one may have in one's life - a radical sight of the world entirely without concepts, society, culture, and language, a sight that has left us all.

ON THE ECSTASY OF NOTHING

What is the Ecstasy of Nothing?

The Ecstasy of Nothing may most commonly be referred to as the effect brought out by truly successful meditative practices, or the meditations of those inclined to see reality for how it is, in which the ability to obtain a perspective of the world without prejudice follows. It is to see the sublime in the Real.

The Ecstasy of Nothing is the reaction to the radicality of seeing the world of Nothing, or the real world. However, the Ecstasy of Nothing may refer to a wide degree of ecstatic experiences from the inclination to see the world with a real and non-conceptual lens, some being mere Glimpses, some being complete Visions. This book's particular definition of it is the result of being struck with the world without unrealities. Such unrealities those of us engage in in the modern experience are entirely to do with the abstractable ones, of conceptual and lingual unrealities.

The Ecstasy of Nothing has also been called Nirvana, the Now, Enlightenment, the Sublime, Love, Om, the Light, the Dao, and God. What it is called is never what it is, and the cultures that interpret what it is as merely "a cultural process" only mask it.

In "the Ecstasy of Nothing", the two central concepts we deal with are "ecstasy" and "nothing". The "nothing" referred to may in some contexts be referred to as "nothing added". For example, to pass through time with the conceptual instinct is to constantly attain for the future. As long as we submit to the

current conceptual prejudices of passing through time we will have this notion. However, to even be in a certain space is to drown in all sorts of illusions the will-of-language and the will-of-concepts grasp you by. We see a certain space, such as a bedroom, with its own prejudicial context. This is what is meant by “nothing added” - for such additional unrealities on top of the Real in space, time, or whatever else are done away with. We perceive the world in a certain reduced and fascistic context, a context often entirely divorced from what the world truly is and could be.

The reasoning to use the word “nothing” for this experience may be confusing. Nothing, as well as “nothing added”, may also be better thought of as no-thing, or no-concept – absence, emptiness, purity. Once one sees past concepts, one also comes to see the lack of definition between oneself and the world altogether, in which the only way to translate this experience into concepts would be that the self is another form of the world, and/or the world another form of self.

As we have spoken of the lingual instinct, the will-to-conceptualise, the chaining of concepts, and all to do with observing and perceiving oneself in what one might call the ordinary world, the Ecstasy of Nothing may best be referred to as the stark opposite state of perception. As all things that can be spoken about are concepts, the Ecstasy of Nothing can never be ultimately reached through concepts. However, one may be sneaky in using language to point to the experiences of the Ecstasy of Nothing, the world of Nothing, or the real world, all correspondingly referring to the same experience. Hence, writing about this experience is a challenge - the experience of Realness and Nothingness has almost nothing to do with theories of such experience. This book does

its best to portray what the experience of the Ecstasy of Nothing is, but will never do it justice.

The Ecstasy of Nothing may be said to be the *real* context of the self that directs itself to the world - if such a context exists subjectively and in actuality in the appropriate way context is used. At moments one may infer that the world is fundamentally absurd, and from then one may infer there is no actual context at any real basis. However, I resist this notion on a particular ground. Rather, the absurdity of the world is the stepping stone to total realisation, not the other way round. It is rather that the dissipating of conceptual notions initially lead one to see the world as absurd, but once one grows accustomed to the nature of states of affairs beyond clear-cut unrealities and lingual and conceptual structures, one discovers a new "context" - the ecstatic and sublime context of the Real beyond the distractions of unfamiliarity and thus, absurdity. The new radical position of seeing the Real does not necessitate insanity and sensory chaos in the same way that not concentrating on the words someone speaks does not lead to unintelligibility. It is rather that the prejudices leading out of base-level interpretations of reality radically fall away.

The World of Nothing

The Ecstasy of Nothing is referred to as ecstatic because when one is released or releases oneself of the shackles of concepts, language, and unreality, one sees reality for how it is. The sky is blue, the moon is bright, and the sun is brighter. The coffee is warm, the water is cold. The space is empty, the implications are absent. Money and work become irrelevant terms outside of the real processes one engages in. Identity is revealed to be dramaturgical, and one's true self is locational but boundless.

The social contract is revealed to be nothing but a myth. Love becomes unconditional. Time becomes infinite and notions of how we measure time appear, too, as myths. One as it were, finds oneself back in the world. One does not clumsy themselves with notions of what the world should be, what one should be, and what one should do, and what the world ought to become. These notions in the Ecstasy of Nothing are senseless and invalid. Such immediacies of both observations, actions, and even relationships, all shine brilliantly through the doors of perception in their full reality, divorced of oughtness, and the emotional response is a sober and clear ecstasy.

Where, then, does that lead the world of lingualisations and conceptualisations? The world of concepts is ingrained into our society, our architecture, and our interactions with other people, Of course, the function of language may be biologically rooted, but the will-to-conceptualise and the will-to-lingualise, and the adversarial will-of-concepts and the will-of-language, are not the ultimate ends of evolution. Rather, there are such wills that abstract and derealise the world, wills that have been perverted to engulf our entire perception. They are obstacles that must be overcome. They are similar to the obstacle of other primal instincts, only this instinct comes from the opposite end of animal primality. It comes from human tendencies of over-intelligence, of prudeness, and denial of life.

The Ecstasy of Nothing is an experience of observation that leads to the death of the power of the will-of- language and the universal functions that it leads us into. One does not follow the compulsion of language to separate, dominant-judge, value-dominant-judge, insist validity, insist agreement, attain for processional completion, oppress, imply superiority, or retract from the Real at all. We can see how far the lingual and

conceptual instinct has served to derealise and depersonalise ourselves from the world, and in this experience, we realise that this freedom, however temporary, will influence the rest of our lives.

The perception of the Real does not conflate subjectivity with objectivity in all ways, nor spirituality with the scientific and logical view of the world. Rather, all perceptions of reality will ultimately be subjective in some way to us - only this subjectivity will now be surrounded by realities rather than unrealities. In other words, we do not see things the way a deity does, because such a notion is unneeded and upon closer inspection does not make sense. For example, how may we imagine the sense-data of colour to appear to a deity who sees colour *objectively?* Would it be as the colour we see them?

This is a subjective interpretation of its data. So, then, would it see colour transcribing the length of electromagnetic waves? If a deity saw the numbers, these numbers would too, not be pure numerical data, but representation by the signifier of numbers, of the shapes of numbers. There would be no end in which we can imagine a deity seeing the data of colours objectively, for the data must always be represented in some way.

Therefore, the question of seeing colours in our perception need not be worried about due to lack of objectivity. This question arises from the lack of awareness of the mere delegation of neurological authority, of letting the structure of our minds do the tedious work. As it were, it presents the colour red as how we see it - the state “red” points to. Seeing the Real is not attaining some objective deity-like view of the world. Seeing and experiencing the Real is the recognition of our own subjective experiences outside of concepts, and this

response views our truest perception as nothing short of sacred.

Our best memories and anticipations may indeed be tinged with moments of the Ecstasy of Nothing. Indeed, we are seeing the brilliant light at all times, and retrospection and imagination of the times we are most intimately in the world might be a gateway into the radical reality of the world itself. This is not an experience exclusive to the hard-training Buddhists, Yogis, or other mystics of the world. We always have access to this view.

The Ecstasy of Nothing brings the ceasing of the Questions as much as it brings the answers. The Questions are the unresolved and repressed queries regarding what is viewed as the incomplete or unanswered nature of the world. Are we in a simulation? What happens after death? Is my job important? What's the meaning of life? The Questions even refer to queries like: Why am I not happy? When will I be satisfied? What is this subtle discomfort I am always experiencing? The Questions are fundamental to our unrest with the world we inhabit and may be both lingually asked, as well as psychologically (and even physiologically) felt. The fundamental questions appear to us as ways to hold a cup at one end, the length of time of a walk at another, business decisions at another, and cosmological uncertainties at another. These uncertainties, like all fundamental problems, are unreal.

All of the Questions of the world cease in the Ecstasy of Nothing when the assumptions of the objects of the nature of the world that the questions rely on are pacified. These assumptions might be as such: there is a subjective view of the world that is more valid than another, that there is a separate person that can die, that there is a scale of "importance" of

jobs, and that other people have an interior world that is separate to you, but unreachable. The Ecstasy of Nothing will recognise that these assumptions that carried these questions were not visible to our consciousness and that these assumptions are questionable, and many times also founded on an unstable and unreal conceptual and lingual ground. After speculation, it will show that in many cases, both the Questions and their assumptions are meaningless.

What is immediate to you, sensuous to you, sacred to you? It is, of course, the Ecstasy of Nothing.

The Ecstasy of Nothing is a total view of the world. It is outside of the conceptualisation of time. The reality that time may be pointing to is real, but when we conceptualise it, we see ourselves as an infinitesimal dot on a finite line, commonly going left to right in the West. Such notions are entirely arbitrary. We may elaborate on this conceptualisation further - with a blurry conception of the start of the finite line exploding outwards, and significant points marking the beginning of the Earth, beginning of life, beginning of intelligent life, and the beginning of your life. The lines continue until the death of all aforementioned things that began (an endpoint we are sure to fear!) The finite line imprisons time in a conceptual box, and as long as we view the finite line in the way we see it, we will see the universe as contained by this box.

There is no such box. Even if this representation may be scientifically reliable in predicting the future of our universe, it denies and represses our truer subjective experiences of the Real. The universe is not going left to right or right to left, it is not on a line, it is not inside anything we can lingualise, it is not bound by anything, and it is not finite in any way we can

properly conceive with our minds. While the teachings of the institutions of science may be important in the world of predicting and expecting, they are still bound by prejudicial representations.

These representations are precisely what lead us to over-exercise the will-to-conceptualise and as consequence the will-of-concepts. It is what has led to viewing the representations of the world through second-hand experience as higher forms of reality than the sky, the moon, the sun, the coffee, or the water. The actualities of the Real illuminate all senses acknowledged and forgotten, while the timeline illuminates an overworked and unreal perception. As said in The Chaining of Time in the previous chapter, the assumptive and prejudicial timeline is dichotomous to the holistic motion of objects. This imagined end of things only signifies the assumption of such separate things in the first place. The Ecstasy of Nothing is entirely uninvolved in such futile and even masochistic thought processes.

The world of Nothing is inhabited mostly by children and the few adults who have discovered the shackles of conceptualisation put unto them through conditioning and have been able to free themselves from its ownership.

The Full Picture of Nothing

The Ecstasy of Nothing is a means to see everything in one’s view at once. One does not perceive the entire world literally, but the awareness of one's entire subjective world in all areas illuminates, and the realities of the significance of memories and future experiences of both discerned and non-discerned nature come to light, all shining brilliantly. So, it may be

referred to as the Ecstasy of Everything. How peculiar it is that opposites will often come to refer to the same thing when dealing with that which cannot be divided into dichotomies! The names only matter for discussing the reaction to the experience - it is the only thing we may really talk about productive regarding such an experience.

To experience the Ecstasy of Nothing is to have the full picture. To experience Nothing is to experience everything, and to experience everything is to experience Nothing. The duality of the referent that brings out ecstasy illuminates the nothing in the Real, with nothing separating the perceived self from the perceived world and correspondingly the emptiness of the world.

What of a total conceptual view? It would be a blackened world that overshadows and obstructs the Real. It would produce a fog, a veil, in which nothing is perceived but a full and total shadow with no qualities or attributes to speak of besides that which relates to all emotions heavy and negative. It would be senseless and qualified in no way. This would characterise a break of the self from any form of reality, and a perception of all to do with the density of the conceptual. The harrowing nature of this density and unreality of the representation, and a representation of nothing but the representation itself, brings out the largest of artificial and negative emotions. If the Real is the light, the unreal is the darkness. How are concepts experienced without sense? They are characterised by the *obstruction* of sense, in which we see it by the limitations of how we see the Real. The absence of concepts is an absence of obstruction. In this sense, the Real is characterised by absence.

The Ecstasy of Nothing takes as incredibly many forms as there are different forms of subjective reality, but they are all rooted in the awareness of the infinite in the finite, the transcendent in the immanent. To fully recognise Nothing dissolves the dichotomy of opposites, of many experiences and one experience, and of experiencing nothing and experiencing anything. However, the Ecstasy of Nothing is of the highest experience, for the shadows of representation and unreality bear no sublime scent and flavour like the tacticity of the Real does.

The Ecstasy of Nothing does not recognise names, ages, races, or national identities and in fact, ceases the dominant perceptions of these facts. As these dominant perceptions cease, the more real states of things, some half-conscious, some forgotten about completely, scream at you as if to rejoice the final and eventual hearing of their voices.

What is the weight of the seriousness of problems in the world? One may wrongly infer that those that believe the existence of problems is doubtful are mad. On the other hand, these inferences are done by those who believe that a “serious” problem marks a problem with existence itself, that the problem bears an infinite weight and means the world is fundamentally mistaken, a mistake our finite intellect has noticed! This is the truly mad view. For example, a utilitarian may implicitly have the idea that unhappiness or unpleasantness is a fundamental problem with the world; a fundamental problem more exponentially weighted the more fascistic one’s utilitarian perspective gets. Yet, this assumed mistake must be a fact of the world. The deontologists and virtue ethicists are utilitarians of the same kind, for they merely pride moral duty and virtuous character instead of

happiness as their guiding principle of how to “correct” the world. However, they disguise their fundamental problem of the world - the lack of moral duty, or the lack of virtue - as its antithetical endpoint. It is nevertheless the same sort of condition.

What does the absence of a problem feel like? Nothing, for the problem itself, has formed into what we may call the thing, the discerned object of thought. In Four Universal Functions of Mature Language, I wrote that things oppose actualities. Then, all Things of the World, as they oppose actualities in some way or another, can become problems. However, the world is not composed of things. At any level of direct experience of the world, an unsolvable or fundamental problem never arises. Truly, problems may never hold seriousness at all.

We may find ourselves under a new law we do not like but cannot change, but this law is not a problem when we find ourselves in the world. We may protest against the police, but when we find ourselves in the world, we are not under a problem. We may even become locked away in prison, but if we manage to properly find ourselves in the world, we find ourselves free of problems. Pleasant and unpleasant experiences are of course a state of experience, and even physical pain may cause suffering (and is perhaps the only non-conceptual type of suffering that exists) but the state of unsolvable problems is an unreal one and bears no factual content.

We must not shy from solving the illusion of problems. After all, a fascist regime may take power and this is something that invokes the character in us that resists such fascism. However, we must never take the problem as if it were universally

fundamental if we want to truly be in the world. We must be genuinely ironic.

We Are Unable To Talk About Nothing

It follows from descriptions of what Nothing isn't that we may want to arrive at a description of what Nothing is and what its properties are. However, we are unable to talk about Nothing.

Most things we cannot speak of, and most things that we can speak of, we will not speak of. To acknowledge the Ecstasy of Nothing with such a name is a great crime. However, to never acknowledge it at all is a crime much greater.

When we consider something, we will always consider it in what can only be described as significant, performative, acted out, separate, dominant, or discerned. However, this means we cannot consider its opposite, unless we make it significant, performative, acted out, separate, dominant, or discerned in some way. For example, if we were to say that the duck waited, we impose the quality of it doing something significant, something that pops out. What of the insignificant or non-performative?

The will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts will always take the quality of nothing and make it useful in some way, make it perverse. "How may I *use* the beauty and purity of Nothing for some ulterior motive?" one might ask. Nevertheless, the only use for Nothing is the acknowledgement and appreciation of its nothingness.

All statements are preceded and succeeded with the most profound sort of statement, and that is the statement of silence. What could such a statement be saying? How much clearer the

general perception would be if we could attribute and ground the basis for appropriate metaphysical, moral, social, spiritual and institutional assumptions on the silence that preceded and succeeded all statements?

Art and Nothing

Art is the recognition of Nothing in an idea or profound representation of the world, and a subsequent failure to recognise Nothing in the real world. Art at its best is pure expression and illumination of things as they are without prejudice.

Art is the recognition of nothing for it dissolves the nothing's opposite - unrealities and untruths. Where our experience with the world is characterised by a dichotomy between the self and the environment, the portrait presents the figure and the background as going together; they form one portrait. Our major concept of time has a strict and particular division of the world into sections of dominant and submissive time, but visual art removes time, and so too, the conceptualisations associated with time. Music has a different way of removing time, and instead, dissolves it into an awareness of the unity of the past note, the present note, and the future note as one song.

Also, is it not true that one enjoys music the most when one listens to space or emptinesses between notes? Is it not true that to listen to music as a classification of units is a great way to destroy the perception of its beauty?

The removing and dissolving of time, too, removes the necessity for an adding function, or the desire to improve or

make better the world of the art, for art is already complete and final. Mediocre art may be improved, but both good art and mediocre art present an idea of things without excess; the idea itself is fully said. The will-to- conceptualise and the will-of-concepts, on the other hand, are never satisfied, and will always intend to continue their processes forthwith in the mind.

Art, among many other things, elucidates the fact of the world being non-conceptual as the art itself, but the great tragedy of art is that it creates one distinct separation - the separation of the art from the world. This brings out the illusion that the reason for the beauty of art is different from the reason for the beauty of the world, and may serve to further amplify our feelings of imperfection and discontent with our environment, even if such imperfection is subtle, unconscious, or hidden from view.

Storytelling and linear art in both films and literature, and also music, have a special way of incorporating the unity of everything into their stories, as if the great force of the world itself moved things in a meaningful and sacred direction. The author may have an intrinsic role in guiding this force, but in the story of the art itself, the world of the film is the story's main author. But indeed, how the great force of the world in art is identical to the great force of our world! Only the world of art is intended by an artist, while our world is intended by many artists, all people, creatures, plants, and rocks that it is made up of.

Because film, like art, portrays Nothing, it allows us to be more open about experiences of those in the film that do not match ours. The experience and empathy of a different other in the

nothing of the film contests against our conceptual frameworks of what the “right” experience of a person ought to be. The perception of these conceptual frameworks temporarily ceases and is retracted from view in the lens that allows us to see Nothing within the world of the film. But then, so too do the functions that generate specific and artificial conceptions of “rightness” of such experience. One must not recreate the events portrayed in Nothing, but know that we share the nothingness of the film.

The content of the film may indeed have moral connotations that reinforce certain conceptual frameworks - but I say this; it is the artistic medium of film *itself* that portrays nothing, not the content. To watch a plot unfold and the artistry of performance may not bear a spiritual experiential quality if seen in ordinary life, but seen in the Nothing of the World of the film turns these moments into majestic, almost sacred experiences. The window of the film itself, not the content of the film, ceases the prejudices of the lingual and the conceptual. We are then in danger of two things; one, that the heightened awareness of the nothing makes us more malleable and influenced by the film’s conceptual moral messages. For the nothing shakes us with its magnitude - as it always will when experienced even slightly. Two, that we lose the ability to see Nothing in our world and also the sacredness of Nothing outside of the conceptual moral conjectures of the film.

The problems that exist in films are the same as problems in the real world. They are theatrical, dramaturgical, and enact a drama that initiates the playing of our character. Why do we not existentially stress over the story of the film in the same unnerved and repressed way we do in everyday life? It is not recognition of the falsity of the film, for we are still emotionally

moved by it. The difference is the recognition of Nothing in the film, for it is through the nothing of the film that we see the entire world of the film all at once. So, we do not attach ourselves too much to the trivialities of the discerned problems of things that the film presents (or identify things as things in the ordinary way at all), problems viewed as separate or primary or requiring necessary and specifically contrived action. We are instead inherently aware of the world of the film all at once, and so the clarity of the context of the world of the film is that its existence precedes any forceful action to be carried out into what may be deemed its “problems”.

If art is a point on a line, a contextual opposite we may impose that draws a line from it is the product, or more specifically, the product amplified by commodity fetishism. Caramelised soda may be an everyday thing in our world, but the identity of Coke is special - it is always the same, duplicated and multiplied as “The Coke”.

What is this but a contrived manifestation of a shadow of some imagined metaphysical realm where this form of caramelised soda originated? The reaction to a taste of this metaphysical realm that appeals to us conceptualists is not only unreal - but perverse.

To appreciate Coke properly, one must voyeur, buy, and drink it - or even just know and experience its specific sacredness through advertisement. This is the difference between it and art, for while all art is a unique representation and the doorway to idyllicism, the Coke is a barrier from our world and “The Place Where Things are Perfect”. It is a barrier, for the finalisation of Coke’s image and existence imposes opposition to our simple perception of our world afterwards: the other

things in our world are varied, unique, and imperfect, one might infer. The medium of the film, the painting, or the poem, neither postulates material perfection nor invokes a product that we voyeur and buy (at the best of times).

The other side of commodity fetishism, besides the product itself, is the advertising, the presentation of the product - and this only further determines that the Coke equates to enjoyment, nicety, and idyllic qualities. The representations via art are used and used perversely, the styling of the artwork on the can, the artistic merit of the posters, the filmography of the adverts on TV, but this art is perverted to another purpose. What is the purpose? To point to the commodified value and perceived idyllicism of the product. Try as we like, but we would still rather a properly branded Coke can than an identical flavouring of a different brand. Is this merely because we find Coke reliable - or is this also because we crave for the metaphysical?

The more we see or hear or in any way sense art, the more invisible it generally becomes to us. But make no
mistake, this is because we have become this art, and just as we cannot see our organs, we too cannot see this art. The self is art, and art is the self.

Nothing and Ghost Concepts

What is a ghost concept? A ghost concept is a consequence of two things. The first is the nature of language to separate states of affairs in the world into two opposites. The second arises from our want to name “everything”.

What are some of the definitions of everything? We have many words that are synonymous to the concept, such as everything itself, life, being, reality, nature, the universe, the world, experience, God, and existence. From there, the ghost concepts such as nothingness, death, the infinite, unreality, the non-natural, the non-universe, the ego, non-experience, godlessness, and non-existence arise.

Make no mistake, this is a consequence of these two situations; the nature of language to divide into opposites, and our want to put a name on the full picture. This is quite obviously the case upon closer inspection since the intention was to describe everything that may be touched through description. This correspondingly results in the want to leave nothing out. To then change this condition to say we really did leave something out is inconsistent, and automatically inconsistent.

We need not investigate states of affairs in the world, but instead, investigate states of affairs with our language and its designations of what things are. Subsequently noticing this inconsistency alone may bring us to this conclusion. If we do intend to refer to everything, such as experience being everything to do with the subjective world, then while language pushes in the direction to find an opposite, we must not. The lack of experience has absolutely nothing to do with the subjective world if experience is everything to do with the subjective world.

We must then, speaking specifically, forget death as a culture. Death as the result of this process of thought is an example of an ultimate conceptual weight that separates us from reality. It has no existence at all. Subsequently none of what we may call ghost concepts have any real existence.

Let me give you an example of the repercussions of a ghost concept. Can there be anything that isn't, isn't at all? No. Everything is in some way, even if it is objectively unreal or imagined. A unicorn is, even if it is only an imagination. However, it would seem that as language invokes being as a condition of states of affairs, there must be something that is not. Such paradoxical conclusions lead to despair over those states of affairs in the world that are not, that we may join the world of not-being, non-existence, the void! Such problems are entirely to do with lingual paradoxes, and once we realise that non-being and the aforementioned makes no sense, we can do away with such hypotheticals.

Let me give you another example of a ghost concept. It is posited and estimated that there is a 1 in 400 trillion chance of you being born. So, for all others who have not been born, do they exist in the abyss, having a form of existence, but a transcendent existence divorced from experience? My fear of death had brought me to the same conclusion. Now I may firmly resist. There is a 100% chance of you being born.

We can approach this semantically and empirically. Semantically, we need to look no further than the phrase "there is a 1 in 400 trillion chance of you being born". Look closer: the "you" is implied as separate from birth and existence when it is not. What sort of you could be spoken of that has not been born? How can we sensibly discuss a "you" as pre-existing and waiting to be born as being accompanied with the same properties of personhood? We cannot.

Yes, there is an amalgamation of potential human beings either being born or not that can be discussed, such as future

generations, but they are potentials - they are not identities. They are not people, in any sensical notion of what the word means. This allows us to look at this empirically. Is there any cause to assume the identity of personhood outside of actuality in the Real, as if some imagined non-experiencing person had as much existence as those that are in the world?

No, this is but a continuation of metaphysics of the senseless kind. We are in the world even *before* we acquire a personality or a "youness", and even then, personhood is not guaranteed. Birth is inevitable, personhood is optional. From here, the conclusion is simple. Non-life is not an actuality of the world, but a semantic error with no empirical reality. We may then make an interesting conclusion - everyone, in some way, is already alive.

What of the utility or such dread of the ghost concept? As these ghost concepts resonate with us on a psychological level, we may find counter-intuitive greatness in them. For example, those that reflect the tendencies of a nihilist will insist on their validity of the ghost concept of Godlessness or whatever else as real and true of states of affairs in the world. Instead, we must investigate not the validity of the ghost concept, but the psychological state, and with leniency and freedom, the creativities and liberties such a psychological condition can lead to. Much of the greatest art, poetry, and literature as well as experiential states are rooted in Godlessness, deathfulness, despair and other ghost concepts. There may be no actuality of Godlessness and deathfulness for the pragmatic effect they have to be worthwhile.

Furthermore, the experience of the total conceptual (that is, the experience of the ghost concept, such as the fear of death

being more striking to us than anything in the world), may allow us to see the falsity of the conceptual altogether. The void and *das nicht*, while viewed explicitly pessimistically by the existentialists, should instead, with creative liberty, be viewed as a fitting and promising antithesis to the fascism of conceptual frameworks.

The Ecstasy of Nothing is the proper view of the Real. However, one's attainment of it could very well come from a thoughtful balance of the limits of conceptual frameworks and a perceived void that, while such void not exist empirically or make sense to speak of philosophically, activates a psychological condition of surrender, and a surrender of the typifications of notions of the world. It advocates a ceasing of the view that the fascistic tendencies of one's life story, one's perception of the world, or one's self-perception are actualities - when these are not either.

The psychological condition of abandonment, despair, or any other existentialist concept is similarly aligned to many experiences to do with the Ecstasy of Nothing. One understands with both that the universe is outside of any framework we could assign it. When I say that the Ecstasy of Nothing opposes despair to a certain extent, I also infer that in this state one uses the psychological condition to heighten one's awareness of a world without narrative, concepts, or underlying structures of unreality. Virtue is arrived at when one does not get carried away with this notion and squirm in anguish, horror, or defeat at these notions of the Actuality of the World indefinitely. The world is not filled with these torments at all. Like all distinctions of language, if this psychological reaction bears no utility, it must be done away with.

Face to Face with Nothing

We are in two psychological places at once. The ordinary world, that is, the world created and reinforced through lingual, conceptual, and representational mechanisms of observing states of affairs, and the real world, the world that is all to do with its realness. The ordinary world snuffs out the real world, seeking an affirmation for its existence as superior (not real, for that is no concern at all to the world of the Ordinary). In addition, it also conceptualises goodnesses outside of either world - to constantly imagine new pleasures and authorities of betterness to encompass in the trivialities of the ordinary world's ordinary games.

The real world - or the world of Nothing, and one's radical experience of it - the Ecstasy of Nothing, are nothing to speak of. The daydream of the ordinary world built through symbols, maps, and labels keep us from its vastness and Realness. The problem is indeed Realness; we exist entirely within it and yet are instead faced with a caricature built for some other functional purpose. To be face to face with Nothing is to see everything completely.

I close this chapter with a question. When was the last time you saw the bonnet of a car? I do not ask for its function, not what colour it is and what colour it isn't, not how big it is, or when the last time you saw what it was. When was the last time you truly saw something as seemingly trivial as the bonnet of a car itself and once seeing it with the fullness of the world became shaken by its magnificent and plainly obvious beauty? To see it and see it finally would be such a grand and wonderful thing, more wondrous than the view from a mountain top, or a fire, or

any view at all. For it is not the expectation, anticipation, or prejudice of what we see, but knowing how to see in the first place that gives us the best joys that seeing has to offer.

Besides the observation of the world, how may we exercise true freedom from concepts with our perceptions?

In the next chapter I shall discuss the beginnings of knowledge as not objective, but communitarian and anthropological, and through such I shall discuss the depth to how our separations of the world bear no reality. From there, I shall discuss what it means to be free from and with concepts, and discuss a possible discipline that relates to all these ways of thinking - the discipline of Conceptuology.

GENEALOGIES OF KNOWLEDGE

A Bottom-Up Theory of Knowledge

It is an irrelevant idea that the term “begin” has a concrete or objective definition. It's about the fact that we can both agree that something that the word “begin” points to, is discernible for the word’s function or usefulness.

We are under the notion that language, or more notably words, come into being from the top down. That is, the meaning of the word “begin”, for example, is used by us at the bottom. This would seem to be, however, because some already relevant and pre-existing “beginning” nature at the “top” was learned and applied by us at the “bottom”. This could be the beginning of the universe itself or the beginning of life on Earth.

Despite this belief, such a top-down notion of word formation is not true if we investigate deeper states of affairs. Rather, the word comes into being through the function of the word itself, not otherwise. In other words, words come into being from the bottom up.

For example, we carry out some activity in our ordinary lives, consciously or unconsciously, such as planning to go berry-picking. When coupled with the endowment of our capacity to discern and separate through language, it results in the need for the inception of the Word. Only when we stumble upon the necessity to find a word for the reference of such a thing, like the start of any activity such as berry-picking (particularly in verb form, for example) do we then create the

word “begin” to use. This formation of the word may be conscious or unconscious, and I posit that the majority of word formations are unconscious.

Only after we have found a functional application for the word in our own lives do we then apply that word to the “top”.

Such an upward notion stemmed from the bottom refers to the world outside of the immediate, everyday, and communitarian activities of the human being. In other words, it refers to the notion that certain separable features of the universe are primordially relevant, and not subjective or relative to our social and genetic evolution.

In this case, one of these notions is the beginning of the universe. Even once we have discovered a fact that relates to modern science, such as Hawking radiation, we do it in a particular context, in a particular location, and with a particular community.

The crux is that we could not speak of any form of “beginning” - or conceive of a “beginning” in a communicable form from mature language at all - unless we initially had a word to use. There is hardly any way to imagine it being the other way. If we were unable to initially think of things as “beginning” unless it was through an immediate, everyday and communitarian means (before modern scientific necessities to formulate words nowadays), there would be no way to conceive of the universe as having any beginning at all. In other words, “beginning” does not start in the cosmos. It starts with the everyday, where we find a reason to even think of such a concept. After that, we have the tools to take it to the cosmos.

The confusion lies in the notion that the cosmos has any more fundamental nature of “beginning” than the everyday. Like all Things of the World, “beginning” is something we have created in a specific way, and for a specific purpose. In cosmological efforts, we now may feel the need to create words entirely for scientific purposes. But the majority of words, such as “begin”, have existed far longer than scientific efforts have. These words have been formed from a pre-science communitarian background. Not only that, but have also been the foundation of how we may describe science in English now.

To approach this idea clearly, what is important to know is that there are no pre-existing separations in any form whatsoever. In this case, the “beginning” of the universe has no separation from the “middle process” of the
universe, and correspondingly its “end”. On a more radical notion, even the continuum of beginning to end is not separate or discernible from other continuums one may then project, such as spatial continuums, thermodynamic continuums, continuums of intelligent life, or all the other infinite continuums one may be able or unable to mention. The beginning of the universe and my breath, so to speak, are the same thing. They embody the same sort of fundamental existence. One could call this a “radical sameness”, in which separations of such radical sameness come *after* the will-to-conceptualise and the function to separate things.

The notion that things are separate to us, and the only way a word can come into being, is through its functionality, or usefulness. As aforementioned, there does not exist the infinite, external and empirical (or even internal and rational) separations waiting to be discovered. This is because, at every level of closer analysis, the absurdity of a true separation is

fleshed out. The head does not become the neck at a sharp line that requires an empirical or even rational discovery in nakedness. The head and neck become separate for the use of biologists, hat and scarf makers, painters, and doctors.

It is not that we are in the process of discovering Things of the World. Rather, the dual conceptual will is the exclusive way in which things come out to be expressed in lingual forms. So, we must be wary of the gap between language and what we may call the Real or the substantive world. The bridge to connect the gap is function - good or bad function - or a reason to use something in the world by describing it.

The sun is the sun - that is, we perceive the sun to be the sun, because of our need to organise time for plans to wake up or go to sleep at certain times, planting crops, seeing things more clearly in daylight, receiving heat from it, and many other things. However, it was never outside of its functional use as something separate until the functions, or uses, came about. This is clear once we discover why we have not separated other potential things from each other. Other potential separate things could be the bottom half of the sun from the top half or the perfect sphere of the sun from its flares. The perception of the sun as a total object is present purely from the functional nature of such perception.

The subjective words and ideas for separate and different colours in different cultures and tribes, and subsequently their perception of such colours, finalises this idea. Even things that clearly appear separate to us as English speaking Westerners such as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, and violet, are not shared universally across the board. It is even the case that in our minds cyan and navy blue appear to be of the same sort

of colour to us, and rightly the same sort of colour if we do not inspect carefully.

Are these at all the same colour, the same sort of visual phenomena? Twi, the language spoken in Ghana, might be far more inclined to separate cyan into the “colour of the sky”, and navy blue to their notion of “black”, speaking crudely. This is because they are more inclined to make shades distinct than hues. This distinction may even seem to make more “rational” or “empirical” sense if one were still inclined to believe that separation of colours is “objective” or should be “universally agreed on”, a notion sillier than most.

There is no word for the feeling of satisfaction after going round a corner. However, if there existed a civilisation tormented by predators that couldn’t go round corners, there may indeed be a word.

But what of the separation of things, from actions, from features to methods? Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs correspondingly? Are the separations of types of words equally relative when investigating their universal meanings? What of this phrase, “The cupboardish cupboard cupboards cupboardly”?

What does the previous statement indicate? Firstly, it illuminates the prior notion that there appears to be a sharply divided line between adjectives, nouns, verbs, and adverbs. Then it resists that notion through the fact that, while grammatically incorrect, it still reflects an understood meaning, albeit an unorthodox one. While most of the words used in the exemplary sentence do not exist in the way they are used, the previous statement can be understood perfectly well.

A noun indeed describes something generally posited as an object, a thing, a static state. A verb, on the other hand, is posited as an action, a process. These things are seen to be objectively separate - different sorts of things. However, the difference between a noun and a verb is not an empirical discovery, but too, a functional one. These distinctions are relative.

What are some other examples? A “cooking session” is ambiguous to either be a thing or an action, and this is an obvious case of mere ambiguity and something of multiple potential meanings. The cupboard is inferred as a noun insofar as it is stable, unmoving, and unchanging to us. This, however, is still relative. To describe a
cupboard as “cupboarding” is not objectively incorrect at all. It only lacks proper function. The cupboard may well be cupboarding, and if we had evolved differently we may see it as a process, or even a property, or a method.

The tools that we have given ourselves to define a cupboard are thus only based on our particular evolution into civilisation. The cupboard is not a noun because it truly is a static state of affairs. After all, the lifetime of a cupboard, from when it was built, to when it lasts, to when it is taken apart and thrown away, is in this perspective, a process. It is then only useful for it to be described as a noun so we may infer it will still be there, stationery, to hold our clothes the next day. This is the crux of what functionality is.

The University of Kent is a set of buildings. However, it is in another perspective a process in which the buildings, students and teachers all change. Its function seems to better describe it as both a thing, a location to go to, such as the phrase “I am at

university", and through this new lens, a process, "I am doing university". This process may be for the attainment of yet another thing, a qualification, but this does not defy the point. One may too, examine whether a person is a thing or an action. A person undergoes complete changes in their life, in appearance, personality, and values. And yet it is merely a relative and etymologically relative decision to refer to the person as a noun, not a process. We may also infer that a person is a feature of the world, or an adjective, such as saying our position of the world is a personal one in the relation to the rest of said world. And finally, one may infer that the world is existing personally - it is creating people. Thus, we may also in this perspective be seen as an adverbial consequence. We live a "humanly" existence.

What about mathematics? Our mathematics is not objective either, but also based on circumstantial evolution. For instance, it is the function to count things that we see in the world, such as camels or potatoes that the integers of one, two, and three arise. As another example, it is our function to measure camel's heights to design clothes for them that measurement and geometry come from. This is so to speak, where our particular mathematics developed from. If a society of a different species functions were different, their mathematics would still be axiomatic, and with abstract but logical rules (for that is what mathematics is). However, their mathematics would likely have a shape different to our own. The recent mathematical concept described as Surreal Numbers (Knuth, 1974) is an example of a form of mathematics that generates and finds its numbers based on a completely different process of discovery. Integers may be found in a relatively short time before fractions, square roots, irrational numbers, and even infinite ordinals.

Our mathematics, however, is marked by a steady, slow and incremental discovery of these things from the former to the latter, taking thousands of years. To imply that either mathematical system is in every respect superior is perhaps to imply that mathematical systems are divorced from the immediate, the everyday, and the communitarian. From this notion, we may infer that it therefore possesses some kind of metaphysical or objective “value” in its particular structure. This is, upon closer inspection, also absurd, and of course, not true either. Mathematical systems are not divorced or separate to those who create and use them in any form whatsoever, and an intentional investigation into the assumptions of language will show us why.

Then, what about all the contexts and situations without words, all experiences that have not been “objectively” separated into things yet? What then? It is a mistake to imply that this book reads in advocacy for a dismantling of perception of objectivity. Many features of the world are objective in the truest sense, but those things are all real.

Conceptuology

What are the culminating investigations of this book heading towards, the total method of investigating modern society? I offer a new discipline and school of thought, Conceptuology, in which concepts themselves are seriously considered in their form, their substance, and their relations to psychological, sociological, and philosophical disciplines. Other disciplines may benefit - perhaps even those relating to science.

It will rely on at least three axioms. The first notion is that concepts have a structure, and this structure is diagrammatical, geometric, and what may only be called axisomal, as discussed in A Theory of Dimensions. This may refer to language itself and the "web of words", and it may also refer to the more abstract geometric relation of non-lingualised concepts divorced from willed intention. As an example, a promotion is perhaps seen as a dimensional correlation between an increase in time passed, increase in productivity, an increase in money, and an increase in deserved happiness.

The second notion is that the incomplete and prejudicial nature of concepts opposes the substantive nature of reality or that which I have given a joint name - the Real/Nothing. Lingualisations and conceptualisations may never speak of this experience, and when seen, is the experience of psychological and spiritual magnitude. Conceptuology may not be so inclined into the spiritual assumptions of this axiom but will still consider its being as evident and primary.

The third notion is that through either creative or scientifically rigorous discourse (or both) we can analyse these; the form and substance of concepts in themselves. There are, of course, more implicit assumptions that conceptuology may found itself on, and this book has generated many of these already. From this, we may apply conceptuology to the social sciences, the humanities, and the philosophies.

As a result, conceptuology may go in two directions, conceptuological leftism and conceptuological rightism respectively. These directions pertain to a disagreement of an apolitical nature. One advocates that we can create new concepts and conceptual models which may change and benefit

the way we think and see the states of things (and even change what it means to think!). The other, however, intends to instead understand and respect the structural authority of language.

Both sides oppose each other in their advocacy. However, in either case, conceptuology as a whole intends to make the first two axioms known and analysed. Concepts are little else but an evolution of particular references to inclines, declines, dimensions of thought, organic but unnatural structures, and geometric forms, and this field shall address them as exactly that.

As spoken of The Chaining of Concepts, if we were to speak of time as an example of a subject for conceptuological analysis, there is an invitation here to consider all of the socio-lingual assumptions behind time, both on the social and individual level. The question might be asked: what does conceptual time do to a person, community, or society, and by extension, are these feelings necessary or even true when we consider the Real?

Another consideration of time is its dimensional relatives. In conceptuology, when considering cosmology as the context, time is what we call “adjacent” to space. In the concept of productivity, it is adjacent to money. In the context of leisure time, it is adjacent to well-being and happiness. In the context of dull work time, drudgery and unhappiness. In the context of historical time, it is adjacent to progress and evolution, or even in another opinion, anti-progress and devolution. Conceptuology is the endeavour to make us conscious of all these facts of perception. This is because conceptuology

discusses the present perceptual perspective concerning conceptual frameworks and their history.

Leftist conceptuologists would perhaps consider alternative conceptual frameworks (or even dismantle the frameworks entirely) for sake of virtue and goodness. Of course, this may beg the question of if there can be a moral foundation we could even speak of let alone use. I shall discuss more in The Ethics of the Real.

It is not necessarily true that time as the referent - the thing we talk about in the world - is malleable. It is how we speak and think of time that is malleable once we inspect its genealogical etymology.

So, if we were to speak of time through a conceptuological lens, we must need a model to analyse time through. Then, we must have a way to approach it, and I offer the following.

We must definitively understand the concept within the macroscopic level leading to the microscopic. We must discover the quantitative dictionary definition, the definition in a community, and the qualitative definition through interviews about how the word varies with individuals. All levels may be appreciated at any level of depth appropriate to study.

Then, we ought to see how time is thought of concerning context, dimensional relatives, such as money, leisure, happiness, progress, etc. This second part must too be acknowledged to vary from individuals, and those who are keen to study in this format will approach this problem appropriately. From this understanding of adjacency, we may map out its conceptual package.

Then, using independent variables, we ought to carefully observe how these different conceptions of time make people act and project differently. Perhaps the cultures and individuals who associate time with money act quicker, have a firmer conception of self, and indeed have more stress and lower well-being and quality of experience!

Finally, if the future conceptuologists do not stray from this axiom, we must understand the reality of time to oppose all the lingual and conceptual assumptions of what “time” appears to be in modern experience. In other words, we must see time in the context of its chaining, as opposing time in the Real.

From this, we will likely aim to place a moral foundation on conceptual time as oppressive and tyrannical in the society and the individual and subsequently blinding to a particular form of freedom and joy of the Real itself. This should aim to either make time a concept better understood to only exist for good function or use (if we are to stay in the world of concepts), or more radically to make time a less conceptual entity altogether.

This would, of course, be gauged through the understanding of the universal functions of language. These are manners by which language will always inflict a certain characterisation of the concept to be separate, dominant, value dominant, relating to betterness, unitary, transactional, aiding in the insistence of validity, aiding in the insistence of agreement, perceptually oppressive, and so on. I have discussed these in The Lingual Instinct. These universal functions are immutable to opposing the Real as these universal functions have no reality whatsoever, and so this is how we may better understand the Real and how it relates to what a concept attempts to refer to.

This study would have two motivations. One would be to understand the relation between concepts and prejudices scientifically. The other would be to emancipate those from that which they are chained by.

It is possible that in the future pursuits of Conceptuology, there may be two polar sides, a leftist and a rightist school of thought, with this book appearing to advocate more of a leftist side. This debate has little relevance to the political debate but is a debate of its own. I am merely calling the positions leftist and rightist.

The leftist side would be labelled as such because it would advocate a more anarchic and iconoclastic movement away from the authority that lingual and conceptual structures have.

On the other hand, the rightist movement may indeed infer that authorities of conceptual and lingual structures are there for good reason, and the reason would be to establish and maintain social contracts, norms, and structures for individuals. In this perspective, the authority of language has grown to unify and better people. So, no single person could understand the importance of the present structure of language and its influence on our perception, be that to initiate a social contract, mediate individual behaviours, or whatever else.

This book acknowledges both sides, but advocates that we are more confined by language than merely brought together by it, and that freedom from language has more necessity to our current situation than appeals to its authority.

This book, most importantly, begins the conversation altogether.

It is from here that we ought to exercise and master two strengths: the freedom with concepts, and the freedom from concepts.

Freedom with Concepts

Language and concepts exist to communicate with oneself and others. The communication is exclusively functional. However, do we always decide this function, or do the will-of-language and the will-of-concepts instead decide, both for societies and individuals? It is from here that a multitude of bad functions, undecided and malformed concepts and words, confuse and tamper with a clear or virtuous perspective of the world.

It is from these statements that I call upon a self-responsibility of mastering how one may view the world through a conceptual lens. The genealogy of concepts shows the growth of newer and newer concepts. However, not all of these newer concepts have been decided by us. Instead, likely, the dual conceptual will has inferred its influence. So, then, perhaps it is the first duty to decide which apples from the conceptual tree are bad before we decide for new and better ones to grow.

What about the concept of “depression”? Depression has become the word for distaste of something as much as a medical condition. This has evolved naturally, but is this conflation good? Furthermore, does the self- diagnosis of medical depression always benefit, or does it sometimes impair and weaken? These are two examples of what may be bad conceptual apples. Either it is the depression that is ambiguous

by definition, or the depression that carries an assumption within them that connotes negativity and need for improvement.

For one, how irritating is the conflation of distaste and despondency, and how such concepts need to be distinguished! And for two, how detrimental might a diagnosis of depression be for someone who is not malfunctioning - but instead aware of the reality of a situation, inquired into the darkness of things, or perhaps merely unresponsive to the drunk and meaningless pursuits of abundant hedonism. Perhaps this person is not unwell but merely acquainted to a profound melancholy. A melancholy, essential to their journey and development as a person.

If the assumptions behind a concept are mastered, then the concept will be mastered.

The question is, for example, if the man diagnosed as depressed were to master the freedom of the concept of depression, what does he do? He may replace the word with another term, such as “burn out”. This alone might be very helpful. However, the connotations behind the origin of the word may still linger. So, the golden rule must be considered - to consider a concept purely for the sake of utility, value, and the leading to virtue. In other words, one must ask: is its function good? If the genuine specifics behind the function are not good, such as the function being to “put a name on my emotion that resonates with the trend of feeling”, this means that one must provide a new function entirely. One must challenge the assumptions behind the concept. What is the Trojan-horse of assumptions, imperatives, and processions

behind the term “I am depressed”, and how may they be challenged? What of such indirect prejudices?

What even is the Trojan-horse inside the word “am” in “I am depressed” alone, and may we find some use in investigating? In English, the “am” refers specifically to being. However, this being is neither signified as temporary or permanent - a very important clarification to make. Let’s investigate another language; for example, Spanish. In Spanish, “ser” refers to a permanent state of being, “I am”, and “estar” refers to a temporary one - also “I am”.

If we had an English equivalent (one that was not bound up by established Spanish grammar on which the state of being “depressed” falls under,) as in “estoy deprimido”, which “am” in “I am depressed” would it be, the temporary or the permanent one? The answer is ambiguous, and points to a fact of experience for English speakers - such a means of expression and subsequent way of thinking would never even occur to us.

Think of all the lingually equivalent phrases we don’t know. Furthermore, think of all the languages that could feasibly exist but don’t! To point this out is to point out the uncountable assumptions behind an expression no matter how simple it is. Even the assumptions behind the verb “am”, let alone the adjective “depressed”, are all ours to master. However, we must carry the duty of continuing to question assumptions.

Most assumptions we cannot speak of, and most assumptions that we can speak of we will not speak of.

How does one establish a new function made from new assumptions? I suggest that a minor amount of depression may

be intrinsic to the development of an individual, not something we should do away with entirely. This is not untrue in any case unless one is conceptually possessed and believes that any state that is called “depression” must be done away with and forgotten. Nevertheless, in regards to the temporary or permanent state of depression, calling it “burn out” actually may help for this reason. It has a connotation of temporariness and one caused by the simple fact of overlabouring emotionally or mentally, rather than an unstoppable darkness that shadows the ability to feel happiness or vitality – and one maybe marking a metaphysical truth about the sadness of the world.

However, if we refer to depressions opposite as for the sake of argument - vitality, or happiness - these too have connotations, assumptions that ought to be questioned. One may ask the question: why even feel vital? Why feel happy? And are happiness or vitality and depression proper contextual opposites? Why, in the syntax of language does there not exist a synthesized version of the two opposites, one that extends out of the conceptual line of depression and vitality/happiness, something of a dialectic that exceeds one dimension?

What about all the different manifestations of what we might call depression? For example, there is physical and emotional immobility, which may be called burn out. Then, there is an inquiry into darkness, and we can call that “darkness inquiry”. And as for existential melancholy, why not separate that term too, and call it “the wonder of the void”? As we see, nothing in the world has changed. The conceptual diagrams that are mapped onto it, however, have. This changes a great deal in the mind.

Furthermore, these words serve discernible and useful functions; the function of burn out, the function of darkness inquiry, and the function of the wonder of the void. And as they have functions, they will be performatively communicable - practically able to be spoken of.

Nevertheless, never cease wariness of the assumptions, imperatives and processions that carry new concepts like darkness inquiry or the wonder of the void. What do we *do* with such experiences? Do we fight to vanquish their existence from our life, or do we appreciate, respect, marvel, voyeur, and develop our characters with them?

In the age of maturity as adults, we must be more responsible for everything, including our happiness. And in the age of mature language, we must be responsible for all perceptions of the world language puts onto us. We are all endowed with different concepts and conceptual paradigms, so we must all be freed in different ways. My examples of this may barely scratch the surface.

This leads to the understanding that one ought to straighten out their conceptual assumptions. However, simply creating new language is not the only strength we may master, for this too can weaken us in many ways. What is the other?

Freedom from Concepts

The recognition of new things to speak of, such as ser and estar, as well as the new ways of indicating certain features of depression - may lead one to the conclusion that the more things one may be able to describe in the world, the better. This is wrong, for these things themselves are not real, but ways of

communicating, and too much time spent into multiplying concepts into different individual forms will lead to forgetting when things are simply better left unsaid. We would do well in learning when to leave concepts alone.

To leave concepts alone, we must recognise the excess of bad functionality. This is a task that must mostly be carried out individually. How may we do away with concepts that have no good function for us?

The rightist conceptuological view is that the authority of lingual and conceptual structures should be respected. But what if this is not true, perhaps in all cases? I do not advocate the policing of language. Perhaps instead I am advocating for a form of intellectual dismissal - the dismissal and ability to refrain from using certain language.

Nevertheless, one cannot avoid either the power of the word *or* the power that comes from the resistance of the word. Instead, it may be simpler to say that some things are better left unsaid. Many things in this book I do try to say, for there is no other way to feature them in the book. However, I may have committed the greatest crime by mentioning the experience that can never be mentioned or conceptualised and yet must be for the sake of the entire book - the Ecstasy of Nothing. Therefore, when one does experience this in all its many forms, one must not try to conceptualise it. This is the freedom from concepts, the ability to leave things unsaid, for such said experience has nothing to do with the signifying 'Ecstasy of Nothing" as it is said here.

The individuals on social media exercising the ability to speak memetically, or through lingual and pictorial memes may take

pride in mastering a certain freedom with concepts, both in concepts referring to perspectives, and concepts referring to the function of language. In other words, the changing of social attitudes on the Internet comes hand in hand with the adaptation and invention of definitions of lingual and conceptual forms, or the invention of things.

But this acceleration of new concepts needs to be synthesized with the contextually opposite idea, the retraction from excess, and the freedom from concepts. How important is the clarity and simplicity of the perception of reality without concepts, the concepts we are now so keen to reinvent and reinvent! Our perceptions shall be
foggy and tunnel-visioned with the excessive building of concepts upon one another through time, and they shall be misinformed, superficial, and mundane if we don't recognise these two values of clarity and simplicity. What if silence became a feature of social media?

One should not consider the new memetic way of communication as wrong or improper. It is difficult to suggest that any naturally growing language is "wrong" in any sense. Then again, one must know that online communication may never reach the same kind of authenticity as communication in person. This is no matter how precise and specific it is online either. This is because communication on the Internet will always be based on prior assumptions on what it means to communicate, as long as online communication based on assumptions made by third-party programmers, software developers, and marketers. This will muddy the notion of such "authentic" communication. Such assumptions are always the foundations of inauthentic and conceptualised thought, and will always only be real in one particular sense, but unreal in all

the others. If we are to embrace the Internet, we would do well to untangle the knots.

The assumptive conceptualisation of communication on the Internet may imply that in face-to-face communication we are free. However, this is not true either. It may even be that tactic or body communication is also muddied in the confines of conceptualisation, perhaps in some way more than with Internet communication. How we fashion ourselves in social institutions, how we dress, how we present ourselves in public space, how we relate in hierarchies – are all conceptually entrenched.

This is where we exercise the strength of a “sacred silence” - a deliberate resistance to name something, even for the sake of functional or useful communication. Functionality for mature language to exist is not the fundamental foundation for the virtue of life. There is, instead, a multitude of expressive communications that may be used - painting, music, dancing, filmography, posture, laughter and tears. Even poetry, in all its expressive and subjective wonders, may be used, provided that such poetry is understood for what it is - art and not science. From here, we may exercise this virtue of freedom from concepts, and leave the most profound experiences unsaid.

In summary, I have discussed a bottom-up theory of knowledge, in which the majority of knowledge was founded through the immediate, the everyday, and the communitarian, and how we need to look no further than language to discover this. I say we should be encouraged to make our own language because if we do not, we become impaired, weakened, and chained. However, I advocate that it should not be built from non-valuable previous assumptions of language created

historically, but from new meaningful attention to the Real. I also discuss the formation of the theories of this book into a discipline, Conceptuology, and how we may convert the findings of this book, if fruitful, into a new way of studying societies, individuals, and cultures.

What of realising such freedom from language in the first place, of realising our autonomy besides merely creating or dismissing language? What of the individual right to make choices outside of pre-ordained conceptualisations and lingualisations? What of the case that an individual can realise their unchaining through action and expression in the world, rather than mere speculation into their chains? Such autonomies from language I shall discuss in the next chapter.

AUTONOMY FROM LANGUAGE

Organic and Deductive Definitions

As I have come to understand in my investigations, there are limitless ways to metaphorically cut the world up - or make things out of the world. What matters, however, is the utility of such a cut or communicable value of the thing. What follows is a demonstration of supporting the utility of such a cut like the cut between two kinds of definition of a word defined here as organic definitions and deductive definitions.

Organic definitions refer to a word being defined contextually, be it in conversation, text, or otherwise. It may also be thought of as a plastic definition. It may also be thought of as one based on the total number of times one has heard the utterances of the word in one's lifetime, from the first time the word is said to the last. Significance of influence with each utterance is of course taken into account.

This sort of word is one that the speaker seemingly directly points to, a phenomenological reality that the listener simply identifies with automatically, a similar enough phenomenological reality for both selves so that functional communication can be possible. The definition in this sense is both the agreed pictures of reality. It is also on another level the variations - the unspoken disagreements, but this is for another conversation about holistic dialogue, similar to my discussions in The Chaining of Other People and the Social Contract.

Deductive definitions are definitions when a word is defined with other words. Deductive definitions are usually top-down in structure - that is, if we intend to use a deductive definition for a word, for example, the word “happiness”, we will look to the dictionary definition. However, any attempt to define a word using other words will be deductive.

What is curious is that due to the plasticity of our minds, remembered definitions of words are rarely deductive. Furthermore, the words one uses to define the original word will always eventually be organic, because if not, one would have to define those words in a deductive sense, and then those words further still. The process would keep regressing. One must remember that words are not based on each other - but based on contextual relevance to the meaning - what is posited as being in the world. The dictionary definitions come afterwards.

Organic definitions come first. Only then do deductive definitions come to further define the organic one. Over time, however, the organic definition comes to evolve naturally and the deductive definition will no longer completely fit the organic one. So then, we experience what we might call a drift. But just as this drift occurs over many years and across myriad different generational groups, so too can it occur within seconds and within the time it takes one person to use it in a sentence. If someone says the expression “I’m not happy, but I am really happy”, it likely demonstrates a drift of the definition to mean two different things at once. This feature of language is perfectly acceptable once one understands the nature of deductive and organic definitions as being distinct.

The Web of Words

Deductive definitions are the most rigid way to interpret definitions of words and so may appear the most at risk of chaining. However, organic definitions are far more prevalent in mature communication in terms of implicit prejudice and so they have much more of a stranglehold on us.

One may imagine the regression of deductive definitions as an objective web of words. It is curious that when one regresses through defining and defining again we arrive at words relating to geometry and mathematical physics. This may infer a conversation to be had at a different time, but this outlines the shadow of all geometrical and mathematical attributes that are hiding behind how we describe things with words - and their essences.

Organic definitions, however, exist in what we may call the subjective web of words. This is the more prevalent case of chaining we are faced with. We learn these definitions contextually, and the definition of every word from when it is first heard to when it is most recently heard changes in the context it is said. Furthermore, not only does the organic definition of the word change, but the organic definitions of the words that surround it, and the existence of the worldly referent of the words themselves. I speak in Four Universal Functions of Mature Language about the nature of discussing the topic of having sex. I speak of the appropriate social dialogue as pre-determined, in which the contextual implications of the words themselves initiate particular warranted responses. This is crucial when understanding our autonomous will outside of languages, for without the knowledge that language bears its own will at all (which this book intends to clarify) we can never rationally understand our will as being autonomous.

What is a potential example of how the web of words relates to our chaining of will? Picture this situation. You may work a job, and the justification for having the job may be of your sincere and autonomous will or it may be of the will of language. You may work at the job because you like money. You may desire to make money because you value money as a commodity - or you want to pay rent. You may want to pay rent because you fear being evicted. However, you may also work at this job because you desire to be successful. You may want to be successful because you value success as a virtue. You may value success as a virtue because your father was successful.

What is being played out here? A rational line of reasoning that comes from yourself and your own will, or the web of words and how language has been taught to you, occupying your mind without a fee? Here we may see all sorts of assumptions that behave like Trojan-horses behind the words, and we may merely be possessed by the organic definitions of words and their perceived meanings, rather than preferably being autonomous agents. We must not take these justifications for granted simply because it is our mind they inhabit. Is this specific job the only or desired way to make money? Is money *that* valuable? Is making money of this sort the only way that will prevent you from being evicted? Will you be evicted if you don't pay rent? Is this job equivalent to being successful? Do you merely borrow from your father's lingual conceptions of success over what may be your autonomous conceptions? Is success a virtue in the eyes of your autonomous will? Was your father successful, and are you following success or merely following a perverse conception of success? While money may be intimately tied to success in the web of words, is money tied to success in reality?

Every level of justification can be questioned. Here, the web of words is constantly shifting but shifting through their own will. It is organic, but organic in a specific nature of its own. a nature that grows through an interdependent system but a system that compels us against our best interests. In fact, in commonsense notions of nature, we may call this organic process unnatural, for the organic features of the natural world do not oppress in the same way as what is exclusively for us - language. Knowing and overcoming the dual conceptual will means realising our freedom to utilise language to communicate our decisions and observations - and not the other way round.

To know our will outside of language, one must carefully self-reflect on intentions and desires. But one must not do this relentlessly, for relentless reflection may lead to further unfreedom and prejudice.

To begin with, one will occasionally hear the voice of one's will but be prejudicial against it. One may call this opening up of the will as the flicker. It is useful then, to ask where the will comes from. What is the intention of the will? Why does it exist? This flicker of the autonomous will to decide may indeed be choked out, and choked out by the will-of-language and the will-of-concepts. Does one wish to walk somewhere new, build a fire, read a new book, run to the desert, but finds oneself blocked by something ambiguous and containing?

Despite this lingual and conceptual blocking insisting that all flickers of potential autonomy are useless, this flicker must be the thing *most* considered if one wishes to make one's autonomy distinct. This is not a case of rationality or logical

reasoning that chokes this will out (for language should be used to support rationality and never the other way round, as I shall make clear in the next chapter.) Nevertheless, it is the assumptions and prejudices of the particular webs and codes of language itself that prevent this flicker of the autonomous will from even being considered, let alone acted out. For example, one may resist the burning desire to run to the desert like this flicker of the will wishes, not because it is one's decision not to go, but perhaps because in the web of words a "long walk" is tied with "effort" and "hard work", and "effort" and "hard work" are tied with "unhappiness" and therefore "suffering", The web of words is particular to the person, so all inspection must also be particular.

Even in more abstract conceptual thinking, referring to the previous example, the distance of the walk may be tied with losing something one considers valuable, like energy or time. Again, we may be met with assumptions that "lost" energy or time is something we can sensibly call negative in the first place, or even that energy and time are valuable to speak of - speaking of them in very specific and socio-cultural definitions. The flicker of the will to finally decide to quit your job, a will that may very well finally be your own will, may also be choked out. One must inspect the Trojan-horse of assumptions and imperatives behind every justification used, every word used in that justification, and the progression from one level to the next.

Pay attention. There is a will underneath all of this, a will present in the non-lingual world, the real world - our own will. So, if one experiences this will, one must for the sake of freedom exercise this will and exercise it curiously and excitedly, for it is the doorway outside. The choice is ours.

One's autonomous will is and should often be rational. However, language should merely utilise the ability to speak of one's rationality. Once language precedes and is prioritised over rationality, rationality holds little value. Language is merely useful in that it is representative, and representative by many incredible and fruitful measures
- but representative nonetheless. If we uphold the representation above the reality we will be lost in a delusion of prejudice, fascistic social imperatives, and above all - unreality. In other words, rationality can only be communicated properly and verbally through mature language, but language is never fully rational. Again, this shall be discussed more in the next chapter, but it is relevant to make this point now.

Besides certain metaphysical attitudes, it has never been the case that, for example, success is the subordinate of Success - that is, the worldly reference being the subordinate to the Concept. It is the understanding of this book that success ought to refer to a communicable state of reality that one aspires to receive more often - not an eternal or metaphysical ideal. Success, in the web of words, was never founded through idyllic, objective, or rational means. It was, rather, a chaotic etymological and socio-cultural negotiation over hundreds of years from which what we know as success has been arrived at. This is true of all words and all concepts.

If we consider success to be serving of Success - that is, the deductive Concept having more value than the worldly referent, we will allow ourselves to believe that the assumptions and imperatives behind the word, the words surrounding it, and the perceptions of their meanings in the world are benign. We will not consider that this particular

string of the word has intrinsic faults that inevitably come through any form of what might be considered as absolute knowledge.

The deductive definition - that is, the rigid or absolute meaning of the word, is rarely even the practised state of the word - as opposed to the organic definition. The organic definition is far more relative and specific to certain contexts, but still carries its own assumptions and prejudices, assumptions unique to any given context, situation, or sets of such. Success in the organically defined sense is never merely an idyllic direction that all human beings ought to move towards - success in late capitalistic societies means being prolific on social media, on keeping your business afloat during pandemics, on predicting stock market crashes, etc. If we do not acknowledge that the terms behind success are transient and ever-changing but never our own to decide completely, we will be blind to the will of language in whatever path it is deciding to take.

The Autonomous Will of the Individual

The simplest thing to do is to learn your own will outside of language. This takes practise, curiosity, wonder, creativity, and time.

However, there is an important clarification to make. Let us examine the rightist conceptuological view of language - that is, the view that the authority of language should be respected rather than resisted. This view holds credence in that language's will does not always oppose our own, and fighting it to surface an autonomous will at all times is not necessary. In fact, constant resistance to the will-of-language can lead to unnecessary destruction. However, there is a secondary point. I

argue that the lingual and conceptual structures one adheres to should always be decided by the agent. A symbiosis wherein the agent initially decides and decides for themselves what path they take before following it is a far more wondrous destiny than either systematically contradicting or adhering to lingual structures.

One cannot get out of their own way, and to contradict an instinctual intention of choice for the sake of it is unfruitful. One is always confined to one's own sphere of choice, with or without the stranglehold of the will-of- language. So, choosing randomly or in defiance of instinct is not the same thing as discovering your own will. To do this is to still take part in the same set of rules - only to oppose the independent variable rather than affirm it. For example, choosing to go right at a crossroads because you instinctually intend to go left is to still take part in the language game of the assumptions behind going right - with all the implicit rules still written without being questioned - only then making the opposite choice. To infer the quality of opposites in the first place is an inference entirely to do with language and concepts, so to make this decision is to once again play into the hands of its will.

One cannot discover one's own will by being entirely in the ordinary world, or the world as perceived by lingualisations and conceptualisations. One must instead look into the heart of the real world, or the non- conceptual world, for when one is in this world one's own free choices come into fruition almost as if automatically. This may happen so long as one does not resist the flicker, wherein the potentialities of one's autonomous choices come into view.

In this sense, the flicker of the will is identical to the Glimpse of Nothing - or the ecstasy one receives from such a glimpse. Why

separate them? This chapter wishes to emphasise the will for freedom of action - not just phenomenological pleasure as the title chapter had described.

If this book wishes to confirm anything, it is that the freedom, peace, and joy outside of language can never be put across through language. That is the most crucial part. So to enact one's autonomous will one must be concerned with action, to identify the lingual and conceptual structures and retract oneself from them to initiate a form of freedom of choice and impact. Pragmatism is the key to this point of focus, for this chapter is dedicated to decision-making, not observation. Nevertheless, both observation and action together form the notion of the virtuous state of the individual in the Real.

The Autonomous Will of the Socio-Political

This book does not intend to restructure the world of the socio-political. Rather, this book wishes to give others the freedom to do that themselves. It is either that or to finally come to the willing conclusion to affirm the value of the socio-political current - though I doubt the latter will occur if intense inspection takes place.

This subchapter is entirely dedicated to freedom of action as well as freedom of thought in what one might call such socio-political currents. With the knowledge that lingual and conceptual structures oppress, as well as knowing how they do this, one can take steps with the conceptuological perspective towards a more just and virtuous landscape of sociopolitics. Furthermore, this book intends to use certain examples, but not to highlight them as the most pressing, or to merely advocate specific alternative positions on those examples and

make such advocacies a final statement. The book simply wishes to use them as ways to elucidate the ethos of this chapter, this ethos being the freedom of action and decision outside of the will of language and concepts on a wider level.

If one intends to reform or amend lingual and conceptual structures of the world, this book would advocate paying attention to these structures themselves as opposed to realities in the world first, and from there reapproach the world theoretically. After a new way of restructuring the world has been theorised, one must exercise the tool of pragmatism on how to change the world. If an injustice observed in the world stems from the omnipresence of conceptual structures, we might infer a moral duty to initiate the course of action of amendment at the very least, and spiritual revolution at the most.

How does this apply on a conceptuological level? We may think of money, for example. The confines of money may be inherently present in the mind of the perceiver, and regardless of what political situation or proclivity you have, money may, in any case, be used for injustice. If one is inclined, then, one must carefully examine what money is on a conceptuological basis, for otherwise one's chaining to conceptual money prevents one from acting rightly and effectively. So then, one asks the following questions: what defines the worth of money compared to other worths? What does it mean to own money? What does it mean to have more money than the next person? What does it mean to spend money? What does it mean to spend money *wisely*?

The concept of money, too, is adjacent to concepts of labour, goods, and property. One may carefully analyse the relationship

they have to each other - not as an objective relationship, but one entirely dependent on nations, cultures, and individuals in turn. One may go deep into the heart of the seemingly concrete relationship these adjacent concepts have in the mind, and then unravel and deconceptualise. If it is £3 for a coffee and £3 equates to roughly half an hour of labour, the offering to give half an hour of labour for a coffee, for example (or any transaction of that kind) may be absurd in the light of norms of the social world.

However, the mere thought of this alternative transaction may have large implications for the minds of those who ask the question: what is the difference? I insist that to even ask the question holds power. The individual who works at the coffee shop may too be affected by merely being asked this question. Indeed, the web of words and concepts can and will be altered as with every exchange! This exchange may, at a stretch, shine a light on the previously non-existent nature of the autonomous will. It may alter her conceptual structures of what it means to be a customer or a consumer, the trend of a form of the hegemonic social current being that impertinent questions at all are associated with deviance, or that the concept of money is and may have always been - negotiable. Not negotiable by a state authority or imagined market, however - but negotiable by the individual.

Perhaps the chaining of space, and more particularly the oppressive nature of conceptual structures of property ownership, is intrinsic to social cohesion. But they may also be inflicted by an all-too-powerful authority of conceptual and lingual structures. One may again, first inspect and understand the pre-existing lingual and conceptual structures that contain it and the results may be as follows. Perhaps it is that property

is initially owned by a “them” that you pay a mortgage for, that the price is non-negotiable, that a property with certain qualities is preferable to one with other qualities. Again, the concept of spatial ownership, like money, has little to no physicality or actuality in the real world. It is but a mechanism for benign or problematic social cohesion. However, what qualities of the “them” are conceptual, and what are real? Are the “them” out of sight, or are they open to communicate and empathise with? The “them” that hold all the desired “properties” that you or your lingual constructs deem “preferable” may chain you uniquely, both in their power and the possession you wish to seek.

In the wake of a pandemic such as a coronavirus, such housing prices have already proved to be negotiable. People could always negotiate their rent and mortgage with their landlords and estate companies. Unfortunately, a specific hurdle gave it cause to come into being and not mere deconceptualisation for its own sake - potentially a process and exercise, with far less suffering, but a fruitful process nonetheless.

This book does not intend to encourage liquidation of the assets of the property class (for the belief that the property class is inherently bad may too be a concept and must be closely considered in equal merit) but to initiate pragmatism and discovery, even if such pragmatism is merely to ask the question to oneself or to ask the question to your mortgage receiver or landlord. The confines of language are either intrinsic to the mechanism of the relationship between the tenant and the landlord, or merely conceptual. What exactly initiates the idea that the price of a property is non-negotiable? Is it an idea held willingly by the property class, the tenant class, both, or neither?

The freedom to act with one's autonomous will means the freedom to inspect legal systems and their attributes of either enforcing and upholding real values and ethics that a community or country ought to follow, or laws that are purely conceptual and have no relevance in the Real. Truthfully, the ability of the state to command a nation of citizens that legality is equivalent to morality *itself* is the prime example in which legality, or the Concept of the Legal, has powers outside of real and truthful modes of virtuous action in the world. It is the Concept of the Legal, outside of the reality of moral virtue that such a concept is responsible to represent - and the subsequent obedience that it generates outside of that knowledge of the dichotomy of the Concept and the Real - that is it at its most powerful form and has the most potential to harm, sometimes to a catastrophic degree.

Therefore, this book does not intend to naively redesign law by any stretch of the imagination. It intends to dissect the occasions in which law is communicably representative of reality and specifically reality of virtue - and when it is not. The potentiality of all laws, bonds, statutes, judicial systems, approaches to property, war, and discriminations and such be divorced of virtue will never be more apparent once one adopts this view.

As the introduction explains, anarchy and chaotic action without reflection of one's own underlying lingual and conceptual prejudices only leads one into complete non-awareness and so enslavement of said prejudices. So, said chaotic anarchy against all that is lawful by the state offers no valuable insight into pragmatic action for the sake of attaining for the Real whatsoever. While perhaps fruitful for

deconstructing, the same game is played, all its same implicit rules, only it is inverted.

Nevertheless, obedience has caused more widespread catastrophe than disobedience. So, what is needed in the face of the Concept of the Legal? It is dissection and differentiation from the representation of the virtue of the Real - and subsequent disobedience and non-compliance in the case of its differences. For example, environmental protests around the world are not chaotic or anarchic to all that is socially lawful or even stately lawful, but a collective notion that law does not represent reality.

Indeed, it instead may be contriving a new reality, a reality where unchallenged environmental devastation is more necessary than civil disobedience to the Concept of the Legal.

To then refer to protesters as “extremists” is only further oppression. And the oppressive tool? The will-of- language - as commanded and indoctrinated by said legal systems. It is prejudice from legal systems at their most oppressive and unreal. Recognition of the Real and the Concept of the Legal as two overlapping but different entities (to whatever degree they may differentiate, minorly or majorly) and careful and thorough recognition, will lead one to not only be free of the shackles of the law in the social world, but more affiliated with the truth of the Real.

How else may autonomy manifest itself when regarding the natural world but a return to it, and a divorce from the conceptualisations of the social contract? For once we are equipped with the understanding that our autonomy is an outcome of nature and not in spite of it we will return to its

harmony. This will likely lead to one to retract from the proliferations of mediation in modern communication (and modern miscommunication) and enact the differences each individual has from it. What are these differences but reflections of a real difference of self-actualisation from the senseless compromises the social contract commands?

So then, what of the universal function that compels agreement for speakers and its socio-cultural product of homogeneity via globalism and centralisation? Many of us also firmly believe in the importance of independent cultures, such as outlier tribes, disconnected from the strengths and weaknesses of social contract, or culturally, what we may call “Big Culture”. But what of a different problem if each independent culture too forms its own mediations? We may imagine a state of what one might call a multiplicity of tyrannies, each culture enacting its own particular form of oppression and unfreedom. Therefore, one should not advocate homogeneity for its own sake, nor heterogeneity for its own sake either. We must recognise the reality in these different cultures.

What should be advocated, then, is the ability to reason on what states of affairs in the world are for people when they find themselves in the Real, even if these states of affairs are different among different people, and when lingualised, even appearing to be contradictory to a universal ideal. This reasoning may be decided by an individual, group, community, or nation, but if it is reasoning based in the Real, it is virtuous nonetheless. This ability to decide freely under what we might call “Big Culture”, that is, the centralisation and dilution of all worldly cultures, however, gets choked out more and more over time. What may arise as an inevitable pluralism of ideas between nations, communities, and individuals is far more

likely to be the result of people's autonomous freedom to arrive at their conclusions of reality - which is then, the form of heterogeneity that this book advocates.

Authentic anarchism, then, is this very ability to make an independent way of life outside of the lingual and conceptual prejudices of Big Culture. However, to be authentic one must be able to rationalise outside of one's own lingual and conceptual prejudices as well. Authentic anarchism is the recognition that compromise is necessary if global cohesion is inevitable. This comes after the triumph that individuals have made their decisions on what the properties of the Things of the World, or Actualities of the World, should be thought of as - rightly, and freely. Only then, may possibilities to synthesize authentic viewpoints with other individuals, groups, communities, and nations be carried out properly.

The highest virtue one can derive their autonomous will from, be it either socio-political or individual, is that of freedom. However, this freedom must always be grounded on what is real.

Further Autonomisations and Conclusions

So far I have advocated two main ways to realise one's autonomous will. The first is a thoughtful consideration of concepts themselves to properly recognise their falsity. The second, in regards to action, is the noticing of moments of potential autonomy, which I call flickers, where true volition supersedes conceptual habit. But indeed, I may remark that there are several positions one may place oneself in to attain this autonomy that comes hand-in-hand with seeing the world as-is. Think of meditation, a religious experience, an embrace

of nature, dreaming, and even a rave, a creative urge, the act of passionate sex!

What of other potential means to autonomisation? One may, with assistance from an external device, even randomise one's actions and so inhibitions, and in one's leaving one's actions up to fortune, discover converse freedom to act autonomously that is free of deep-rooted conceptual shackles. All of these may be said to increase autonomy if the mechanisms that equip us are free from ideological coercion.

The moral foundation for all healthy and safe actions that increase conceptual autonomy need only be conceptuological. This book recognises conceptual structures as largely false, prejudicial, and oppressive to one’s life in the modern world, and so by that token, we find autonomy to be the said antidote falsity, prejudice, and oppression. In the simple axiom that any reasonable antidote to these is what makes a good life, such an antidote would be one that promises a path to high virtue.

To summarise, I have discussed the difference between deductive and organic definitions. I have then, through discussion of the subjective and objective web of words, illustrated how we are choked and oppressed by wills of language and concepts that deny our autonomy. From invoking ideas of how the properties of such an autonomous will confront one of the unreal, I have suggested individual and socio-political cases to illustrate the potentiality of how such autonomy and freedom may be performed and arrived at.

In the next chapter, I shall explore how the philosophies of this book may involve themselves in ethical or moral theory - and

from there, explore what ethical or moral advocacies may be prescribed.

THE ETHICS OF THE REAL

Rationality and Language

Discussion of rationality is generally designated to the internal, self-conscious and logical, as if rationality was purely a thought-out and self-reflective procedure that, from the rational agent, projects its internalised reasoning onto how to observe the world, and how to act in it. Humans certainly err in practice, but rationality is certainly designated to these qualities of a person that infer their priority over all other parts.

However, the person with the ailment of psychosis might think otherwise. The person with psychosis, who is perhaps acutely aware of his condition, performs his irrationalities in a much more peculiar way. He may, for a split second see a ferret on the ground where there is none, or refuse to drink water from a certain glass. He twitches for an anxious reason he does not know, at times he believes his flatmate is some sort of clown-like creature (or at least a creature closest to that description) and a peculiar feeling that his room is haunted creeps up on him in the middle of the night when he is barely awake or lucid.

These, despite their being clear-cut delusions and hallucinations that are vivid and communicable, are certainly irrationalities. But are they irrationalities of the conscious, of the self-reflective, of the logical, of the internal agent? No, these are irrationalities of the semi-conscious to the unconscious, of the unthought and non- considered, a

rationality devoid of any localised agent, of no internal consciousness whatsoever! Imagine a person who does not have these ailments and performs well - he does not see a ferret, he does not refuse to drink water from a certain glass, he does not twitch or even know that in another situation he would be twitching, he does not believe any delusion that his flatmate is a clown - for he would never even consider such a notion - and he does not have any creeping doubts that he is alone when he is about to go to sleep.

These are cases of being rational - but these rationalities are not, as most discussion implies, conscious, logical, thought-out, self-reflective or born from an internalised agent either. They are unconscious and sometimes even what could only be called *non-conscious*. They are non-logical, for no logic is needed to derive the conclusion that one will not twitch. They are not thought out, for the rationality of not seeing such a ferret is self-evident and automatic. And it is not self-reflective, for even a state of coping, managing, dealing with states of affairs without self-reflection is certainly one that belongs to a certain kind of rationality, and so it comes from a mechanism that existed even before an internalised agent did. These are all, in a certain sense, rationalities. Rationality, then, is *not* what it is discussed to be - at least not entirely.

All rational speech acts, including discussions of morality, while intended to be purely rational, are always superseded by language. Rationality and language are not identical, for language is irrational, and rationality transcends the lingual. However, the only way to communicate about rationality is through language.

Even the imagined and observed unrealities of concepts are intrinsically caught up with rationality. The observation of a desk as being in a place in space, such as an office, seems to have this symbiotic relationship with a form of free and naked rationality - where we appear to have rationally determined what the desk is and where it should be. However, much like the will-to-conceptualise and the will-of-concepts, our rationality and conceptualisation play off of each other. Our rationalisation must abstract to both understand the world conceptually and explain it lingually.

Furthermore, it is also not only based on the instinctual parts of the person - metabolic instincts, mood, etc. - but also the will-of-concepts *themselves*. This is where a problem persists. Our particular rationality cannot divorce itself from the particular wills of unrealities. So, much of our claimed logical observations and actions ignore the reality of the free will of the individual. Even the more primordial state where the internal mind did not exist - or a state where the organism was to cope without such an internal or self-reflective agent - is accompanied with unrealities in the age of the conscious modern human. We too feel conceptual structures in our bodies.

So then, with the knowledge of what we may call lingual rationality and conversely metabolic rationality, may one advocate a sort of sublime rationality - a form of rationality free of the confines of the irrationality of lingual and conceptual unrealities? If we may use the example of the desk in a practical sense, what reason is even the observation and value-judgement of a position of a desk in the room *truly* rational? Why instead may it not be elsewhere? And if we find ourselves acquainted with this sublime rationality more and

more as time goes on, at what level with the primitive lingual rationality that preceded it end up residing in day-to-day life?

When one speaks, they imply absolutely everything one does not. The thoughts of the spoken and the unthought states of the implied come from either primitive rationality, sublime rationality, or lingual and conceptual unreality.

The Ethics of the Real

Reality precedes unreality - the unreality that can be perceived or experienced. So then, reality precedes the unreality of concepts, representations, and language - describing words for the unrealities that are presently experienced. The Real, as said in this book, is very difficult to understand in book form, besides being a negation of the conceptual, but it might commonly refer to the sensuous, the immediate, the physical, the permanent, and the sacred.

As the point of this book wants to illustrate, it makes no sense to form ethical rules from language and concepts and their prejudicial wills. We must instead form our conceptual moral principles from what I call Real Ethics. We do not need our present modern languages to determine ethics - that is, our present languages in their ideally functional and practical form, and consequently the unrealities that occupy the space and time of our lives. To be truly ethical and aspire to be better, one must acknowledge the requirement to transcend the language used to discuss it and transcend one's resulting conceptual structures - in whatever way is pragmatically possible. This is how we begin to properly attain a form of ethics grounded in the Real.

What sort of ethical principles may we derive from such theoretical ideas of the Real, the world outside of perceived unreality? One may indeed turn to the universal functions of mature language as read in chapters 3 and 5 and understand them as prejudicial to experiences of the world, as well as ethical principles. However, this entire book could be viewed to discuss ways of straying from the problems of language, concepts, and experienced unreality.

It is only a small step further to assume that the ethics of this book are at least partially grounded in the ways I have discussed the prejudices of language themselves - to even write this book, as with all books, is to aspire for some betterness, for example. However, we must be able to speak of ethical advocacy, even if it is ideally an ironic one and still inevitably falls into the prejudice of language.

The world of Nothing precedes the world of Things. To say this in this context is not to say an imagined void preceded the universe, but that the world was fundamentally boundless before prejudicial interpretations of perception and action were put onto it. It was a nothingness, or a blankness, or spaciousness - a world of No- Concepts. Therefore, the most present challenge we face in the context of arriving at Real Ethics is to dismantle and deconstruct unrealities, and base our action and perception knowingly on top of what we are calling Nothing.

Nothing is our most intimate but most forgotten friend amid accelerated conceptualisation, and to deny the existence of such nothingness and not account for it underlying and encompassing all conceptual structures, or things, is the most incorrect direction we may tread in. One must carefully allow

the fog of conceptualisations to dissipate before seeing that all perception and action on the world is done not from an infinite series of conceptualisations, but eventually from the foundation of Nothing.

Why do I communicably separate the essence of the world into both Nothing and the Real? Nothing is identical to the Real, the non-conceptual, the non-unreality. So, besides having two ways to speak about it and illustrate it instead of just one, the only difference is contextual - Nothing presents itself as that which negates the strings and structures put on top of and oppressing our view of reality, and the Real being the world of colour and light. Both are the same thing.

Nevertheless, to find Real Ethics is to find a form of ethics that builds itself from an acknowledgement and an embracing of Nothing. It may tell us nothing verbally and may be incredibly ambiguous when put in a lingually rational form - but this is of course the challenge we face. On the other hand, denying the most present reality of Nothing because it merely does not speak words (or worse, is inconvenient) is a fatal direction and one we have been led by since the birth of lingual rational consciousness.

So, what then? How do we find a communicative way to aspire to be better from a reality that precedes the prejudice of communication? Well, one simple answer is that you cannot in full effectiveness - for two reasons. The first is that Nothing or the Real may never be communicated without furthering prejudice. The second is that such pursuits of ethical justice and betterness miss the point - such ethical principles ignore a fundamental aspect of the world that contradicts principles of ethics. Nothing itself is already Nothing - and if all actions on the world exist within this Nothingness, then there is no

requirement to perfect it. Perfection, improvement, and betterness, in this sense themselves, are all based in unreality, or rather, are simply not radically real.

Ethics itself is too a word, a word existing outside of the real world and with its own forms of metaphysical prejudices, conceptual packages, and forced means of perception and action onto an empty and boundless world. However, the second reason as to why aspiration for ethical betterness will always come with conceptual prejudice is less useful if we will be endlessly attracted to the pursuit of being better people - which seems very likely.

But this reason is useful because of this question: must we cling to the infinite seriousness of crafting a better world full of better people forever, or is there another way of living outside this seemingly endless and obsessive pursuit? The world of Nothing offers exactly that, a reason to know that should we succeed or fail at this task of making the world better, the world of Nothing is uncaring about improvements. If everything depended on such a pursuit, everything would be lost if it failed.

This still does not bring about a foundation of ethical theory. Ethical theory in a context like this will always result in paradox and must always be approached ironically. This sort of irony is how best to approach the rest of this chapter. This need for irony may come from this simple truth – we are automatically born into this world under lingualised and conceptualised notions for ethical conduct. Just as there is no way to fully escape the trappings of our society and culture, there is no way to fully escape the prejudice of standardised ethical conduct.

But if we are pressed to be so blunt about things, under conceptuology and what we may describe as post-conceptualism, what actions might be considered right and what actions wrong?

It is most likely the case that it is easier to know what is ethically wrong than what is ethically right. One possibility is that we may only be able to talk about unethical states of affairs and never about ethical states of affairs. For example, it is unclear what the right way to raise a child is, but there are many examples of what the wrong way to raise a child is. So then, as we can talk about language and the world of concepts and we cannot talk about the world of Nothing or the Real, and we know that denying the reality of Nothing is one of the gravest mistakes we can make, we can use language to deconstruct and dismantle itself.

We can then assume that in human states of affairs, succumbing to primal instincts (the unleashed repression of animalism from society towards the recession of the human back into the base instincts of the animal) is an ethical wrongness we can talk about. It may be accepted quite ordinarily that one cannot kill, assault, and abuse senselessly - one cannot merely be a primal being that succumbs to the instincts of animalism. This is the first clear case of a potential ethical wrongness we can speak of.

As for the second, conceptual, conceptual conclusions on how to act (still instincts) are all subject to ethical wrongness - too, an ethical wrongness we can talk about. It may be accepted that one cannot kill, assault, and abuse under a conceptualised

authority figure - so too, one cannot merely be a conceptual being that succumbs to the instincts of conceptualisation.

Besides these two, can it be the case that that which is not subject to these forces can never be wrong? Such actions, beyond instinctual primality and instinctual conceptualisation, transcend causes of intended tragedies, of non-sublimated aggression and anti-socialisation, of hierarchical obedience, of the root of evil. Even if we ultimately cannot speak of such behaviours, we may, like sublime rationality, call sublime behaviours, and so we can acknowledge and advocate them.
What is an example? Quite poignantly and simply, we may imagine a man running. There are three components to the action as with all human actions - the primal, the conceptual, and the real.

The primal aspect of running is the benefit given by the animalistic instincts - we are running to create adrenaline, to let off steam.

There is the conceptual instinct, the human instinct - we run because we aspire to be fitter in the future.

However, there is a third aspect to the running, one we may never talk about - and that is the real aspect of running, neither instinctually primal nor instinctually conceptual. The man simply runs - he exists in the world with all his sensations and thoughts and chooses to run (either by his own volition or otherwise). So, with this theory, primality and conceptualisation are always *prone* to ethical wrongness - they may not necessarily be wrong, but they can be. Even a responsible return to a form of primality might be a great antidote to an over- conceptualised human world, one many

discussions may move towards in the future, but when talking about ethical theory, this does not absolve all primality.

The primality of an adrenaline rush may be benign, but it may be because it fuels the man's desire to open up his unfiltered animalism, a form of animalism the man cannot embrace fully due to his self-consciousness but one that may lead to his volition to chase something undeservingly, perhaps even to a catastrophic end.

The conceptualisation of aspiring for fitness may be benign, but it may also be an obsession - the man puts himself into mental harm because he sees himself as undesirable or unworthy. The man may be blinded by the instincts of his conceptual fitness and either puts himself down unfairly or projects his low self-esteem onto others.

Now, can the real aspect of running, the simple running as-is component to the action ever be wrong? It cannot. If we were to divorce primality and conceptualisation from the action and the man were to simply run, he would simply run. The real component we may not ever be able to speak of, but this deconstruction and negation of language as an instinct as well as all other instincts is why and how we have finally arrived at a form of Real Ethics.

Is this an objective morality? I would think otherwise. Conversely, we may then imagine that there are two categories. States of affairs that fall in the first category may be wrong but are not definitely wrong. States of affairs that fall in the second category are such that are never wrong but things we may never certainly be able to speak of.

This exercise wishes to clarify one major thing - ethical advocacies are valid for the interaction of self-conscious people, but they are never absolute. This includes this ethical advocacy. It exists to serve as an application for introspection, policy, and social organisation. Even though this ethical advocacy bases itself on Nothing, if it had thought itself as serving a higher truth than the absolute truth of Nothing, it would be just as prejudicial as any ethical theory that came before. So, as aforementioned, we must always approach abstract theories ironically.

Final Thoughts on Real Ethics

We are usually always in two worlds at once: the world of Nothing and the world of concepts. Both worlds behave almost entirely oppositely. Even desires to be more acquainted with the world of Nothing are at least partially propagated by conceptual motives; the two worlds exist conceptually in our minds, and the world of Nothing is viewed to be more virtuous. If we intend to view ethics as a means of behaviour outside of simply coping and experiencing in the world of Nothing, it will always come attached with a conceptual model to understand it. So, as long as we want a form of rational ethics to determine our lives, we will remain in the world of concepts.

We then have a choice. Either we remain loyal to what we may call “conceptual ethics” and so balance the world of concepts and the adversarial world of Nothing - or rejoice in the world of Nothing entirely by fleeing from conceptual ethics. However, if one is to disavow the more virtuous of all concepts - conceptual ethics, one should have already disavowed all other parasitic and pathological concepts first. What we may call “conceptual

ethics" at least intends to point to something virtuous, whereas many other words and concepts do not.

This is not to say, however, that "ethics" is entirely benign as a force in any way at all - and sometimes it is anything but benign. Some of the most brutal acts of humanity have been carried under guises of "ethical" behaviour. These acts are at least partially justified because ethics, or whatever similar guises are used - God, law and order, prosperity, national pride, security, peace, cleanliness, obedience to authority, honour, and even formalised knowledge and discovery of new nations - are concepts that are placed above the Real or actual states of affairs. Even in theory, no matter how perfect the ethical concept seems - if it was actualised in all walks of life, it would be dull, frigid, tamed, tyrannical and lifeless! Something would always be left out - either freedom on one end, responsibility and carefulness on the other, barbarism on one end, repression on the other, and so on. In every case, the Real is the composite of both the truth of the ethical concept and the omission of the adversarial part.

Many people fall into radical terrain, politically, socially, and personally - as if to rebel against the tyranny of the world they perceive. What if such tyrannies were true of the world of the Ordinary, and their advocacies were really masked advocacy to the Real that was misguided in action? But be wary, for the propagandists will attempt to sell you their version of the Real, and it will only ever seem Real because it opposes and attempts to sell you out of the tendencies of the Ordinary - when in fact its only offerings are of something much worse. No authority can ever tell you what the Real is - we may only know what the Real is ourselves.

I have called both the experience of seeing radical reality and the title of this book the Ecstasy of Nothing. I close this chapter regarding ethical action on the subject of seeing reality. It is unethical to deprive yourself of the possibility of having this experience. Such an experience cannot be expected. However, to even deny yourself of any motivation of experiencing a glimpse of the Real is to deprive yourself of knowing both the present manifestations of what reality is and the potential manifestations of what reality can be. To taste the Ecstasy of Nothing is to taste the centre of self-actualisation, self-mastery, love, courage, freedom, and happiness! Even to devote yourself to one single formal philosophy, be it in written or spoken form, is to deny the Real, for all formal philosophies leave out what is and will always be - unsaid.

To summarise, I have first suggested and advocated a new way of speaking about rationality that is largely undiscussed and I have defined current rationality as one bound up in the constraints of lingualisation and conceptualisation. I have then gone through rationality to discuss a way of talking about ethics using this book's central philosophies, and with these ideas, identified potential ways we can and can't talk about that which I call Real Ethics. After this, I have gone through some advocacies of what ethical models might be conceived from the foundation of what I call Nothing.

The next and final philosophical chapter deals with what I term folk philosophy - the philosophies of the lived, the unlived, and the unspoken, and final thoughts on embracing the world without prejudice, worry, regret, and needless suffering – an embrace of the world.

FOLK PHILOSOPHY

Folk Philosophy

The more prominent version of what philosophy is is perceived in books. It is generated through the academics and theorists and writers that have pushed the discipline forward through history. It would appear through this, that the wisest of men trickle their philosophies of life down through books and lectures to the masses. This would then be how individual and collective lives move forward philosophically. One may infer this as the top- down model of philosophy and this model suggests that without this handful of wise men, all of our developments, modern experiences, and fruitful achievements that relate to a philosophical inclination of life would be lost. Even this hypothesis leaves out qualities and virtues of experience entirely.

If the top-down model is the prominent view, folk philosophy is its contextual opposite. Folk philosophy refers to the philosophies of the lived, the unlived, and unspoken. The written philosophies are vast, many, and could never be read in a single lifetime.

But what of the uncountable unwritten, wondrous, profound and indescribable experiences had by all that have come to shape and influence everything done from then on? What of the infinitely complex nature of life, of the moving power of art, of friendship, of nature, of emotion itself, both dependent on and *independent to* modern culture and society? If we cannot speak of these experiences, and won't speak of them, how would we ever know their value?

What makes folk philosophies invisible is what makes them so valuable. However, this chapter intends to make them at least understood if not written, to recognise their place in human experience as valid and above all, irremovable. Every lived mind has drawn an uncountable amount of connections on the meaning of life, how to live, and what their rightful virtues are. The memory of folk philosophy is even vaster than the memory of a human mind though, for the physical memory lies in the physiology of the person, of biological evolution from sexual choice, their anatomic make-up, and of their genetics.

And too, how the lack of philosophy, of space, of blankness has more importance than the philosophies of the lived. Without silence, how may we have the speech to put on top of it? Without blankness, how may the space for anything-at-all be created, discovered, invented, learned, said or thought inside said silence?

The written philosophies are great tools. But they are for the recordists, of the *surveillers,* of those who value the lingual constraints of the representation of life over free life itself, of those that value the seriousness of their character and the problems they are presented with over the truth of their existence as a human being. They are of those frightened, knowingly or unknowingly, by death and fortune. This is because the folk philosophies are silently known to be ephemeral, to change over time, to be eventually forgotten by the proceeding generations. The written philosophies in this sense might be for those who have forgotten how to live.

Even the evidence of the sciences can be falsified if new evidence comes along. Subjective experiences of the lived, on the other hand, are always true.

How the written philosophies have done a great deal for a certain form of development and mental evolution. But it is always the turning to life that gives us the clarification philosophy intends, not the continued turning of pages. The best philosophies project the littlest and are neutral to the truth of life, and so life's truth itself remains more real and fundamental than the conceptualisation of any philosophy created within it.

Revolutions

All formal philosophies of Western history have been conceptualist philosophies. This book attempts to offer post-conceptualism, or conceptuology, as the rightful antithesis.

The great revolutions of art, mathematics, music, science and philosophy have all come under great initial scepticism and scrutiny from all those who grow comfortable with what came before and it would seem as though we would eventually become used to this fact of revolutions and change to welcome the new eras of these fruits. And yet we haven't, and we will always continue to initially scrutinise. Once we learn to understand that the revolutions of these fruits will always come under such initial views can we learn to accept them as potentially ingenious and, in one sense, part of our rightful path of growth.

Revolutions are much like dimensional dialectics; they will find something that all that came before in their field will have in common, and find a functional contextual opposite. No wonder such a developed opposition will eventually happen (for it is the nature of progress), and no wonder that without understanding how opposites function will we not understand that two opposites create a whole. The opposites may be contextual, and that is to say that the direction we put ourselves in will be particular and exclusive to other directions - but the directions may always be whole and true once they have achieved a consensus that what they offer is authentic, moving, or useful. Much shame to those who opposed the mathematics of complex numbers, of impressionist paintings, of jazz music, of Darwinian biology, of general relativity and of existential philosophy, of more advantageous currencies! How fruitful these directions have been for formal experience. And how fruitful will the future directions of these fields be if we finally give them the seriousness and credit they deserve!

The Heavens on Earth

It seems to be that, in a metaphorical sense, despite our hellish lives, when we find ourselves in the world, we find ourselves in Heaven. Our Hell is indeed dramaturgical, a play performed in the courtyard of Heaven. It is the performative villain of the story, a villain with a heavy heart. As we are drawn to perceptual darkness and heaviness as creatures of the conceptual, the villain is all we may see in the full story. However, make no mistake, the villain plays its part in the courtyard of the angels, of perfect trees, rocks, clouds, and stars, and when the villain finishes his part, we see what the walls of the courtyard are made of.

We are indeed creatures characterised by this heaviness and darkness. We enjoy our nature because the hardness of our attraction is as similar to objectivity and science as it is to suffering. Do we not pinch ourselves in a dream to see if it is real, thus furthering the notion that we test our reality by hurting ourselves, by suffering? Nevertheless, all suffering, and even in some contexts that which includes physical pain, comes from the unreality of concepts. If only we knew how much our modern suffering was a test proving our unreality, not our reality!

Concepts bring us conceptual Hell, a particular game we find ourselves so caught up with today. However, even the truth of the Heavens of the Real laugh at us and encourage us, for, in reality, we too are made of these Heavens.

This is the true nature of the world. This means that our intentions are never merely to seek out suffering because it is real, but because it is a game played in Heaven's courtyards. If the non-conceptual, the Real, or the world, is devoid of such a serious existence regardless of our perception, how could it be any other way?

The question is, then: if our living in the non-conceptual was equated with perfection, what use was language in petty and insignificant improvements over time? Adam and Eve, in the story, did choose to eat the fruit of knowledge, and this led to the fall of Man. But what is the use of this fall? Anthropologically, was it the ability to plan, to master, to forge and to conceive, with survival merely being a random outcome, something we now cling to as vital for our existence? Or did we instead want a story, a confrontation with nature to contend with, to best describe and enact? Was the fall our means to

become *better* than the world, or merely a devised experiment against the world, and so the world within ourselves? In either case, we may then proudly see ourselves as the highest actors, those that wish to playfully contradict the Heavens of the Real. But when all is said and done in the ordinary world, finally return to it. The seriousness of life is believed by those who perform the best, and so
all men and women of serious character inevitably prove themselves to be the best actors. Once we exit society and enter the world again as free beings, we will know this at our root.

Discovery of the world is met with the recognition of its timelessness, its boundlessness, its pricelessness, its effortlessness, its blissfulness, and the transcendence of its immanent purity, and no great literary work or human invention could ever compare or hold a candle to the moon, the stars, the trees, the grass, the rocks, the flowers, the fire, and the mud. So, when one looks into the heart of the world truly and rightly, one will see this book in all its sensibilities as appropriately useless and meaningless.

EPILOGUE

How I Wrote This Book

This book initially sparked as the faintest, smallest idea. It was in a fever of just discovering cannabis, and just discovering Buddhism. I knew, then, that there was an idea that I wished to explain to the world. The idea, however, was fetal, but like all ideas, nourishment and curiosity to open up to the light allows all seeds to grow, no matter how many years it takes. I had this slightest idea when I was seventeen.

After over six years, the book had reached its completion. Cultivating and growing ideas - especially under the strain of psychosis - has been my biggest struggle and biggest adventure. It was only before my twenty-third birthday that I had even started writing material that I considered "book-worthy" - and believe me, I was writing for this book for three years or more up until that. So then, it was two processes - the process of learning how to write, and the process of learning what to write.

What started as the smallest idea was given by the smallest notion of the middle path, or as my friend had said in a stoned fever, "The centre turning with us". However absurd and pointless the idea was, it triggered the motivation and caused the idea to rest in the back of my head. And rest it did - until it didn't, and other ideas started to flow. I was nineteen when I began my investigation in what I called the "cultural typification of a lemon" - which again, now seems like an absurd investigation leading nowhere final.

However, the spark grew and grew, and I was persistent. I discovered my inquiry which then grew into wanting to discover the power that language has in our perception of the world. As I had allowed myself to let the ideas rest when they wanted, and grow when they wanted, an entire book eventually came into the world. So, without further ado, these are some pointers and tips I advise when writing. I write these tips at all because I believe that we do not read like we used to. We are far more directed towards the social, the interactive, and the intellectually democratic. Nevertheless, a book is static and complete, so it shuts off the possibility for these principles to be fully realised.

So, this is my offering to make something static like a book follow these new principles. This book above all intends to be a discussion and a dialogue rather than a closed set of statements. These ideas are simply mine and they may not be useful to everyone, but my ideas hold the possibility to be useful to some. Since I may inspire new writers, I consider this to be a fruitful addition to the book.

How I Wrote This Book

Ideas are everything. It may take years before the slightest idea pops itself out to you - the tiniest idea, but an idea that finally shows itself as unique, fruitful, and perhaps even “book-worthy”. This one idea, if cultivated and nourished well with patience and consideration may be the idea that defines or develops into your entire book.

Immerse yourself in your passions as much as physically possible. Discover where you stand distinct from it - discover

your own voice. This refers to the writing style as well as the content.

Push the envelope in the place you are the most passionate about. Push the envelope!

Learn how to explain ideas. Understanding is when two people play the same language game, so complex ideas may require complex language games. Explanation of ideas, however, never needs to be excessive, so the explaining process will be a process of writing, trimming, growing ideas internally, and writing again.

Your writing should be truthful, neutral to that truth, and contain nothing but the truth. If you wish to lie, you must illustrate the lie in a true fashion. The truth applies to subjective truths too, and the best works of any kind will still show ideas free of clutter, excessive noise, or distraction.
If you wish to highlight a certain hypothesis, be it an objective truth or subjective hypothesis, the best thing you can do is to consider whether the opposite is true, and consider it with as much might, perhaps more might, than your initial hypothesis.

Writing should be seamless and clean. If something is offbeat, it should be there for a reason.

If you have the option to change anything, considering changing it! This is a useful consideration because we grow comfortable with what we are used to, including writing, and so have a bias against making changes. However, if such a change is significantly on the table, it usually means it will improve the work. This will mean you will end up with your twentieth, thirtieth, fortieth version of writing in due time, but this will

ultimately be worth the improvement of the book. This also means you will not have to think your way to attaining potentially great work immediately but through minor and incremental improvements.

Most people cannot write because they have not discovered a potentially original truth or idea. Find these original truths, for they are diamonds in the rough deserts of excess and fruitlessness.

Only write if you have something to say. If you write for the sake of writing, it isn't writing. Don’t pretend to write either, just as you mustn’t pretend to have conversations with peers - even if they intimidate you. One must be honest with what they know and don’t know - and even choose to show oneself as knowing less than they do, so one learns more. Pride has no place in the process of learning.

Never assume your intellect or hard work means that you are superior in a subject to someone else. The ideas someone else may have are never incomplete and may have just as much insight as or even more than yours.

The hard intellectual, creative and laborious work shouldn't be visible. The writing should be seamless and once the idea appears in the person's head. It should appear obvious. This is the nature of ideas, for once they are there, the meaning and significance of their existence is apparent. Getting there, on the other hand, is another story, but a story that in the activity of being read, should be hidden in the face of the work itself.

Once you have an idea, write it down. Writing is like gardening, and some ideas will blossom and seed other ideas, while some

ideas will frail and cease to lead anywhere special. You will not know which ideas will blossom and which will debilitate, so they must all be written down. Never turn down the opportunity to write. If it is your dream to write, it shouldn't matter how many months, years, or even decades it takes.

The book, like all art, is a contradiction, for it is an artefact, but its creation comes from growth. Grow the book like a tree, with the chapters as its branches and its sentences its leaves. Focus on the chapter that interests your mind most at that time, and then move to a different chapter at will, allowing the book to take its own course on what sort of tree it will eventually become. The growth of the roots too happens with the growth of the entire tree, so the foundations and purposes of the book may come at the same time as the conclusions and afterthoughts. Growth does not rush either, and you will find that not punishing yourself for writing slowly or being inefficient will lead to far faster, fruitful, and more efficient growths. Positive reinforcement is a better motivator than negative reinforcement.

I owe my progress in writing to the tolerance of the multiple great friends who never missed a paragraph I showed them, redacted or non-redacted. Having supportive and constructively critical friends will improve your writing tenfold. You may badger these supportive friends more than you feel that they can take, but I have found ceaseless badgering for approval has helped me a great deal with confidence and assurance that I am on the right track.

Things end when they need to end. There is no need to continue a paragraph because you feel it ought to be filled out.

Filling out is the opposite of good writing. It is pretending to write.

One should not take lightly the power and revolutionary potential of a sentence just because it is easy to think and say. The words in a sentence should be analogous to the moves and combinations of a Rubik's Cube. The Rubik's Cube has 43 quintillion configurations and 36 possible different turns. Yet, all Rubik's Cube configurations can be solved in 20 moves or less. Startling as this sounds, this is true. So then, if we think of the solved state as a solution to a problem, we can compare the moves from the configured state to the solved state to a sentence, turns to words, and number of moves to the number of words. Truth is, we have many more
words in our dictionary than 36, and perhaps an infinite amount of inferable problems, so this may give you an insight into how important or even revolutionary the single 20-word idea can be. While easy to think of, the process that came to creating such a sentence may have taken 20 years. This is especially so when the statement serves its purpose, addressing something well in a historical, social and political context, or when it shows a truth The combinations of word-forming sentences are enormous. While the final statement may be as little as 20 words, the means to get to such a sentence through hard work, discipline, dedication, or sacred inspiration may be nothing short of admirable, and if any of us are so lucky, ingenious.

There is no special place to write. Much of this book was written on a phone, on a bus, on a walk, during a conversation. Ideas often come when you least expect them, and it is your duty to write them down.

Congratulate yourself and celebrate your progress entirely throughout every minor stage of progress, and reward yourself accordingly. This will help you write more and further unlock the joys of writing. Rewarding yourself for even writing a single line will tell your physiology that it ought to write, while at the moment the motivation may be merely fuelled by guilt, shame, worry, and regret. The reward should not prioritise itself over the writing process of the book itself, however, for if it is your dream to write, it is your dream to write.

Writing is a process of trial and error. Most of your non-redacted writing will be bad. Eighty percent of my writing has been thrown away, and over ninety-five per cent of my thoughts were never good enough to even be considered to be formally written.

Create your own particular language for what you are talking about, with particular phrases, words, and concepts, and explain these words as you come to use them. Be specific in this language too, for this will enhance the seamlessness and clarity of the book. The reason for creating a new language or purpose for specific language comes from the fact that you intend to form ideas. This applies to fiction, philosophy, poetry, or any other creative literary endeavour. Rarely, the purposes of language have not even been modified a little in great literary works.

Hack your brain. So much potential of the brain gets missed, when it could all be channelled and focused into one great goal. However, this comes with a balance, so know that the work is to be enjoyed and to never underestimate the importance of leisure time. However, if it is your life purpose to write, then all mental modifications to write well will be met with gladness,

no matter how radical the modifications you make to yourself are. This may change everything about you, but if your dream is to write, all sacrificial changes will be necessary.

Pay attention to the subtext of both yours and others statements, especially in everyday conversation, for the truths behind words are entirely to do with context. Consciously inspecting subtext will not only make you more receptive and open to others' beliefs but also to how those beliefs come to the surface and are spoken of.

There is no bar for what you're capable of, no matter what part of the process you are in, as long as you dedicate yourself.

You are going to sacrifice a lot for a book, and it may take years to practise and perfect your writing style. You may dip in and out of writing as other events and eras in your life dominate, but if you have a firm grasp of a notion of a book that you need to write, then come back to it, work on it, and craft it meticulously. Moreover, never cease to find new ways of building and improving and redacting for as long as you write, for writing can always be improved.

Observe everything in the universe through a creative and productive lens and use it for both analysing and enhancing intuition. Then, all life experiences will play a lead role here. Personal experience is fundamental to what you write about. You are only able to write about what you know and what has to do with your life, and there is enough in your life to write about, so longing for some great experience you're missing out on is unnecessary. The profound is in every aspect of life for and always realised for those who seek it.

Attempt many different creative endeavours at once, if you have the time. This will enhance your ability to learn holistically about the patterns and truths of what works and what doesn't, and this will benefit both all the creative endeavours you do at once, as well as all general ways of living fully and greatly.

You're going to come across a lot of "knots" in your book, whether you are at the note stage, the first draft, or the second draft. It is extremely important to untie, untangle and pull these knots apart wherever they may lie, for it is the purpose of text to be written as clearly and properly as possible. Unless, of course, you have a specific intention to make your writing unclear and improper, in which case you will be putting in knots on purpose. However, I doubt this is the case for most of you, and it certainly isn't for me.

Use your intuition! Observe your instances in the world and use it for analysing and to enhance your intuition. Observe and deconstruct the feeling of making a breakthrough or when something feels good to write, and when it feels stagnant or wrong to write, then use other sources to determine whether your feelings are correct or incorrect. This will strengthen your intuition.

Whatever you practise you get better at, whether this is writing, scrolling, eating, breathing, speaking, worrying, regretting - everything. The first step to taking full advantage of this fact is to be involved with your life and to be decisive about what goes on in it - starting with managing carefully what content you consume and moving to practise doing all sorts of actions better. Use every aspect of your life and the content you consume to inspire and enhance your material to make it as deep, intricate and lifelike as it possibly can.

Anticipate the general socio-cultural future and its content as well as your private future and content, and use this to your advantage.

Be a free human being. If your dream is to write, and if no other future dreams sit on the horizon waiting to be reached, then nothing else matters. This is not to say that you *must* write, however. The miracle is that you don't need to do anything in life at all. You don't have to tidy your house; you will just end up with an untidy house if you don't. Think not "I must tidy the house and I am bad to do this", then, but think, "I would love to have a tidy house". This is not a way of tricking yourself, though. The inverse state of mind is the trick. This is the truth.

Conversely, you may have to sacrifice many of your ideals, comforts, and habits for this book. You will also have to become your writing process, for if you do otherwise and see the writing artefact as separate and distinct, no newer writing will flow from you. You are not taking part in the writing process, or even witnessing the writing process - you *are* the writing process.

Don't believe the surface level of all of your lingual and conceptual thoughts as significant, for while some thoughts have great truth, all thoughts are arrogant and present themselves as universal and unquestionable. Closely examine what assumptions thought itself comes from, and use that to improve the thought and the thoughts adjacent to it.

Find patterns in both the world and your interpretation of the world, for wherever you look, whatever you hear, there is something to write about.

Don't think in a pre-emptive or distinct fashion. Thinking is a process characterised by culture as an action of a person doing the thinking. Rather, the person is the thinking, or in another lens, the thinking is done on its own. So, there is no need to think as if it was its own separate or distinct activity. Most if not all ideas come into form on their own, with no distinct thinking process involved, or the writer follows his thinking process as an observer, not a commander. Deliberate thinking may indeed be the opposite of free creativity and inspiration.

If you are joyful, use it. If you are suffering, use it.

Think dimensionally. If every idea or property in a group has one common feature, what could a contextual opposite be perceived to be? This will help creative thinking.

Properly and openly consider every one of your propositions or statements opposite and as well as in terms of its truth, because if you do this it will stop a malformed idea in its tracks. This exercise will allow you to ask this; is your statement universally true, or does it reflect a notion you may have about the natures of things - a notion different to the statement you believe points to such a notion, but a truthful notion nonetheless?

You might have an ethos, a moral foundation, a reason to write. What is the reason or desired affect you wish to have on the reader and the world? This will not only provide depth to your book but will underpin and enforce the energy and effort you

spend into writing. It is not as clear as it could be; many writers know why they write - but they don't know that they know why they write. Find the ways to articulate your reasoning for creating work, even if you never include it in your actual writing.

Writing a book is like slowly waking up, and this procedure of waking up may take months or years. In the same way that one eats dinner every evening at six-o'clock or goes to school for many years before one becomes conscious of what one is doing, your ideas will be carried out performatively, dormant, unconscious, and not fully realised. You may be performing an idea you will only realise afterwards that you even had, and the process of "waking up" means to take the idea further and further to self-realisation, to full growth, consciousness, and clarity.

This is a very peculiar process. I was nearly finished with this book when I realised that the first universal function, "language as affirming", even existed at all. However, it was the implicit bedrock of all I had written already. I had known that the language affirms the object as existing the entire time, but I did not know I knew that fact, and so did not consider to speak of it in the way I now have. I subsequently moved "language as separating" to the second function, and put the rest of the universal functions in their proper numerical order. This demonstrates the most peculiar arena of consciousness, knowledge of knowledge, for we know so much, but we rarely grasp this knowledge in any form besides a form implicit and hidden within us. It is a minor occasion that we can finally find the voice to say it in all its necessity, rightness, and colour. This is one of the most essential parts to any creative journey, for it

may take a person a few seconds to speak a profound idea, but it may have taken them their entire life to come up with it.

And finally, never feel like it is imperative to write a book if you do not need to. We must embrace Nothing before any singular events or Things of the World, so to write at all is to write ironically. One must only write if one is bored with a blissful embrace of the world, and even then, after the writing is done, one should return to said world.

Thank you so much for taking the time to read my book. This book is not a mere artefact; it is the effect it has on those who read it and everything then after, so know our effect on the world as the beginning of all things and events from here on out.

For freedom, mastery, clarity, and general happiness,

James

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